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 ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis, an approach for securing health information transactions over the public 
Internet or private networks is investigated.  This is commonly proposed to assist in 
secure transactions. The approach is based on developing custom policies that will 
help health organizations in developing an effective strategy for exploiting the public 
and private internet-based networks to improve quality of care. At the same time this 
approach is designed to help preserve patient privacy, patient data confidentiality, and 
human safety. 
 
The requirements for designing the policies for the implementation of a complete 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system [9, 22, and 29] that would cover the health 
care sector of Cyprus are analysed, including potential risks. The first policy is the 
certificate policy (CP), which defines the set of rules for the operation and 
management practice of certification authorities (CAs) issuing qualified certificates. 
The second policy proposed is the certificate practice statement (CPS), which outlines 
the technical, procedural and personnel policies and practices of a particular CA. Both 
of them comply with the “Internet X.509 V3 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 
Policy and Certification Practices Framework” [5]. 
 
As a result of the adoption of the proposed policies the Hippocrates CA was 
implemented, the goal of which is the coverage of the Pancyprian health care sector. 
Hippocrates CA is still at an experimental stage however, and its first users will be the 
Bank of Cyprus Oncology Centre (BOCOC) and the Cyprus Association of Cancer 
Patients and Friends (PASYKAF). 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Today healthcare is among the most personal services rendered in our society [58], 
yet to deliver this care, a large number of personnel must have access to intimate 
patient information. Sharing this information improves the quality and efficiency not 
only of health care, research, and public health surveillance, but also in many cases, 
the patient’s general outcome. Patients must however, be willing to reveal personal 
information.  In return, the healthcare provider must guarantee that patient 
confidentiality is established and.  
 
Maintaining confidentiality is becoming very difficult. Information systems’ 
technology allows instant retrieval of medical information and a widening access to a 
greater number of people.  This however has its risks, as the confidentiality of patient 
information may be compromised.  There is a need to find a safe way of exchanging 
such confidential information without having unauthorized people viewing it. One of 
the most popular ways of accomplishing this is by implementing a public key 
infrastructure (PKI) [29].  
 
The aim and contribution of this thesis is the investigation, design, and preparation of 
the policies needed for implementing a PKI system in the healthcare sector [10, 13]. 
These policies were designed by the author of this dissertation based on the standards 
and legislations given by the European Community Directives [10, 16] and several 
Request For Comments (RFCs) (RFC2459/2527/2510) [1, 2, 5] also analysing any 
potential risks for the health care sector. In addition to providing the opportunity of 
achieving trust between users, implementing the PKI system enables the exchanging 
of records among health care professionals.  Communication security over public 
(Internet) and private networks can also be achieved.  Such an infrastructure does not 
currently exist in Cyprus, not only because of the unwillingness of health care 
officials to exchange patient information among themselves but, also due to the lack 
of confidence these professionals have in such a system. This thesis proposes the 
policies which should be followed for a PKI system to be used for Cyprus’s Health 
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Care system. This PKI is going to be designed in such a way that will make it easy to 
convince Health care professionals and other prospect users to trust the system since 
the transaction of patient information will be secure and the final outcome will most 
certainly be more beneficial to the patient. This is because of the fast, efficient and 
secure method of transmitting and exchanging patient information. 
 
The Cyprus health care sector, including organizations, hospitals, and private doctors, 
do not use any electronic message system to convey patient information between them 
today.  The use of email to exchange patient information, records, etc is a long way 
from being a common practice. Communication between different hospitals and 
doctors regarding the health of their patients is also far from becoming a common 
practice. 
 
This thesis will present the policies written as a result of the implementation of the 
PKI system, which are needed both for (a) establishment of trust among those in a 
health care PKI system and (b) for ensuring that all users participating in such a 
system, show full confidence in it.  All the people involved must adopt a new way of 
thinking for such a system to succeed.  For example, health care professionals must 
understand that exchanging patient information may result in better healthcare given 
to the patient.  Patients should also understand that the sharing of their information 
would not result in any harm to them.   
 
The thesis also analyzes the risks associated with the adoption of such a system in the 
health care sector and presents the methods proposed for implementing a PKI in a 
health care organization. It is also intended to be read by health care administrators 
who are concerned with the security of patient information transmitted and received 
online by their organizations.  It will provide all the policy guidelines and background 
information that is essential in any comprehensive PKI implementation, and finally, it 
will briefly describe the components of a functional PKI [37, 48] and the options 
available for obtaining or creating these components. 
1.1 Objectives of the thesis 
 
The undertaking and motivation of this thesis was (a) the need to achieve a safe and 
secure transmission of medical records among health care professionals and (b) the 
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need to guarantee communication security over public (Internet) and private networks, 
and thus maintain the patient confidence in the healthcare professional at the 
maximum. At the same time it aims to prevent or deter any access to unauthorized 
users, and discourage and detect any inappropriate use of health data. This security 
feature must be able to verify the identity of people and computers with authorized 
access on a timely basis in order to provide security management across the network 
and help improve authentication, data integrity [37], and privacy [9].    This thesis 
also intends on addressing both the organizational policy and technology needed to 
understand and manage security risks. 
1.2 The need of PKI in the health care sector  
  
Personal information contained in medical records is reviewed, not only by physicians 
and nurses, but also by professionals in many clinical and administrative support areas 
of health care organizations. 
 
Healthcare executives must follow the laws governing release of information. While 
the healthcare organization owns the health record, the information in that record 
remains the patient’s personal property. Releases cannot be made without proper 
authorization. Healthcare executives must determine whether patients, or their legal 
representatives, consented to the release of information.  No exceptions to patient 
confidentiality are allowed and the rights of individual patients must be protected. 
Therefore privacy, confidentiality, and data integrity must be assured during the 
transmission of clinical information, to qualified recipients.  
 
Although patient information, consultations, and medical prescriptions between 
doctors in remote locations, organizations or different hospitals could be done via the 
internet, unauthorized interception and tampering by intruders, exposes any exchange 
of information to potential risks.  As a result, hospitals or health care organizations are 
often exposed to financial and legal liability. The development of a private PKI 
system is expected to protect the health care organization from such liabilities. 
 
In general, health care organizations and health care professionals should be capable 
of knowing exactly who is accessing their data and who requests it.  PKI technology 
offers these capabilities through strong authentication [29]. 
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Health care technology is improving dramatically and costs a lot more, while at the 
same time most governments have to face increased spending for the treatment of an 
ageing population [58]. These challenges will be impossible to meet without the 
deployment [35] of a robust solution.  A potential solution to this problem lies in PKI 
technology [13, 35], which provides authentication, non-repudiation, data integrity, 
confidentiality, easy usage, and controlled accessibility to information. This is a 
solution proven for protecting electronic messages transmitted over unsecured paths. 
PKI should therefore be considered “a must” for the proper authentication of users in 
exchanging messages among the health care industry.   The importance of the PKI 
technology lies in its ability to manage secure, reliable and trustworthy key pairs. PKI 
satisfies all requirements for data confidentiality, user authentication, access control, 
data integrity, and support for non-repudiation [13].    
 
Health care is a major business sector.  PKI technology is posed to help hospitals deal 
with a double challenge: to improve the quality and accessibility of health care for all 
the citizens, whilst constraining overall costs [58]. 
PKI assists in making the above possible by providing a way of identifying and 
trusting another internet user1, through the use of digital identification called digital 
certificate [29, 50]. Through its trust framework, it enables security across networks, 
by employing synchronous methods of remote user identification and establishing 
correct methods which replace, and possibly improve the written signature [30].    
1.3 Overview 
 
This thesis concentrates on methods that are needed to protect the confidentiality and 
integrity of electronic information over unsecured networks, as detailed in Chapter 2.  
The analysis of the risks [27, 28] that need to be taken into account prior to the 
implementation and the design of any policies is presented in Chapter 3.  This thesis 
also addresses the complex legislations and standards that apply in the European 
Union. A section that contains these legislations and standards, as they apply to 
Cyprus’s environment is included in Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 discusses similar work 
done in other places of the world and explains the differences with the Hippocrates –
PKI System.  A review of the main policies that a CA requires in order to be 
operational, as well as significant differences from the proposed policies are provided 
                                                 
1 A user can be a person, a computer, or some other electronic entity. 
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in Chapter 6. The complete set of all the proposed policies is included in Appendix A. 
The above mentioned chapters cover the plans, procedures, and technical measures 
that make such a system unique in the Cypriot health care sector.    The Certificate 
Practice Statement (CPS) for the specific Certificate Authority (CA) running at the 
BOCOC is given as an example of the implementation of these policies in Chapter 7.  
Finally, Chapter 8 gives the conclusions and views for the particular technology trend.  
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Chapter 2 
 Introduction to PKI 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Nowadays the Internet is the preferable technology that companies and individuals 
use to complete thousands of online transactions [25, 58] or to exchange important 
information and data, i.e. patient data.  For example two doctors discussing patient 
information over the Internet. However, security suffers, since the Internet does not 
have the inherent security controls in place to secure all traffic passing through it 
against unauthorized access because it was not designed with security in mind. 
Therefore, individuals and organizations that want to take advantage of their benefits, 
must also consider the steps necessary to secure their private transactions over a 
public or semi-public medium of transmission [25]. 
 
While Intranets and Extranets are becoming more widely deployed, new security 
challenges have emerged concerning the protection of organizations and individuals 
from unexpected visitors and interceptions to their networks, and also to protect their 
sensitive information from being misused or even stolen.  Firewall systems, Intrusion 
detection systems and other access control technologies are today a must within an 
organization; however these technologies leave many security issues unstressed. The 
issues are authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation. 
 
Establishing trust between people and companies is today the main issue for an 
organization that uses the Internet to do business.  Organizations today are requested 
to do business with people they have never met before.  The success of such business 
affects the complete organization image and the organization reputation. Public key 
infrastructure can help organizations build trust into their network systems and has the 
potential to make Internet transactions as secure as face-to-face transactions. 
2.1 Internet Security Issues 
 
Normal operation of systems in many cases is affected by unexpected conditions, so 
called threats [41], which need to be addressed in a comprehensive security approach 
prior to the adoption of any appropriate solution. To achieve that, a spherical 
knowledge on the dangers that threaten the normal operation of the systems is needed. 
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To start with, all communications over the Internet use the Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). TCP/IP allows information to be sent from one 
computer to another through a variety of intermediate routers, computers and separate 
networks, before it reaches its destination.  Thus a third party may alter any 
information sent when it interferes with communications in the following ways:  
 
• Unauthorized disclosure: When patient information is transmitted between 
doctors’, “in the clear,” hackers can intercept the transmissions and obtain 
patients’ sensitive information. 
• Unauthorized action: A competitor or disgruntled customer can alter a Web 
site so that it refuses service to potential clients or cause malfunctions within 
the Web site.  For example a Web Site that is being used to offer information 
to a patient may be altered, resulting in all of its services being declined to its 
visitors. 
• Eavesdropping: The private content of a transaction, if unprotected, can be 
intercepted en route over the Internet. For example, someone could learn about 
a patient’s situation, record a sensitive conversation, or intercept classified 
information.  
• Data alteration: The content of a transaction cannot only be intercepted, but 
also altered en route, either maliciously or accidentally. User names, patient 
ID numbers, patient demographics, and patient treatments sent “in the clear” 
are all vulnerable to such alterations.  For example, someone could alter a 
pharmacy order or change a doctor’s prescription. 
 
Other security threats or attacks that may affect the normal operation of a system are: 
 
Spoofing: Is the kind of attack during which the perpetrator appears to be someone 
else either by using its IP or its address.  Spoofing relies on trust relationships 
between machines within the trusted network.  For example, in the health care sector a 
hacker can pretend to be the doctor that gives fake advices to patients.  Another 
example of spoofing appears to be the creation of illegitimate sites, i.e. health care 
sites, which appear to be published by established organizations or hospitals.  
Smurf Attack: In this attack, the attacker sends an IP ping (or "echo my message 
back to me") request to a receiving site.  The packet specifies that it be broadcasted to 
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a number of hosts within the receiving site's local network. The packet also indicates 
that the request is from another site, the target site that is to receive the denial of 
service.  The result will be lots of replies flooding back to the innocent, spoofed host.  
Denial of Service Attacks: Is the disruption of service and the loss of availability. On 
the Internet, a denial of service (DoS) attack is an incident during which a user or 
organization is deprived of the services of a resource they would normally expect to 
have. Such attacks are designed to bring down services and machines and do not 
usually result in the theft of information or other security loss. However, these attacks 
can cost the target person or company a great deal of time and money.  Health care 
services are critical for the patient health and patient confidentiality; as a result such 
disruptions may have impact not only to the normal operation of the health care sector 
but may also lead to the loss of patient trust. 
Viruses:   Nowadays, one of the biggest threat that computer users face, are viruses.  
A virus is a program that usually propagates to the computer via the Internet, email 
(as an attachment), downloads, or via contaminated files that are contained on 
infected floppy discs or CD’s.   As some of the viruses can enable the email sending 
procedure automatically it will be very degrading for the health care professional to 
appear to have sent an email to one of his/her patients propagating a virus or even 
sending meaningless emails.  Viruses can also cause data corruption as well as 
accessing passwords or other patient information. 
 
Syn Attack:  This attack is initiated during the initiation of Transport Control 
Program (TCP) between a client and a server in a network.  During this 
communication, an attacker can send a number of connection requests very rapidly 
and then fail to respond to the reply. This results in an unauthorized increase of traffic 
and a delayed response to different services. For example if the pharmacists tries to 
access a prescription, the increased amount of traffic will cause a delay in the viewing 
of the prescription. 
2.2 Definition of Public Key Infrastructure 
 
Public Key infrastructure (PKI) [29] is the technology that builds trust over unsecured 
public networks.  With PKI, users can securely and privately exchange data, i.e. a 
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health care provider sends personal health information (e.g. a hematology test result) 
to another health care provider securely, in the knowledge that only the intended 
recipient will be able to read the information, or can even proceed to an exchange of 
money in return for service provided. PKI enables these by providing a way of 
identifying and trusting another Internet user, through the use of digital identification 
called digital certificate [29, 50].  This digital certificate is like a driver’s license or a 
passport. It contains the Internet user’s name and some other credentials2. 
 
A digital certificate can also be used to verify a digital signature, which can be 
attached to e-mail messages or other types of electronic messages. This signature is 
created using Public Key Cryptography [22].  
2.2.1 Public Key Cryptography 
 
PKIs are built upon a security solution called Public Key Cryptography.  In Public 
Key Cryptography [22] with the aid of a mathematical algorithm and the use of the 
public and private keys, the information or the value is transformed in a form that is 
unreadable for all entities other than the sender or receiver, i.e. encrypted, and can 
only be converted back to its original format, i.e. decrypted, with the use of a 
complementary mathematical algorithm and an allied value.  In Public Key 
Cryptography [22] public and private keys perform a one-way transformation on the 
data. Each key is the inverse function of the other i.e. while one encrypts the other 
decrypts the message.  
 
With Public Key Cryptography, a doctor can send a private message to a colleague or 
to a patient by scrambling the message with the intended recipient’s Public Key [22, 
48].  A Public Key is made publicly available by its owner, while the Private Key is 
kept secret.  Recipients can then decode the message with the recipient’s Public Key. 
Private Keys are stored on a computer’s hard disk or on a special cryptographic 
device called token.  In the case that it is stored on a token it can only be used while 
the token is inserted in the computer.    
 
Public Keys [22, 48] are usually embedded within a digital certificate [50].  Digital 
certificates are easy to distribute, either via a web site (through the browser) or as an 
                                                 
2 Content of digital certificates depends on the organizational policies and private issues. 
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email attachment.  Embedding the Public key in the digital certificate gives an identity 
to the digital certificate, much like the giving of a driving license or a government ID 
to a person.  In other words, the identified entity is strongly associated with the 
assigned Public Key. 
2.2.2 Digital Signatures: 
 
Digital signatures [36] are one of the primary ways Public Key Cryptography [22] can 
be used to make Internet communications safer. It can be used to authenticate the 
identity of the sender of a message or the signer of a document, and possibly to ensure 
that the original content of the message or document that has been sent is unchanged. 
It is easily transportable, cannot be imitated by someone else, and can be 
automatically time-stamped.   
 
In the health care sector where many times doctors have been accused by patients of 
mistreatment or wrong prescriptions digital signatures can be used to provide the 
assurance that any message, for example a message that includes a medical 
prescription, has not been changed and that the sender is who he claims to be. This 
will therefore eliminate the chances that an “intruder” posing as the patient’s doctor 
will send a message to a patient concerning treatment or medication leading to 
mistreatment of the patient.  Digital Signatures can authenticate the identity of the 
health care professional and have the ability to ensure that the originally signed 
message sent by the health care professional cannot easily be repudiated at a later 
stage.  Digital signatures are part of the digital certificate that is issued by an authority, 
which belongs to the PKI system.  Figure 1 and figure 2 show the complete procedure 
for encrypting and decrypting a message using the digital signature.  
 
Figure 1: Creating a Digital Signature for a Message 
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Figure 2: Decrypting the Original Message 
2.3 Health Care PKI System Addressing Issues:  
 
PKI is a trust framework that enables security across networks.  It’s purpose is to 
provide synchronous methods of a remote user identification and to establish the 
correct methods, which imitate- and possibly improve- the written signature.  Such a 
framework can be extended to include every person, computer and electronic entity in 
an organization or company.  However, there are six major services that must be 
provided for a Health Care PKI system to be functional [36].  These are authentication, 
non-reputation, data integrity, confidential communication, ease of use, and access 
control.  These services make the PKI a candidate solution to provide the required 
level of security and protection.  
2.3.1 The Full Range of Services Are: 
 
• Authentication. A guarantee that a message contents really has come from the 
person who claims to have sent it. This avoids any disputes among the users 
i.e. doctors – patients, or doctors – doctors. 
• Non-repudiation. The certainty of knowing that the sender of the message 
cannot later deny having sent it. Digital signatures can be used to establish the 
non-reputation of transactions 
• Data Integrity. Proof that the message contents have not been altered 
deliberately or accidentally, during transmission and storage. There has always 
been a demand for integrity when two or more remote parties need to rely on a 
given quantity of information. Data integrity is assured using public key 
cryptography. It is important to achieve data integrity when it has to do with 
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patients’ treatments, pharmacy orders, or doctors’ prescriptions given to 
patients. 
• Confidential Communication. Only the intended recipient is able to read the 
file or message. 
• Ease of use: End users should be able to quickly and confidentially access 
private information resources via the Internet without worrying about the 
underlying technology.  Health care professionals but more specifically 
patients should be able to easily use any system that will be created for 
exchanging information.   
• Access Control: Access to sensitive information is controlled through the use 
of authenticated identities. For example in the health care sector doctors are 
expected to have access to more information compared to nurses. 
2.4 The Components of a PKI System 
 
To implement all the above-mentioned services there is a need for an infrastructure 
[37, 48]. A general PKI system is mainly consisted of a certificate authority that 
accepts user requests for a certificate and at the same time acts as the authority, which 
issues and manages security credentials and Public Keys [22, 48] for message 
encryption.  The PKI-Enabled applications can also be considered as part of a general 
PKI system. These PKI-Enabled applications are provided by the PKI system in order 
to supply the above-mentioned services. Another part of the general PKI system is the 
End-users, who vary in status, depending on the type of system application.  These are 
the characteristics of a general PKI system. The organization of the components of 
any specific PKI system may vary, again depending on the application of the system.  
For example, many PKI systems [43] separate the operations performed by the 
Certificate Authority (CA) and the Registration Authority (RA) to avoid the 
complexity of tasks, which are already performed by the CA. This is also necessary if 
the organization wants to separate the certificate request process from the certificate 
issuing process.  
 
The advantages of using RAs are: 
• Separation of the two authorities minimizes the risks and security constrains 
that would apply if the CA is also responsible for user registration as a web 
server.  
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• With RAs, organizations can set up local or stand-alone enrollment centers at 
distributed geographic locations. Employees of an international company can 
be enrolled into PKI via RA centers of the country they are living in and 
digital certificates will be issued to those employees from the company’s CA, 
which is located in the company’s country. 
• Requests for digital certificates are sent to the RA instead of the CA, relieving 
CA administrators of the task of vetting certificate requests. 
• Users accessing RA can also configure to access the Certification Revocation 
List (CRL) database.   
2.4.1 Certification Authority (CA) 
 
A certificate authority is a trusted authority in a network that issues and manages 
security credentials and Public Keys [22, 48] for message encryption [9].  As part of a 
PKI, a CA checks with a registration authority to verify information provided by the 
requestor of a digital certificate.  If the RA verifies the requestor’s information, the 
CA can then issue a digital certificate.  The CA is also responsible for the distributing 
and revoking of the certificate. 
 
Depending on the PKI implementation, the certificate includes the owner’s public key, 
the expiration date of the certificate, the owner’s name and other information about 
the public key owner [34]. 
 
A CA is like a licensing authority.  Digital certificates are only issued to users who 
can prove their identity and credentials to the CA. By using a process called vetting, 
the CA examines traditional forms of identification before issuing a certificate. 
 
CA’s also respond to queries about the validity of certificates they have issued.  A 
validity period of the certificate, specifying how long the CA expects the certificate’s 
contents to remain valid, is also included. A certificate may become unexpectedly 
invalid if information about the certificate subject changes. On the other hand, a 
certificate is valid, if it has not expired [34] and the information in the certificate is 
true. It may be important for a CA to be physically located in the same geographic 
area as the people it is issuing certificates to.  
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2.4.2 Registration Authorities (RA) 
 
A registration authority is an authority in a network that verifies user requests for 
digital certificates and tells the CA to issue them. RAs are also used to enroll new 
users into the PKI. The Certificate renewal request for certificates, which have 
expired or need updating, are also be done through the RA. Via the RA, users or 
prospect users have access to a variety of information that concerns the PKI 
application and the status of a certificate i.e. request or renewal certificate status. 
Another use of the RA is that it provides these users with the possibility of finding 
answers to any frequently asked questions.   The RA can also be used, as a means of 
requesting the destruction of a certificate, i.e. to destroy certificates that are no longer 
needed. It can be used for requesting the revocation of a certificate if suspicions exist 
that somebody else is using the certificate. Finally the RA can be used for key 
recovery if the key was lost due to hard disk failure. This can be done, by recovering 
the lost key from the authority’s database.   
2.4.3 PKI-Enabled Applications 
 
Without the ability to integrate the PKI with applications (making the applications 
PKI-enabled), the PKI has a limited value in business.  Fortunately, PKI systems can 
be supported through a variety of off-the shelf software programs, which allow the 
PKI solution to meet demands, as the application environment and requirements 
evolve over time. Such applications/programs are: 
• Web browsers 
• E-mail clients 
• Virtual Private Network (VPN) software and hardware [36] 
Today’s most widely used Web-browsers, Netscape Navigator and Microsoft 
Explorer, are already PKI-enabled, and can provide users with the ability to generate a 
key pair and download a digital certificate.  Popular e-mail programs such as 
Microsoft Outlook and Netscape Messenger are also PKI-enabled. Users instruct their 
email program to digitally sign a message simply by clicking a button. 
 
As was mentioned before, nowadays companies use extranets for their transactions. 
To extend the PKI beyond the firewall many companies PKI-enable their extranet or 
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create a virtual private network (VPN) [36].  Extranets and VPNs use digital 
certificates to authenticate users and provide access control. 
2.4.4 The End-users 
 
The end-users are typically the people that are using the system for example in 
healthcare the end-users are doctors, medical assistants, nurses etc.  End-users are the 
key element of the system since application, policies, and practices are built up for 
them.  The end-user using the PKI system can establish electronic transactions over a 
secure network.  Transactions could be in any form, such as email, e-banking [25], or 
e-shopping, that of course, depends on the structure of the application.  In general, the 
end-user may request certificates from a CA, receive the certificate from the CA, use 
the certified keys and certificates in PKI enabled application services, thus enabling 
support for strong authentication, encryption and non-repudiation and may search the 
certificate repository for certificates and status information. 
2.5 Central processes in a PKI 
 
The PKI’s applications main tasks are to accept new user registration, to verify and 
authenticate the users, to issue the certificate through the CA and finally to apply the 
service provided to the users, in the way that these are stated in the policies of the 
system. The first two processes are done most of the times via the RA.  In many cases, 
and depending on the domain of the system, these processes can vary in how their 
applicability is enforced and not in their general meaning.  For example in Health 
Care, which is the main concern of this thesis, to ensure the effectiveness of a PKI 
system these processes must be applied in a way that guarantees trust among the users 
and the safety of any transactions done.  
 
This is also true for E-commerce PKI systems where trust must be present in order for 
these to be used. However in E-commerce any mistake occurring can be redeemed, 
whereas for Health Care the damage caused may not easily be undone. 
2.5.1 Issuing certificates 
 
A certificate can be issued to end users and end entities in accordance with the CA 
policies, and not before the validation of the given information, since the CA will sign 
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this information with its public key.  By issuing an X.509 [29] certificate to the user 
or an entity, the CA also binds its private key.  A certificate is typically issued for a 
certain period of time, which depends on the CA policies (Chapter 6 & Appendix A) 
and the purpose of the certificate.  It is usual to provide certificates with different 
extensions that define the purpose of the certificate, such as authentication, 
confidentiality and non-repudiation.  For the Health care PKI system, the issuing of a 
certificate can only be done in accordance with the policies that the system follows. 
Certificates are issued only to those that are eligible for such a certificate. 
 
2.5.2 Revoking certificates 
 
This process normally takes place after the party owning the private key directs the 
CA to revoke the certificate.   Specific conditions for certificate revocation are 
specified in the Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) (Chapter 7).  Such conditions 
may be: 
 
• The loss or exposure of the private key of an end-user or end entity  
• The suspicion of exposure of the private key  
• The change of basic information of the certificate by a user or entity, leading 
to the requirement of a new certificate. 
 
Revoked certificates are placed on a list signed by the CA. This list is called a CRL 
[32, 33]. In accordance to the Certificate Policy (CP), the CRL will be available to all 
users.  
2.5.3 Authentication / Verification 
 
Authentication is the process of confirming an identity and creating trust in the digital 
world. Authentication involves the confident identification of one party by another 
party, prior to doing business or sharing sensitive information.  In the real world, 
human authentication relies on physical credentials such as a driving license, 
government ID, etc. to prove if someone is who she/he  says they are.  In the digital 
world, this should be imitated so that prior to any transactions, the correct 
authentication will take place.  In other words, authentication in the digital world is 
the service that assures one party that the credentials of the second party have been 
validated by a trusted third party.   
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Proper authentication allows the authentication of the two parties involved. Thus the 
end-entity verifies the client authentication and the client (end-user) verifies the server.   
This process basically implies a means of verification, since it ensures that the 
certificate information is still valid, as this can change over time.  In a PKI system, 
authentication and verification may be assumed as one procedure, during which one 
starts with the initialization of the other.  Authentication, however, is achieved only 
when both sides trust the public key corresponding to the private key used by the CA 
when it issued the certificates.  
 
For the health care authentication and verification is a crucial process because of the 
confidentiality of the information and in many cases the human lives.  Doctors should 
be able to identify that the person requesting information for a specific patient is a 
legitimate user of the system and has the right to know.  Also, in the case of a medical 
prescription, health care professional should be able to identify that the requestor is 
the real patient.  
 
2.5.4 Non-repudiation / Verification 
 
Non-repudiation is the method used to ensure that a transferred message has been sent 
by the sender site and has been received by the second party, who claims to be the 
receiver.  Non-repudiation guarantees the transaction with both sides (sender / 
receiver).  Both sides cannot deny having sent the message or having received the 
message.  Non-repudiation can be obtained through the use of certificates, which 
come about from the use of a digital signature. The digital signature is created, by 
encrypting given data with the private key specified for non-repudiation, and creating 
a hash or a message digest [6, 7, 8, 36].  The verifying party using the certified public 
key will decrypt the message to the expected values. This procedure, as with 
authentication, ensures non-repudiation at the time of action, since the receiving party 
should be able to check for certificate validity and revocation status. 
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2.6 PKI Process Flow: 
 
The following is the graphical representation of the PKI process flow 
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Figure 3: Graphical Representation of the PKI Flow 
                                                                    
• Step 1: The Subscriber applies to the Registration Authority for a Digital 
Certificate i.e. a private3 Health Care professional decides that she/he wants to 
electronically exchange patient information with other private Health care 
professionals or clinic. A contact with the Registration Authority as per the 
policies (proposed certificate policy), should be made. For example as per the 
policies the user can access the RA web server and apply for a certificate 
online.  When needed she/he must supply the RA with all information in order 
to proof hers/his identification. 
• Step 2: The RA and CA verify the identity of the Subscriber and issue a 
Digital Certificate. The RA verifies the identity of the applicant according to 
the policies (certificate policy). If the applicant is who she/he implies to be 
then the RA will send the application information to the CA. The CA issues 
the certificate according to the group the user belongs to, as these are defined 
in the certificate policy.  For example, to confirm that the certificate request 
originated from a Licensed healthcare persons, the RA must contact the 
Ministry of Health and the National Medical Committee to verify the 
proficiency license of the Subscriber.  The CA expects the user to accept the 
certificate. 
                                                 
3 Private means a  practitioner who has his own practice 
Certification 
Authority 
 
Repository 
 
Subscriber 
 
Relying Party 
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• Step 3: The CA publishes the Certificate to the Repository. The Repository 
can either be in the RA or in an independent Web Server. An obligation of the 
CA in accordance with the CA policy is to inform users of the certificate status. 
It is also obliged to state which users have certificates. The time limits that a 
CA applies to the updating of the repository are stated in the CP. This tends to 
be updated every 24 hours. 
• Step 4: The Subscriber digitally signs the electronic message with the Private 
Key to ensure Sender Authenticity, Message Integrity and Non-Repudiation 
and sends it to the Relying Party [46], i.e. if the above points are followed and 
the Health Care professional has his own certificate then a signed message 
may be sent by this Health care professional to another user.  
• Step 5: The Relying Party receives the message, verifies the Digital Signature 
with the Subscriber’s Public Key, and goes to the Repository to check the 
status and validity of the Subscriber’s Certificate. For example the receiver of 
a message (second health care professional) can open the message using the 
public key of the subscriber (if the subscriber is known and possesses a public 
key). To find out whom the subscriber is and if she/he  has a public key the 
receiver can go to the repository to check the status as stated before.  
• Step 6: The Repository returns the resulting status check on the Subscriber’s 
Certificate to the Relying Party. The repository is just a simple query on the 
web server which all users can access. This may be part of the RA, which is 
backed by a database that contains the status of the certificates.  
2.7 Considerations and approaches for the Design of a PKI System 
 
Nowadays, many approaches for the design of PKI systems have been introduced by 
vendors.  However, many vendors are only considering the financial benefit [27] that 
such solutions may provide their companies, and not the usability and the applicability 
of the system and the application in general.  They are promising the delivery of an 
unmatched level of security and reliability to Internet and telecommunications 
customers around the world, for secure online transactions with reliable authentication 
and encryption through their well-designed specialized applications.  Through 
strategic considerations they implement applications to cover the needs of big 
enterprises, small and medium businesses, a personal home or office.   Planning for 
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the maximum share market margin, they even proceeded with the division of the 
market into different sectors, i.e. hospital, bank, etc., and developed applications for 
those specific sectors.   
 
Despite all this, their applications suffer from interoperability [2], considering specific 
organizational or departmental needs that may apply. They are also costly, 
considering the amount of available freeware software, such as Open SSL. The lack of 
policy deployment in general is another disadvantage, since the local CA policy, such 
as certificate content rules and administration authorizations, is hard to be established. 
 
Other drawbacks that these ready made applications may have are: 
• The minimal control that can be applied from the organization using the PKI 
system for the certificate management functions, such as certificate issuance 
approval (based on RA approval), revocation approval, and general 
administration functions. 
• The failure to support the Certificate issuance, certificate life-cycle 
compliance and protocol support, cryptographic key management, secure 
records retention, data based mirroring for disaster recovery purposes, and 
other core functions. 
 
The second kind of PKI system is the Standalone PKI.  When implementing a 
Standalone PKI system, enterprises assume 100% of the risk by providing 100% of 
the security infrastructure, operational risk, service infrastructure, and a disaster 
recovery. In other words, with this system 100% of the responsibility is assumed, by 
the enterprise / health care organization, for all the surrounding technology, including 
systems, telecommunications and databases.  
2.8 Choosing the right solution 
 
Implementing the right PKI solution depends on many factors [31].  For example, the 
application domain of the system, i.e. E-health [13] or E-commerce, and the capital 
needed.  In this section, a basic description of the general challenges is presented.  
These should be noted prior to any decision taken for the implementation of a PKI 
solution, and a specific solution for the application domain should be selected.  
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2.8.1 Scalability 
 
By scalability it is meant that the PKI will address the following issues: 
 
• The PKI’s services should extend, not only throughout an organization, but 
also beyond it, in order to provide the appropriate level of security for all of 
the organization’s internal users, as well as for any external entities that the 
organization deals with. 
• The PKI should operate efficiently and effectively with all the organization’s 
users, i.e with all users of a Health Care PKI system. 
2.8.2 Usability 
 
A PKI must be easy to use. No one will use a PKI if the enrollment process is 
complicated or if it is difficult to use. It should be integrated seamlessly into an 
organization’s existing network system and software programs and should require 
little or no special training to use. 
 
A PKI must also be easy to manage. The administrative interface for the CA or RA 
should be an intuitive graphical user interface, which can be used to process high 
volumes of certificates and certificate requests. The interface should also be flexible 
and customizable. 
 
Implementing a PKI solution should be as easy as possible. The everyday use of the 
PKI should be intuitive and should not require special training. A system 
administrator should be able to easily install the PKI software and quickly configure 
an organization’s network systems to use a PKI. 
2.8.3 Service Provided and Technical Expertise 
 
Due to the high importance of the PKI system for the reliability of Internet and 
telecommunications’ applications, adequate service should be provided by the 
company that has installed the application.  Service should be guaranteed 24 hours a 
day, seven days a week.  Provisions for the minimal downtime should be taken by the 
organization that applies the PKI system.  Such provisions should be clearly stated in 
a service agreement contract.   Organizations that will implement stand alone 
applications should guarantee the training of its personnel and should also ensure that 
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the experts and those most knowledgeable, as far as the systems are concerned, do not 
leave the organization.  For that reason, the organization should sign a contract with 
the personnel.  In the contract, the specific job description, along with the employer 
benefits and any penalty clauses the employees might fall into, should be stated. 
2.8.4 Cost of such a System 
 
The cost of such an implementation is high due to the high expectations that are 
addressed, i.e. security, trust, authentication, etc.   This cost is also dependent on the 
domain of the application; for example, in the health care sector the implementation 
of such a system may be much more costly due to the extra security features that may 
be needed. 
2.9 The need and complexity of PKI for the Health Care Sector 
 
The decision for choosing the right PKI solution for the health care does not depend 
only on the amount of money that can be spent, but also the service provided, and the 
expertise that may be available within the area that the PKI solution was built on.   
 
The Health Care sector is considered among the most crucial sectors in the market. 
The right design for a Health Care PKI system is essential not only because many 
times it is related to human lives, but also because of the economic consequences a 
mistake may have.  For Health Care PKI systems some particularities should be taken 
into account. Some of these particularities are patient data, which must be kept 
confidential as well as doctors’ prescriptions to patients, which should not be altered. 
The fact that many times a patient’s health depends on a doctor’s advice or on a 
decision that was taken after the collaboration of two or more doctors is also a 
particularity that should be taken into account when designing a Health Care PKI 
system.  Another particularity that needs to be looked at is the guaranteeing of trust 
among the users.    
 
All these factors make the design of Health Care PKI applications demanding 
compared to other PKI applications, i.e. E-Commerce.  For example, for an E-
Commerce application [28] that lacks application design, if any mistake occurs the 
result will be some money loss either for the company or for the customer, which may 
be covered later by an insurance company. Conversely, for Health care PKI 
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applications this is not the case, and if any error occurs, it may result in a loss of a life 
that cannot be redeemed by any insurance company.  If for example a patient 
requiring a prescription for hypertension receives the wrong prescription this could 
lead to the patient suffering a stroke, as a consequence of which permanent neural 
damage or even death may occur.0 Such consequences would not be present in an 
incorrectly designed E-commerce PKI system and any damage caused is redeemable. 
How crucial the design of Health Care PKI systems and in general all E-Health 
applications is, compared to other industry sectors, becomes apparent when failures, 
not only in electronic transactions, occur. These might be power failure, fire or 
flooding, failure of the hardware, failure of the software, failure of the web site. The 
outcome of such failures would be the distrust of the system, user unfriendliness, 
delay in performing a service e.g. doctors trying to give timely (could be life 
threatening) advice or a treatment prescription to a patient.  
 
Prior to the implementation of Health Care PKI systems, policies that govern user 
access privileges, administrative duties, system maintenance should be well defined 
within a framework of legal and social responsibilities, which must be addressed 
through the Certificate Policy (CP) and the Certificate Practice Statement (CPS).    
These policies determine the operational and technical practices of a PKI and provide 
clear guidelines for operating the PKI. They also provide guidance for all aspects of 
implementation i.e. obligations of the authorities, obligations of the users, the role of 
the different members of the system, the agreements, the restrictions that users may 
have, the financial responsibilities, the secure access to electronic records as well as 
the training and monitoring of employees to ensure that they follow the established 
security protocols.   
 
Consequently, all these give an extra complexity to the system which makes its 
implementation hard and at the same time it explains why it is not yet a popular 
solution for the secure transaction of electronic messaging among the health care 
community. 
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2.10 PKI Security Policies 
 
As was stated above, certain policies and standards, which determine the operational 
and technical practices of a PKI in the community, should be addressed prior to any 
implementation; these are the Certificate Policy and the Certificate Practice Statement  
 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), in one of its informational publication 
(RFC 2527) [5], clarifies clearly the relation between Certificate Policy, Certification 
Practice Statements, and interoperability.  Through a well-defined Certificate Policy 
and by employing a product that can support it, interoperation between PKI domains 
may be possible without causing serious downtime or interrupting workflow.   
According to IETF a CP states what assurance can be placed in a certificate. A CPS 
states how a CA establishes that assurance. A certificate policy may apply to a 
broader scope and not just a single organization; a CPS applies only to a single CA. A 
CP for the health care community should be developed to cover only the users and the 
aspects of the health care sector.  In accordance the CPS of a specific health care 
organization that implements a PKI system, should be developed to specify any 
diversions of that PKI System from the given CP, and to clarify any standards the 
specific health care organization- PKI System should follow, e.g. the procedure used 
by the CA to revoke certificates. 
 
Certification Policy (CP):  According to The Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), a certificate policy is ‘a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a 
certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security 
requirements. A certificate policy may be used by a certificate user to help in deciding 
whether a certificate and the binding therein, are sufficiently trustworthy for a 
particular application.  A CP explains the conditions and limitations of use for a 
digital certificate. The IETF states also that the more detailed description of the 
practices followed by the Certification Authority (CA) in issuing and otherwise 
managing certificates, may be contained in a certification practice statement (CPS) 
published by or referenced by the CA. It can be embedded in or referenced in a digital 
certificate. 
 
Basically, certificate policies best serve as the medium via which the most common 
standards, industrial, governmental, and organizational assurance criteria apply.  In 
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other words, within the CP, all globally acceptable criteria are available.  It defines the 
policies for standards and interfaces that the PKI system is using. A  CP statement is 
provided to users via an online documentation or in a writing format. A CP is not an 
isolated or steady document, but is a document, that over time, tends to evolve and 
encompass more security issues and other risks that may arise in the future. 
 
Certification Practice Statement (CPS): One of the issues in implementing a PKI 
for a specific CA is to create unique policies, for that CA, and to document that these 
can only apply for this implementation and for the people that will be the users of the 
specific implementation. This is called a Certification Practice Statement. 
The CPS for an organization may also be referred to as an Organization Policy Model. 
For the creation of an Organization Policy Model the involvement of administrative 
people, the heads of the organization, who will be the leaders of the CA and the 
application, computer administrators and in some cases attorneys, is required.  All 
decisions should then be approved by the organization’s legal department.  Indeed, 
this process is expensive and time-consuming but is needed not only to protect the CA, 
but also the users of the CA. 
 
A CPS is a legal document, created and published by a CA. The CPS explains the 
CA’s certificate issuance and revocation policies. The CPS must clearly state all the 
legal responsibility of all the prospective users of that CA and all variations of the 
policy, depending on security and policy requirements of particular situations. It 
defines the level of trust that the user is showing to the CA and may be associated 
with the PKI.   
 
CPS as a policy document states the multiple groups of CA users along with the level 
of the privilege given within the CA.  This will permit applications to make 
programmatic decisions about appropriate use of the certificate. For example, a PKI 
enabled application can look at an external researcher’s certificate, and see that there 
is an approved non-disclosure agreement on file, and that the holder is a licensed 
physician. The application can then grant access to clinical research information that 
would otherwise be confidential.  
 
A CPS finally governs how the PKI participants create, administer, use, and access 
keys and certificates.  The CPS may also cover items like the enrollment process for 
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users and administrators, the CA’s overall operating policy, procedures, and security 
controls; for example, in protecting their private key.  All prospective users must 
accept all the CPS policies in order to be allowed to use the certificates issued by the 
CA. 
2.11 Summary and Conclusions: 
 
In today’s computing environment, where the power of the Internet has opened the 
doors to a whole new realm of e-health, the need for a “solution” for an open and 
interoperable distributed network security is a must.  Over the years a number of 
solutions have been considered as ideal, but none appear as ready to address the needs 
of security as Public Key Infrastructure today [45].  
 
PKI today can be implemented to provide services in areas where electronic privacy is 
sought after with the use of encryption. Such areas may be the transfer of sensitive 
patient files over a network, the payment of services that were provided by a health 
care professional, the encryption of E-mails and the sending of messages across the 
internet. Implementation of a PKI solution is offered today by many vendors.  
However, many vendors are only considering the financial benefit that such solutions 
may provide their companies, and not the usability and the applicability of the system 
and the application in general [27].   
 
Implementing the right PKI solution depends on many factors.  For example, the 
application domain of the system, i.e. E-health or E-commerce or the capital needed. 
The Health Care sector is considered among the most crucial sectors in the market 
compared to other PKI applications, i.e. E-Commerce [28].  Patient information 
criticality and the provision of trust among the users are considered as some of the 
particularities that should be addressed prior to the implementation of Health Care 
PKI systems.  For that reason, policies that govern user access privileges, 
administrative duties, and system maintenance should be well defined within a 
framework of legal and social responsibilities addressed, known as the CP. 
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Chapter 3 
Risk Analysis in Health Care PKI Implementation 
3.0 Introduction  
 
PKI is considered by many as a standard set of flexible services. Certificates provide 
an attractive business model.  Once the system is implemented, they cost almost 
nothing to make, and if all computer or internet users are convinced to purchase and 
use a certificate, this will assure the company issuing the certificates, a good income.  
The same of course applies, if somebody is convinced to purchase a private CA, and 
pay a fee for every certificate issued.   However, the extra complexity of the system as 
was stated earlier, is considered the main reason for the unpopularity of such a system 
in the health care sector.  Conversely, the complexity of the system is not the only 
reason responsible for this sentiment; this part of the thesis will focus on other issues 
that have caused the PKI system to have often come under strong attack and criticism.  
When such criticisms take place in the health care sector their only result is to 
discourage organizations from implementing such a system and users from using it. 
Such, criticisms revolve around trust, key distribution and ownership, key 
management and storage, as well as pretty basic, unanswered questions such as, what 
good are certificates anyway? Are they secure? What are they used for? [27, 31] 
3.1 Risk #1: “What is trust, and who is consider as a trusted person?” 
 
In cryptographic literature trust is defined as "that which you cannot confirm but must 
assume”.  However, when a CA is defined as trusted, it basically means that it handles 
its own private keys well, but this does not imply that it is necessary to trust a 
certificate from that CA for any particular purpose, i.e. exchange patient information 
or even proceed with payments for the service provided by the health care 
professional.  But, who gave the authorization for the CA to be called “trusted”? 
 
A CA can do a superb job, in writing a detailed Certificate Policy and a Certificate 
Practice Statement, as well as in applying these policies. This, however, does not 
mean that it can be trusted to be used for any specific application. The reason for this 
is that CAs many times does not query the users’ authority for the usage of the 
particular certificate or the correct usage of it.  In spite of this, they issue certificates 
no matter the risk, because of the financial benefit to their companies.  To avoid these 
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issues, Health care PKI systems should operate at any given time with professionalism 
and should follow high standards when its time to authenticate users and issue 
certificates. In accordance should follow a specific way, known to the users, to query 
the actions of the users among the community. 
3.2 Risk #2: “Who is using my key?” 
 
Management of a personal private key is considered as one of the biggest risks that 
PKI users face [27].  Certainly storage of their private key in a desktop computer at 
home or at work is subject to dangers, such as viruses, malicious program attacks, 
theft attacks, network users’ attacks, or even by people who try to guess the key.  The 
same risks are posed to the private key, even if the owner of the key owns a secure 
computing system, with physical access controls, shielding, network security, and 
other protections such as video monitoring of the computer room.  Security 
weaknesses also show up with the use of Smart cards, which some CAs brought into 
their security policies, as a method of securing the private keys of their users. Even 
with smart cards, however, critics question whether the card is resistant to any kind of 
attack and whether it can be easily stolen.  
 
In countries where E-commerce is becoming a part of every day life, the CAs 
propagate terms such as “non – repudiation” and “trusted”, in their advertising 
campaign.   They try to promote similarities between the illegal use of private signing 
keys and credit card fraud.  For example, under mail-order or telephone order rules, if 
an item on the credit card bill has been found and has not be bought, the card owner 
has the right to repudiate it by saying that he didn’t buy that item.  The merchant will 
then be required to prove that the item was bought.   In spite of all the above, this is 
not always the case for private keys, and the users are exclusively responsible for 
whatever their private key is used to do, if this has been certified by an approved CA.   
 
To avoid all the above-mentioned for the Health Care PKI system, the CA, in 
accordance with its policy, must establish a technique to inform its users of the correct 
use of their private key and its security.  The CA must also specify the legal aspects to 
the legitimate users in case of any private key misuse, in accordance always with the 
locally applied Laws. For example a suggested technique is to publish and distribute a 
bulletin of how to use their Private Keys. 
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3.3 Risk #3: “How secure is the verifying computer?” 
 
Another big issue the PKI system has to face is the security of the verifying computer 
i.e. the one that uses the certificate. Indeed, an attacker can manipulate a certificate by 
adding his own pubic key to the list of the “root” public keys that a Certificate 
verification system uses, and issue his own certificates, which will be treated exactly 
like the legitimate certificates. As a result, such a certificate is self-signed and offers 
no increased security. For a Health Care PKI system, the only answer to this is to 
build a PKI system that uses a secure verification system.  Such security can only be 
provided if the verification of certificates can be done on a system that is invulnerable 
to penetration by hostile codes or to physical tampering. 
3.4 Risk #4: “Identification of the user.” 
 
Certificates generally associate a public key with a name, but unfortunately these 
create more problems to the system.  For example, a CA may have members with 
identical last names.  Imagine that a user receives an email from a colleague called 
Andreas Andreou.  The user may only know one person with this name and last name, 
but the CA may have several members with this identification.  The user at his own 
risk may open that email and may see that it is an email from his friend, but the 
opposite scenario is also possible. In such a case the sender of the email can cause 
serious harm to that user. Prior to the design of the Health Care PKI system the 
implementation team must think carefully about this issue.  They must build a system 
in such a way, so as to prevent users from blindly accepting a certificate.  That system 
should be able to find out if the particular user certificate received belongs to a 
colleague?  Certificate information could be extended so that is contains information 
which is unique for each user, in order to avoid such occurances . 
 
A possible solution to this classical PKI problem for a Health Care PKI system could 
be a directory that keeps track of all the individuals.  In that directory a user can pull 
down all the information needed on whoever he requires to send things to.   However, 
there is a downside to this approach. Whoever is running the Directory needs to be up 
to date and has to be very careful that what they publish is absolutely right, but at the 
same time ensure that they do not publish to the outside world more than they want to 
declare about the organization.  
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3.5 Risk #5: “Is the CA an authority?” 
 
In a PKI system the CA is the legitimate authority that issues certificates.  However, 
for the CA to have such permission, it must be officially registered to any 
organization that is legitimate for inspection and is able to ensure compliance of the 
CA with the country’s laws at any given time.  Only then, the CA can be granted a 
business license and be able to certify the contents of its certificates and its actions.   
However, most of the listed CAs are not registered, and since this is the case, the 
question “what harm is done if an uncertified server were allowed to use encryption?” 
is often asked. This issue needs to be addressed with care, especially when on many 
occasions attackers of the PKI system take advantage of and criticize the application 
and the system.  Prior to the initiation of the operation of a Health Care PKI system, 
external auditors, who are experts in the field, should audit the system along with the 
policies and procedures. An official government accreditation needs to be given to 
such a system to verify that it is eligible to operate and act as a Health Care PKI 
system. As this PKI system is not officially up and running the above has not yet been 
done. However, contacts have been made and the CP was sent to the European 
Standards Organization as well as the Information Communication Technology 
Standards Board for comments. 
3.6 Risk #6: “Is the user part of the security design?” 
 
At every stage of the implementation design the user should be taken account of.  The 
design team should consider that the users, i.e. elderly patients, many times are not 
computer literate and should provide different types of assistance so that they can 
make the use of the system easier and user-friendly. Users cannot, and should not be 
expected to know, how to operate the system and the risks in doing so. The system 
should provide an adequate source of information either on line or during the 
acceptance of the users’ registrations.  
3.7 Risk #7: “Was it one CA or a CA plus a Registration Authority?” 
 
In some PKI system implementations, more specific to the stand-alone 
implementations, there are two parts of a certification structure:  the Registration 
Authority (RA) part, which is in secure communication with the Certification 
authority (CA) part.  For such systems the security holes are greater and are 
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considered less secure than systems that run only one of the authorities and have the 
other run independently by an outside source. 
 
If this is the case, the users should be informed prior to their registrations.  Users must 
know what the available security features are for such a system so that the system 
could prevent any key misuse or any other type of harm.  The CA should sign a 
contract with the users, which states all these features and clarifies to the users their 
responsibilities.   
 
For Health Care implementation models, the CA should work independently and must 
be isolated from the entire network. It should be protected in a secure and monitored 
environment.  If this is the case, it is recommended that this be stated and identified in 
the CP of the CA, which the users should be able to read, prior to their registration. 
3.8 Risk #8: “How did the CA identify the certificate holder?” 
 
Subsequent to the user registration, the CA should establish mechanism for the 
accurate and correct identification of the users and their information.  All mechanisms 
should be mentioned in the CP and should be able to act fast for the best service of the 
user.  In some PKI systems, however, this is not the case.  CA authorities looking 
forward to the financial benefit of their system could register any kind of user without 
even a certain type of identification or verification of the identification.    Use of the 
Health care PKI system should be allowed only to groups and users as specified by 
the CP. 
3.9 Risk #9: “How secure are the certificate practices?” 
 
Health care PKI prospect and former users should understand that Certificates do not 
secure their systems; they are just an approach followed in order to achieve a secure 
transaction over a network, i.e. Internet.  Certificate holders must use their certificates 
properly if they want to assure security over their transactions, i.e. pharmacy orders.  
Prospect users should check the PKI practice policies and standards and confirm their 
suitability with its expectations.  They should also check if the Certificate Revocation 
Lists (CRLs) are built into some certificate standards and how the revocation is 
handled. They should check the length of the generated public keys and be able to 
find answers as to why that length has been chosen.  For example they should check if 
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the vendor supports 512-bit RSA [9] keys just because they’re fast or 2048-bit keys 
because someone over there in the corner said he thought it was secure? Moreover, 
they should confirm, if for the proper use of these certificates any user action is 
required.  In that case, policies should state the duration of the training needed for the 
users to be able to perform these actions. Finally policies should also indicate the key 
lifetime and the probabilities of key loss.  
 
Unfortunately, not all the available PKI applications for the health care sector 
implement their practices and policies according to their needs and expectations.   As 
a result, such systems do not provide solid security for their applications and do not 
consider the needs of their users. The system lacks interoperability and is inconsistent 
with its primary role.  For example, many times such systems do not always specify 
the key lifetime, which depends on the application of the key, and key loss may not 
even be considered.  However, a key has a cryptographic lifetime. It also has a theft 
lifetime, i.e. the time the key will be valid after it has been reported stolen, which is 
dependent on the vulnerability of the subsystem storing it, the rate of physical and 
network exposure, the attractiveness of the key to an attacker, etc. From these, one 
can compute the probability of loss of the key as a function of time and usage.   
3.10 Risk #10: “Assurance of Identity” 
 
Due to the high availability of CAs and the fact that all available CAs today follow 
certain procedures that differ and have different policies for issuing a certificate to a 
holder, the problem of assurance of the identity of the holder is higher.  Today, not all 
certificates are issued equally. Some certificates are issued based on a valid e-mail 
address.  Other certificates require presentation of photo ID and must be vouched for 
by a trusted party.  Accordingly, the amount of trust that an application or even the 
user can show in each of these certificates varies and depends on the policies of the 
issuer.  Of course the vulnerabilities of such certificate authorities are not in the 
certificate that they issue, but in the methods that they used for identifying the 
applicant.  For example, via this method one can acquire a digital certificate 
fraudulently, by posing as another person if sufficient details of the other person are 
known.  
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These methods of impersonation should not be acceptable among the Health Care PKI 
system implementations. The system should apply different methods to identify the 
user. All these methods that are based on the Assurance of Identity should be clearly 
stated in the policies and procedures of such a system.  
3.11 Risk #11: Definition of Certificate Policy and Certification Practice 
Statement 
 
Among the PKI community there seems to be a kind of confusion as to what exactly 
these two policy statements are and what their exact definitions are.  The unclear 
definition of CP and CPS can cause serious system downtime or an interruption of the 
workflow. For a Health Care PKI system both the CP and CPS should be clearly 
declared as legal statements whose primary function is the limitation of liability and 
the declaration of organizational policy about how the PKI will be implemented and 
used.  
3.12 Risk #12: Profile Proliferation 
 
Today, the X.509 (Appendix B) is generally accepted as the standard for digital 
certificates.  X509 is currently implemented in three different versions with the latest 
being the X.509 V3 [2, 29].  X.509 V3 is comparable to Versions 1 and 2 in providing 
the basic functionality, but Version 3 also provides extra extensibility.  X.509 V3 is 
consisted of several types of extensions, including those for keys, for policy use, for 
subject and issuer, and for constraints and limitations.  Any of the extensions can be 
marked critical or non-critical. If it is marked critical, the extension is required and the 
application accessing it must be able to parse that extension, or the certificate will be 
non-usable. If an extension is marked non-critical, it may be ignored if the application 
does not support it. 
 
The set of extensions and how they are implemented must be decided during the 
Health Care PKI system design. This is definitely a vital design decision for the 
complete implementation, since the more options used, the more likely there will be 
interoperability problems. 
 
Understanding what the options are, how they work together, and how they are 
implemented in products and other PKI’s is a time consuming task. Many extensions 
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permit multiple options. For example, the name fields may use an email address, an 
X.400 address, a URL, an IP address, or an X.500 directory address [36], in almost 
any combination. In addition to the standard extensions, X.509 permits adding 
customized extensions.  Set of all available options used should be clearly stated in 
the CP. 
3.13 Conclusions 
 
There is no doubting that if such a system is developed for the health care sector the 
security of personal data during and after any transaction process is a must.  
Unfortunately many systems, which do not take into consideration the threats and the 
risks to a PKI system, can give short-lived promises that are far from reality. Prospect 
and former users of any Health Care PKI system with skepticism and knowledge 
should make the necessary inspections and verifications prior to deciding which 
system they will use. 
 
During this section of the thesis considerations and risks, which need to be taken into 
account prior to the proposal of any policies for a Health Care PKI system as well as 
prior to the implementation of such a system, were analyzed.   
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Chapter 4 
European and Cypriot Legislation 
 
Due to the fact that the protection of patient records has become increasingly complex 
and more critical, when implementing a Health Care PKI system it is important that as 
many issues as possible are agreed on. This will result in the common benefit of both 
the patients and the organizations. To achieve a good degree of agreement certain 
legislation and standards should be followed. 
 
Although this is not a law thesis, the sections that follow where included because they 
were taken into account during the proposal of the Certificate policy and Certificate 
Practice Statement, which apply for the Hippocrates CA. These sections provide the 
reader with an overview of the initiatives and guidelines that are applicable to the 
health care sector and may have significant impact on how electronic transactions will 
be made in Cyprus.  
4.0 Overview 
 
For a system to be well documented and become widely accepted a specific 
legislation and standards should be followed. The PKI framework [44] requires a 
combination of legislation and technical standards to succeed. A major achievement 
was the introduction of papers, called Directives [10, 16]. The European Commission 
submitted these Directives, which constitute the most common form of European 
legislation. All Member States are obliged to enforce these directives into their own 
legislative framework.   
4.1 European Electronic Signature Standardization Initiative (EESSI) and 
Guidelines 
 
The EU Electronic Signature Directive [10] has established the legal framework for 
the recognition of electronic signatures. The industry, with the assistance of European 
Standard Bodies, is in the process of providing an agreed framework for an open, 
market-oriented implementation of the Directive. In January 1999, therefore, a new 
initiative was launched – the European Electronic Signature Standardization Initiative 
(EESSI) [17], to execute this task. Its task is to identify the standardization activities 
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necessary to enable electronic signatures and to monitor the implementation of a work 
program to meet this need.  
 
EESSI's first recommendations, made in July 1999, contained an overview of the 
requirements for standards related activities and drew up a detailed work program to 
meet these needs. Three key areas were identified: 
 
• Quality and functional standards for Certification Service Providers (CSPs) 
• Quality and functional standards for Signature Creation and Verification   
• Products 
• Interoperable standardization requirements for Electronic Signatures. 
  
The priorities of EESSI are: 
 
• Security requirements for signature products 
• Certification/registration of conformance products and services for electronic   
signatures 
• Security Management and Certificate Policy for CSPs issuing qualified 
certificates 
• Signature creation and verification 
• Electronic signature syntax and encoding formats and technical aspects of 
signature polices 
• A standard for the use of X.509 public key certificates as qualified certificates 
• Protocol to interoperate with a Time-stamping Authority 
 
Many drafts and standards were created to support the European Electronic Signature 
Standardization Initiative (EESSI). Such as “ETSI TS 101 456 v1.2.2: Policy 
requirements for certification authorities, issuing qualified certificates” [19], “ETSI 
TS 101 862 v1.2.1: Qualified certificate profile”[18], “CEN/ISSS WS/E-Sign N 141: 
Draft CWA: Security Requirements for Signature Creation Systems” and many others.  
4.2 EU E-Signatures Directive  
 
The EU Directive [10] “on a Community framework for Electronic Signatures” 
1999/93/EC, dated 13 December 1999 (“Electronic Signatures Directive”), lays out 
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the general framework for the use of electronic signatures, for reliable and legally 
valid communications via electronic means. 
 
The scope of this directive is to facilitate the use of electronic signatures and to 
contribute to their legal recognition. It establishes a legal framework for electronic 
signatures and certain certification-services in order to ensure the proper functioning 
of e-services. 
 
The directive defines that electronic signatures cannot be denied as legal effects just 
because they are in electronic format, as they have the legal equality with hand-
written signatures [48]. The directive, also allows Certification Service Providers to 
provide their services without prior authorization by national bodies and outside the 
internal market. Member Countries may themselves decide how to ensure the 
supervision of compliance with the provisions of the directive. 
 
The directive also states the requirements for the constitution of a qualified certificate, 
the requirements for certification service providers issuing qualified certificates and 
the requirements for secure signature-creation devices.  
 
Member Countries including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden and the UK have already rearranged the 
Electronic Signatures Directive. They implemented the appropriate legislation based 
on the directive for recognizing the legal validity of electronic signatures and the 
liability of certification service providers. Most of the times, the law complies with 
Annex I, II and III [10] of the E-Signature Directive. Also, all of the countries allow 
an organization to provide certification services with no prior authorization or license. 
In some cases a country requires an organization to provide certain information (i.e. 
name, address, email, legal form services) to an appropriate Telecommunication or 
other authority, before offering any services.  For example, under the French law, a 
certification service provider must be a provider of cryptography services. Other, non-
EU member states have also adopted the directives and have built up their own 
legislative framework for e-commerce activities. For example, the Utah Digital 
Signature Act [45] and the American Bar Association Digital Signature Guidelines 
developed their own legislative initiatives to address secure electronic commerce, 
with efforts by other states and the federal government, trailing close behind. 
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4.3 EU Directive on Data Protection  
 
These Directives [11, 12] set out the legal framework for protecting the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of ordinary people, and in particular their right to privacy with 
respect to the processing of personal data. The Directives applies to the processing of 
personal data, wholly or partly by automatic means, as well as to non-automated 
processing of personal data, which are included or will be included in a record. It does 
not cover the processing of personal data, which is carried out by a person for the 
exercise of exclusively personal or domestic activities. 
 
The Directives define what kinds of processing of personal data are allowed, along 
with the general principle that the collection and processing of sensitive data is 
prohibited; at the same time, the Law enumerates a long list of exceptions to this rule. 
 
Member Countries providing this personal data must ensure that this data is: 
• Processed fairly and lawfully; 
• Collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of 
data for historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as 
incompatible provided that Member Countries provide appropriate safeguards; 
• Adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they 
are collected and/or further processed; 
• Accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be 
taken to ensure that data, which is inaccurate or incomplete, as regards the 
purpose for which they were collected or for which they are further processed, 
is erased or rectified; 
• Kept in a form, which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than 
is necessary. The length of this time period is decided taking into account the 
purposes for which the data was collected and any further processing this data 
might require. Member States should lay down appropriate safeguards for 
personal data stored for longer periods due to historical, statistical or scientific 
use.  
 
Member Countries must bring into force laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary to comply with these Directives, at the latest, at the end of a 
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three year period, starting from the date of its adoption. When Member States adopt 
these measures, they must contain a reference to these Directives or be accompanied 
by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication.  
The methods of making such a reference shall be laid down by the Member Countries.  
4.4 Cyprus Legal Framework 
 
In Cyprus the enforcement of the above mentioned regulations became necessary, for 
the harmonization with the communal possession, and also for compliance with the 
European Convention of the European Council that makes provision for the protection 
of the individual from the processing of information concerning his/her person. 
4.4.1 Protection of Personal Information 
 
The decree and enforcement of Law 138/2001 regarding the protection of personal 
information was signed by the Cypriot Government in 1987.  The main aim of Law 
138/2001 is the protection of individual members of the public, and it concerns 
information about the individual, such as personal, financial, professional as well as 
information about the individual’s criminal record.  Personal information is separated 
into two categories; the sensitive and the non-sensitive personal information. 
Financial information of the individual is not classed as sensitive.  
 
The processing of an individual’s information is only allowed when the subject in 
question gives his/her oral consent. The processing of such information is confidential 
and is carried out exclusively by persons acting under the control of the person in 
charge of processing this information. Processing means any work carried out by any 
person on the individual’s information. It includes the collection, registration, 
organization, preservation, storage etc of such information.  Information about the 
individual means any kind of information referring to a subject who is still alive.  
 
Sensitive information according to the Law, is information concerning race or 
nationality of the individual, and political believes as well as information concerning 
criminal persecutions and convictions. 
 
According to the Law the collection and processing of sensitive information is 
prohibited. Some situations may be considered as exceptions under certain 
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presumptions.  Also the inter-association of files, according to the Law, is only 
allowed after notification of the commissioner. Permission to inter-associate files is 
given only if certain presumptions coexist.  
 
Inter-association of files is any kind of processing, which gives the possibility of 
comparing the information of one file with the information of a file or files, which are 
kept by other persons in charge of processing or which are kept by the same person 
for another reason. 
 
Unfortunately in Cyprus there is no legislation concerning certificates and encryption 
of information, especially health care information. However, with the enforcement of 
this law, the hospitals or health care organizations are obliged to have signed consent 
forms from the patient which will give them the right to exchange patient data.   
4.5 Standards and Legislations apply for the Health Care Sector- European 
Union 
 
The European Council in Feira, June 19-20, 2000 endorsed the Commission eEurope 
Action Plan 2000 "An Information Society for all"[14]. Under the heading Health 
online the challenge’s objective is given as: “The prime objective of this action is to 
develop an infrastructure of user friendly, validated and interoperable systems for 
health education, disease prevention and medical care.” 
 
In order to allow access to healthcare information electronically, at all points where 
this is required, the need to secure data appropriately becomes a significant concern. 
Healthcare stakeholders, including patients, caregivers and administrators, must be 
confident that any sensitive medical information exchanged over networks will not be 
compromised, and will be viewed only by authorized individuals. 
 
For these reasons, Security and Electronic Signature Standards, which include 
requirements for security of patient-identifiable healthcare information, were 
proposed. Standards for handling patient-identifiable health care information apply to 
all health care organizations and hospitals regardless of their size. 
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Standards are implemented to guard data integrity, confidentiality, and availability, as 
well as to guard data transmitted over a communications network against 
unauthorized access.  Those are classified in to the following categories 
• Administrative Procedures - to guard data integrity, confidentiality, and 
availability, with documented formal practices, covering contingency plans for 
system emergencies, policies on access control, formal termination procedures, 
and protection of data.  
• Physical Safeguards - covers media controls and security on physical 
computer systems and equipment.  
• Technical Security Services - to protect, control and monitor information 
access, such as access control, audit controls, consent for use and disclosure, 
data authentication, and user identification.  
• Technical Security Mechanisms - includes processes created for preventing 
unauthorized access, integrity controls, and message authentication for data 
that is sent over a network.  
• Electronic Signature - includes recommendations for, but does not require, the 
use of electronic signature.  
As part of the information technology requirements some of the above points, require 
that technical policies and procedures are defined specifically for the following eight 
areas: 
• User authentication 
• Access controls 
• Audit trails 
• Physical security & disaster recovery 
• Protection of remote access points 
• Protection of external electronic communications 
• Software discipline 
• System Assessment 
 
Each member state has to assess its own security risks and determine its own 
appropriate plan of action to achieve all the above. 
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4.6 Assessing Health Information on the Internet outside European Community 
 
The Internet presents a powerful mechanism for helping users improve their health-
care decision-making, by providing easy and rapid access, exchange, and 
dissemination for enormous amounts of health information. The Health Summit 
Working Group [15]   was one of the groups that have developed a set of criteria to 
address this critical need. These criteria are intended as a resource for users seeking 
health-related information on the Internet, and should aid in evaluating information to 
determine whether it is usable and credible.  
 
The Health Summit Working Group has developed a set of seven major criteria for 
use in assessing the quality of health information on the Internet.  Those are 
credibility, content, disclosure, links, design, interactivity, and caveats (advisories).  
4.7 Conclusions 
 
Considering that the health care sector is one of the most crucial sectors, where any 
patient information is important and electronic communication between different 
parties is essential, the provision for secure, trusted and legislative systems must be 
provided.  
 
Compared to Cyprus, the European Union4 has a more mature and sensitive view, as 
far as patient information is concerned. The European Union has had its legislations 
and standards, concerning patient data protection, for a number of years, and trust in 
these has been shown from both doctors and patients. It is important therefore, when 
implementing a PKI system for Cyprus’s Health Care sector, to take these European 
Directives [10, 16] into account as well as the standards that needed to provide 
appropriate protection for the data conveyed across the Internet in a practical, cost-
effective way. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The comparison with Europe is carried out because Cyprus will be entering the EU shortly and a 
harmonization with the European standards is a must.  
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Chapter 5 
 Discussion on PKI-related work 
 
Nowadays, ready made Healthcare PKI solutions can be provided by many companies, 
such as Verisign, Baltimore, and Entrust.  However, the cost of such applications 
along with the lack of scalability to suite the needs and standards of Cyprus’s 
environment, made the supporting of a custom made application a favorable solution. 
The fact that the Hippocrates PKI system, which is the PKI system setup exclusively 
for Cyprus’s Health Care System and which will be on trial initially for cancer 
patients, is custom made prevents any kind of comparison being made with the ready 
made applications. In order to get a feel of the difference in price between the two 
solutions consider that an application similar to Hippocrates is to be provided by 
Verisign or Baltimore. This would cost around 200 Euro per user. Add to this the 
additional cost for the software modules, which would cost around 30,000 euro for the 
server module and 30 – 50 euro per user for the desktop modules, as well as the cost 
needed to configure the application, this would lead to an unnecessarily high cost. 
However, setting up a custom made system such as Hippocrates would cost a lot 
cheaper. So far there has been no attempt to analyze the actual cost of the Hippocrates 
PKI system, although such a costing exercise is needed to identify the cost of the 
different implementation aspects of the development.  Another reason for choosing a 
custom made PKI solution is that ready made ones are profit-oriented and it was 
judged that such solutions may not have been fully trusted. 
 
It is also recognized that there are pilot projects and local implementations of systems 
similar to the Hippocrates PKI system. These pilot projects may apply to E-commerce 
sites, E-banking [25] or E-health and require an encryption solution [9]. Although 
these projects may apply to different sectors of every day life, they are all based on 
the same guidelines as written in the RFC 2527. This reference clearly states that 
certain modifications can be applied to suit the environment in which the Certificate 
Policy (CP) and Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) will apply. Even though E-
commerce and E-banking have the biggest share of the market as far as applications 
are concerned, and are considered by many as the most important because they mainly 
deal with money, E-health care is as important and maybe even more critical than the 
others. E-health involves patient treatment and in some instances may make the 
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difference between life and death. For example, if tissue compatibility information for 
patients waiting for liver, kidney, bone marrow transplants etc, is lost, then some 
patients may loose their life despite the availability of donors somewhere else in the 
world.  In addition, E-health requires patient information confidentiality. If this 
information leaks out, the patient can sue the health care organization. Apart from 
costing the hospital a substantial amount of money, it can also damage its reputation. 
As a result of this, patient trust towards the doctors may be lost.  
 
PKI was adopted by the Australian Government [54] to enable the transfer of sensitive 
medical information across the Internet, without compromising the individual's right 
to privacy.  
 
Health eSignature Authority Pty Ltd (HeSA) [54] acts today as a Registration 
Authority for the provision of digital keys and certificates within the Australian 
healthcare sector.  HeSA will facilitate the introduction of PKI across Australia's 
health sector.  Certificate authority tasks are appointed by SecureNet. Both HeSA and 
SecureNet have successfully completed the Commonwealth Government Gatekeeper 
process to become an Accredited Provider (February 2001) of PKI within the 
Australian healthcare sector.   
 
The project was coordinated by The Alfred hospital in Melbourne that is currently 
using it for allowing health records to be accessed via the Internet.   
 
Another PKI related application was adopted by the Government of Canada, which 
committed to electronic services delivery in 1999 [52]. At the same time an ambitious 
plan to make all federal programs and services available on-line by 2004, was 
announced.   Since then the Government of Canada has become a recognized world 
leader in public key infrastructure implementation in a public sector environment. 
 
As per the Canadian project, the Government of Canada Public Key Infrastructure 
[53] provides departments with an efficient, effective, common basis for the secure 
electronic delivery of federal services and programs. The ultimate goal of the 
government's PKI project is the establishment of a secure federal electronic service 
delivery system based largely on a centrally managed Public Key Infrastructure cross-
certified with other PKIs. 
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Depending on a number of factors, different policies were implemented by the 
government of Canada which represent four different assurance levels and depend on 
the sensitivity or complexity of transactions.  According to these policies each federal 
department may have its own Certification Authorities, or choose to enter into a 
contract with another organization for the provision of Certification Authority 
services.  However, each departmental Certification Authority can issue different 
types of certificates. The applicability of these certificates will depend on the 
application used.  
 
For instance, the certificates issued under “the management and use of certificates 
containing Public Keys [22, 48] used for verification, authentication, integrity and key 
agreement mechanism”, could be used for verifying the identity of electronic mail 
[23] correspondents or remote access to a computer system, verifying the identity of 
citizens or other legal entities, or protecting the integrity of software and documents.  
However, the certificates issued under “the management and use of certificates 
containing public keys used for encryption key establishment, including key transfer”, 
are suitable for providing confidentiality for applications such as electronic mail or 
Web communications, including the protection of Global Software Publishing (GSP) 
designated information. 
 
The President of the Treasury Board acts as the head of the Government of Canada 
Public Key Infrastructure, and is responsible for entering into and terminating written 
agreements for cross-certification on behalf of the government. 
 
A third PKI project that was studied was the one proposed by the Health Informatics 
working group [55], whose task is to define security terminology to be used in 
healthcare and in ISO/TC 215 standards in particular.  It is also responsible for 
defining the essential elements of a health care public key infrastructure that will 
support the secure transmission of health care information across national boundaries. 
 
Some other PKI projects which were also studied are the ones undertaken by the 
Swedish government and the trial PKI system in the United Kingdom, operating under 
the NHS plan [40, 56].  Unfortunately due to inadequate information in English about 
the Swedish PKI system, it is not possible for further information to be given on this 
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system.  An announcement from the British Department of Health states that, the pilot 
trial is the first step in making electronic health records available to everyone in the 
UK by 2004. In this trial, patients will have access to all their consultations for the last 
four years.  Each time a patient accesses his or her records, they will have their 
identity authenticated by a "clever mouse" that reads the patients' index fingerprints. 
Patients will also be given names and passwords to enter in order to validate their 
identity before they can see their records.  Apart from the two above mentioned 
examples, in Europe there is generally the tendency of enabling health online [14, 51, 
59]. The overall purpose of health services is to provide an increasingly good quality 
care for the patient / citizens not only in their home land but also throughout Europe 
and the rest of the world. 
 
The above systems may not be needed in Cyprus because of the individual 
characteristics of the Cyprus environment.  Cyprus is a small island and despite 
limited resources it is not difficult for anyone to find detailed information about 
anybody else in a very short time.   There is also the fact that due to the work load 
many doctors have, it will be hard for them to adapt to a program designed for other 
environments apart from the one they are used to working in. Consequently, some of 
the important features of the above systems are of no great importance or use here.  
However, the need for a secure communication system between healthcare 
professionals in Cyprus is very important and thus became the incentive for the 
proposal of the Hippocrates PKI system.  The policy statements of this PKI system 
were based on RFC 2527. The design of the Hippocrates PKI – System was based on 
the Cyprus culture.  As a result there are many individualities and characteristics of 
the proposed CP, which were explained in Chapter 6, which may not be applicable to 
other countries.   
 
The Canadian and Australian systems were chosen for comparison, because they 
provide a description of a complete system, and they are not drafts. They were not 
however chosen for implementing the Hippocrates PKI system, because this will 
apply to a close knit community based on cancer patients and oncology treatment and 
care. Therefore the system was designed in order to ensure that patient data remains 
within this community, whereas the two above mentioned PKI systems cover a 
broader community area and there main scope is making money. Some key 
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differences between the Hippocrates PKI system and the Canadian and Australian 
systems are also provided below. 
 
These differences are: 
 
(a) Applicability: The applicability of the Hippocrates System is exclusive to the 
Health care sector and will be pilot for the benefit of the cancer patients.  If this 
project succeeds, then Hippocrates can be the base for developing the Root CA for the 
Health Care sector in Cyprus.  For the application proposed in Canada, certificate 
policies have been designed to satisfy general public key certificate requirements of 
the Government of Canada. In Canada, as mentioned before, and under the policies 
defined by the government, each department may develop its own CA.  For example 
the Ministry of Health may proceed to create a system analogous to the Hippocrates 
System. 
 
(b) Financial Responsibility: In the Canadian policies each federal department may 
use a contractor to provide the required CA services.  The contractor has to provide 
satisfactory evidence of financial responsibility.  For Hippocrates this does not apply, 
since the services of Hippocrates will be provided only by the Bank of Cyprus 
Oncology Center, because of the limited number of people who will get involved. 
Despite this, the requirement by the government of Canada is correct and can be 
followed by the Hippocrates system also, if the need of a contractor arises. 
 
(c) Fees:  The Cyprus Health Care PKI system will currently charge no fees for the 
issuance of a certificate. As stated above, the system will initially be applicable to 
cancer patients. As per the law of the Republic of Cyprus, cancer patients are allowed 
to receive free treatment. As an extension of this everything concerning patient 
treatment, such as 3D-planning, dosimetry, calibrations, quality assurance test of 
medical equipment etc are free. The organizations dealing with these patients are of a 
purely charitable nature. It is therefore believed that it will be better for such a system 
to provide free services and be used, since the use of such a system will benefit the 
patients.  For the Canadian PKI system the charging of fees is subject to the 
appropriate legislative authority and policy.   Fees are also applied in all the other 
systems studied.  Fees may be payable for the issuing and re – keying of Certificates, 
or even for certificate accessing.  
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(d) Subscribers: All system policies specify members / subscribers of the system. This 
could be an individual, an Organization, or a group of individuals.  For each group, 
there are policies that use authentication methods as a way to prove identities.  
However, for the Canadian project, End entities may also be devices, or applications.   
For the Hippocrates project there are currently no provisions for identifying and 
issuing certificates to machines or applications.  This may be part of any future work 
carried out by the Hippocrates team. For example sending Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) or Computed Tomography (CT) images from one Hippocrates user to 
other Hippocrates Users, could well be an option in the future. 
 
Compared to the Australian, the Swedish and the Hippocrates projects, the Canadian 
project assigns the eligibility for a certificate at the sole discretion of the CA. For the 
Canadian project, this works as expected, because the CA operates in federal 
departments.  However for a closed community like the one Hippocrates will apply to, 
this is not the case, as the community does not have the power that a federal 
department processes. The role of the CA is, therefore undertaken by the PMAC. 
 
(e) Policy Management Authority Committee (PMAC): In some applications, the 
PMAC is referenced to as PMA. For Hippocrates, the creation of a PMAC as a 
committee is suggested based on the structure of the application and on the members. 
This will have the upper hand in registering, interpreting and maintaining the CP. In 
this case the PMAC, as a responsible committee, will apply all the regulations set by 
the board of trustees of the BOCOC and the Law of the Republic of Cyprus. 
 
For the system in Canada the Policy Management Authority, a senior executive 
committee, assists the Secretary and the President in their PKI-related duties. It also 
provides the overall strategic directions for the PKI in the federal community, and 
makes recommendations to the Secretary respecting membership in, and cross-
certification with, the Government of Canada.  In the case of Hippocrates, the PMAC 
will, for the time being, be the authority that will establish all the duties of the PKI 
and its members.  This may not sound democratic, but the nature of the application of 
Hippocrates, and the fact that 75 % of the cancer patients treated in Cyprus are treated 
at the BOCOC, make this a practical setup.  
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(f) Determination of the Suitability of the CPS: There is a recommendation in the 
Australian System, that three different parties will determine the suitability of any 
CPS.  Those are the Health Care PMA, the PMA operated by the CA and the 
Competent Authority. Understandably this may be one possible solution for big PKI 
systems.  In our proposal, suitability of a CPS is performed only by the PMAC, which 
operates on behalf of the CA and the RA.  As stated above, the PMAC is the BOCOC 
which treats about 75% of all cancer patients in Cyprus. It was therefore considered 
logical that in the closed community, in which the PKI system will be operating, the 
organization treating most of the patients should have the right to decide whether or 
not a CPS is suitable. At the same time, having only one body to take such decisions 
speeds up the whole process. 
 
(g) Disputes – Disagreements: The policies that were proposed in this thesis, which 
can be found in Appendix A, suggest that any disputes be resolved through 
communication between the relating parties and the PMAC.  There is no specific time 
limit for the resolution of such disputes, but it is dependent on the judgment of the 
PMAC.  However, if the disputes are not resolved they should be submitted to an 
arbitrator.  In this case the PMAC will act as the committee relating parties will use, 
in order to avoid any inconvenience, money loss or trauma, which may be caused if a 
case goes to court. In a way this results in the speeding up of the whole procedure.  
The same approach is followed by the PKI system in Canada.  In Australia however, 
although they have the same approach, a specific time limit (max 28 days) is set for 
settling disputes.  After that, the dispute may be submitted to the arbitrator.  This 
direction seems to limit the role of the PMAC and at times may result in the 
frustration of the parties involved in the disputes.  
 
(h)  Records Retaining Period: According to the Hippocrates policies, the Health Care 
System must establish mechanisms to ensure the retaining of the audit information, 
Subscriber Agreements and any inspection, audit, application, identification, 
authentication, acceptance and revocation information for  a time period which is 
equal  to 7 years. This was decided following the current policies of the BOCOC for 
auditing and medical records keeping.  In the Canadian PKI system the retaining 
period is two years. Nothing is mention in the Australian PKI System about the record 
retaining period. 
 53
 
(i) Identification & Authentication: Identification in the Australian PKI system is 
based on a points system.  For example if a health care professional presents his/her 
birth certificate she/he earns 70 points.  Upon receiving 100 points she/he  is 
identified as a legitimate user of the PKI system.  For the application proposed in 
Cyprus, this is not the case.  Identification/Authentication of members depends on the 
group the user applying for a certificate, belongs to.  For example, Authentication of 
an Individual -- Independent Practitioner can be done by contacting the Ministry of 
Health, the Subscriber, and the National Medical Committee.   Even though the points 
system in operation in the Australian PKI system is a well organized system, such a 
system is not needed in Cyprus. This is due to the fact that Cyprus is a small place 
with a closely knit community.  The Hippocrates community is an ever smaller 
community that this. It is therefore relatively easy to identify if an individual is who 
she/he claims to be and if they are eligible to become legitimate users of the PKI 
system. 
 
(j) Name Uniqueness: For all applications studied, distinguished names (DN) must be 
unique for all End-entities of a CA. For the Hippocrates PKI – System the CA may 
issue additional numbers or letters to the commonName to ensure the uniqueness of 
the DN.  The subject name (for certificate applicants) must have a distinguishable and 
unique Distinguish Name (DN) in the certificate subjectName field. The subjectName 
and issuerName must have a reasonable association with the authenticated name of 
the Subscriber.   It is also recommended that the organizationName component be 
included in the DN and that it should be the official name of the Organization. 
 
(k) Suspension: Another major difference with the applications that were studied deals 
with the suspension of the certificate.  For example, Suspension of Certificates for the 
Canadian PKI system is not applicable at all.  In the Australian PKI – System 
suspension may occur when circumstances for revocations are suspected, but are not 
confirmed.  For the application proposed in Cyprus, Certificates should be suspended 
by the CA, if the CA suspects unauthorized use of the certificate, and should proceed 
with further investigations.  Also, upon notification of a temporary change in 
employment status of the Subscriber, a restriction of the Subscriber’s rights to access 
health information for a certain time period may occur.  
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(l) Training: In the Hippocrates PKI – System extensive training and seminars are 
suggested for all group users, taking into account that many of them do not have the 
required computing knowledge. Users must have knowledge of how to back up and 
protect their keys and also how to operate the system.  Training is also advisable for 
all the PKI –System personnel.   However from the systems studied, adequate training 
is only reffered to in the Canadian PKI System.   
 
(m) Cross Certification: Due to the non-existence of other CAs in Cyprus, cross 
certification was not taken into account. However, this shall be taken into account in 
any future expansion of the PKI – System.   
 
In the Government of Canada Public Key Infrastructure, departments may operate 
more than one Certification Authority. In such instances, the department designates 
one of its Certification Authorities to be its Level 1 Certification Authority. It cross-
certifies with the Canadian Central Facility, and signs the certificates of the 
department's subordinate Certification Authorities. If a department has only one 
Certification Authority, it is automatically a Level 1 Certification Authority. A 
department's Level 1 Certification Authority is responsible for the creation of the 
departmental Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statement.   
In the Australian system, however, there is nothing mentioned on cross certification.  
Although not mentioned in this thesis, it seems that cross certification will be needed 
to connect other future services the government of Cyprus may need to provide, in the 
case of the expansion of Hippocrates. 
 
(n) Group Division: Another innovation of the policies in the Hippocrates PKI - 
System is the division of authorized personnel into groups ranging from doctors to 
anti-cancer societies, with a different scope of authority for each group. In Cyprus, the 
authentication of these groups is hard to implement, therefore it is suggested that this 
be done by the authorities to whom these groups belong, i.e. for doctors by the 
Medical Association or the Ministry of Health. For patients authentication takes place 
after doctor recommendation and approval from the PMAC. Other applications do not 
seem to provide such a group division, but they offer different types of certificates, 
which, in a way, control the user privileges in the system.  This application effectively 
has the same result as the one suggested in the Hippocrates PKI – System.  In the 
Hippocrates- PKI system however, due to the small community the system applies to, 
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and due to the fact that closer control and higher security levels are required, the 
suggested division of groups is the ideal solution.  
 
(o) Revocation List : For a more efficient operation of the Hippocrates – PKI system it 
is very important to notify all members and Relying Parties of the issuance or 
revocation of a certificate.  The same strategy, applying to the revocation or issuance 
of certificates, as the one suggested for the Hippocrates PKI system, is also followed 
by the Australian PKI – System.  For the Canadian PKI – System there is no 
requirement for a revocation list and currently it does not support an on-line 
revocation/status checking. 
 
(p) Auditing: Auditing for Hippocrates is being made by external auditors only.  
Periodic inspection of the performance of the PKI system is at the sole discretion of 
the PMAC. For the Canadian system only one of every five audits must be done by an 
external department. The rest are made by the PMA.  Due to the lack of experienced 
people in Cyprus it is believed that external auditors, who have sufficient knowledge 
of the PKI technology and cryptography techniques, should carry out these audits.  
External inspectors must also have knowledge of the operation of the relevant PKI 
software and the operation of the PKI components [48] in accordance with this policy. 
 
In this chapter related work to the Hippocrates system was summarized. From this 
related work a few differences - innovations of the Hippocrates system were extracted. 
In general applicability of the Hippocrates system is primarily only for the benefit of 
cancer patients from whom no fees will be charged. Each subscriber of the system 
will be divided into different groups which will be given different rights accordingly. 
The complete authentication of each group of subscribers will be a decision of the 
Policy Management Authority Committee which will apply all the regulations set by 
the BOCOC, the law of the Republic of Cyprus, the CP and the CPS. When disputes 
arise the Hippocrates approach is that disputes will be resolved through 
communication between the related parties and the PMAC. The time taken for a 
dispute to be resolved is in the sole discretion of the PMAC. A record retaining period 
has been set according to the BOCOC policies. Identification-authentication of a 
member can be done by contacting the ministry of health, the national medical 
committee and the organization/society to whom the subscriber belongs. Another 
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innovation recommended by the system is that there will be no cross-certification with 
other CA’s in Cyprus. There will also be extensive training of the personnel. For a 
more efficient operation of the Hippocrates – PKI system a revocation list that notifies 
all members and Relying Parties of the issuance or revocation of a certificate is 
suggested. Finally for Hippocrates, Certificates should be suspended by the CA, if the 
CA suspects unauthorized use of the certificate, and should proceed with further 
investigations. 
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Chapter 6 
 HIPPOCRATES-PKI Certificate Policy (CP) 
 
This part of the thesis summarizes the design issues and procedures that indicate the 
applicability of a certificate, for the operation of a particular community with 
particular security requirements, in this case the Health Care sector.   It also highlights 
the design choices for the set of rules in the so called Certificate Policy (CP), which 
form the basis for the operation and management practice of certification authorities 
(CAs). The aim of the CP is to create the appropriate confidence in certificates, issued 
by a Certification Authority (CA).  Subscribers and other parties, certified by any 
particular CA, must have confidence in the applicability of the certificate.  
 
Due to the high volume and the structure of the certificate policy, it was decided to 
include in this part of the thesis only a brief description of its content along with a 
description of issues that make the design of this CP both unique and, applicable to 
the Cypriot standards.  The complete CP can be found in the appendix section.  
Although, the structure of the CP was based on the Internet X.509 V3 Public Key 
Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework” [5], some 
diversions were made based on the demands and the needs of the health care sector in 
Cyprus. Those diversions are explained in this section. 
6.0 Introduction 
 
In general, the aim of issuing this CP is to set the policy requirements for the 
operation, management, and use of certificates containing public keys for digital 
signatures. This is to assure that the verification, authentication, data integrity and key 
agreement mechanisms will be well established.   
 
The role of each part or member of the PKI system is briefly described.  These parts 
are the Policy Management Authority Committee (PMAC), the Certification 
Authority (CA), the Registration Authority (RA), the Sponsors, and the Subjects 
which represent the community on which the system is built and to which this policy 
will be applicable.  The members are fully responsible and liable for any actions that 
diverge from the provisions of the specific CP. 
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Other issues described are the role, the function, and the need of repositories, which 
are closely related with the certificate status checking, and the contact details 
regarding the policy. 
 
The proposed CP of the Hippocrates-PKI differs from other CPs in that it applies only 
to the Health Care system. Another innovation of the Hippocrates-PKI system, as 
detailed in the Certificate Practice Statement (CPS), is that it is a closed system, 
which applies only to cancer patients in Cyprus, who receive treatment from the Bank 
of Cyprus Oncology Centre (BOCOC), and who are registered patients for receiving 
home-care from the Cyprus Association of Cancer Patients and Friends (PASYKAF) 
and DITIS5 research team, i.e. the two non-profit organizations who offer assistance 
to cancer patients in Cyprus. A special feature of the system is that a Policy 
Management Committee (PMAC) is proposed, which, as discussed later has extra 
responsibilities and more power. The PMAC according to the CP and CPS is the Bank 
of Cyprus Oncology Centre (BOCOC), as this treats more than 75% of cancer patients 
in Cyprus. All subscribers are Health Care employees and professionals as described 
in the CP.  According to the CPS of this PKI system, however, the subscribers here 
are all Health Care professionals related to Oncology. These belong to the closed 
system, described earlier. Their role, as specified in the CP, is approved by the PMAC.  
A real time online status checking (repository) is also proposed for checking the status 
of the certificate. The repository, as described in the CP, will give the opportunity to 
users for checking the status of other certificates on a 24hour basis. Finally, another 
innovation proposed in this section regards any future expansion in users of the 
Hippocrates-PKI system. In such a case Hippocrates will be able to use a contractor to 
provide some of its services. It will however, be responsible and accountable for the 
CP. 
6.1 General Requirements 
 
All requirements relating to the obligations of the CAs, RAs, PMAC, Sponsors, 
                                                 
5 DITIS is a system that supports Collaborative Virtual Healthcare Teams dealing with the home-
healthcare of cancer patients in Cyprus. Through a pilot project DITIS will support the activities of the 
home healthcare service of the Cyprus Association of Cancer Patients and Friends (PASYKAF), using 
a patient centric philosophy. It is based on the Internet (web) and on GSM mobile communications.   
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Subscribers, Relying Parties (inspectors), and other issues pertaining to law and 
dispute resolution are clearly stated in this section. 
 
This section also explains in detail the role that the different authorities and 
subscribers of the system have, as well as the authority that one has over the other.  
For example, in the relation of the CA with the RA, the RA always operates in the 
interest of the CA.  The CA’s role, is to ensure that all RAs operate and act in 
accordance to relevant provisions of this CP. Some of the unique obligations of the 
CA are:  
• The maintenance of a CA Repository which will not be accessible to the 
public, but will be for the CA’s use only. This Repository is a reference for 
keeping records of the certificate as well as a means for backup and protection 
of the CA’s data. 
• The providing of relevant information about the issued certificates to the 
interested authorities, as required by the law governing the Republic of Cyprus, 
in the case of disputes concerning digital certificates.  
 
The RA has some unique obligations in the Hippocrates-PKI system as well. Some of 
these unique obligations are: 
• Prior to submitting the information of a subscriber to the CA, the RA is 
obliged to verify the identity and any other given information of that 
subscriber. It also has the obligation to verify that the subscriber has the right 
to receive a certificate. As mentioned in the later section of this Chapter as 
well as in the CPS, the RA, for example, must identify that the physician is a 
certified one and eligible to work in Cyprus as per the governing Laws of the 
Republic of Cyprus.  
• The identification and recording of all subscriber actions which are helpful in 
the case of disputes or any other violations against the RA. 
 
 As per the General requirements section, the guaranteed conservation of these 
obligations is achieved through an agreement between the CA and the subscriber 
which clearly outlines the minimum obligations and responsibilities of all members of 
the system. In this agreement certain obligations and responsibilities are assigned to 
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each category of Hippocrates users, whether these are individuals, organizations or 
groups of individuals. 
 
Emphasis is also given to the financial responsibilities and liabilities of the 
subscribers. As per this CP, any financial costs for the use of the CA services are paid 
for by to the Organizations, individuals, or any other relying parties of the 
Hippocrates-PKI. The CA has no obligations, and disclaims all liability for any use, 
other than the intended, as identified by this CP, for the certificates issued under this 
CP. However if the CA fails to comply with the terms of this policy, then the CA 
itself becomes responsible and liable for any damages to the users. 
 
A unique characteristic of the Hippocrates-PKI system is that any services provided to 
the closed Health Care system mentioned above, will be free of charge as stated in the 
CPS. Finally this CP suggests that external auditors should inspect both the CA and 
RA performance and check the compliance of PKI components [37, 48] of this CP as 
well as checking whether the CPS meets the requirements of the provided CP. As 
suggested in the CP, external auditors must have sufficient knowledge of the PKI 
technology.  Additionally, as stated in the CPS, periodical inspections will be 
performed by the PMAC. 
6.2 Identification and Authentication 
 
The registration process to obtain a Hippocrates certificate is given in this section.  
According to this process there are two ways that the certificate application will reach 
the RA; via the electronic way, over a secure channel using the public Internet, or by 
bringing the application directly to the RA, in person. 
 
In the process of identification and authentication emphasis is given to the type of 
names and the need for these names to be meaningful.  Although this CP was 
designed in accordance with the RFC 2459, like other CPs, the individuality of this 
CP is due to the fact that it stresses the uniqueness of names in all groups mentioned 
above e.g. Medical Oncologists, Home-Care Specialist Palliative Care Nurses, 
Psychologists, Physiotherapists, Social workers, other members or patients, 
organizations or groups. The CP requires that the Distinguish Name (DN),  listed in a 
certificate must be unique among all entities of a CA. For each entity, the CA must 
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issue additional numbers or letters to the common name to ensure the uniqueness of 
the name. 
 
A final point on the uniqueness of this system is the lack of any points system for the 
evaluation and authentication of individual subscribers, organizations, or groups. 
Specific rules for the authentication are given in the CP. However, organizations that 
do not belong in the Health Care sector and act as agents or as business partners of 
healthcare organizations, are not allowed at the moment to be authenticated. 
6.3 Operational Requirements 
 
This section describes the requirements imposed upon the issuing CAs, RAs, and the 
end entities with respect to various operational activities. These requirements have to 
be satisfied when applying, issuing, or accepting certificates. They can also be used 
for justification of revocation and suspension of certificates. This section also 
discusses the auditing procedures as well as the types of events which are recorded, 
and refers to the way the RA will handle the application of the certificate. As 
mentioned earlier, applications may be submitted via two methods; online or by 
completing a printed version of the electronic form.  In both cases the applicant 
should provide adequate proof of his/her information in written form.  Beyond this, 
the future needs of cross certification were not overlooked, although the CP was 
designed with the knowledge that the Hippocrates – PKI system will initially be 
applicable to a closed community. Furthermore, according to this policy certificates 
will not be published to the RA repository unless they have been accepted by the user 
via electronic means.   
 
Revocation requests can only be done through the authorized RA electronically or if 
the Subscriber contacts the CA or RA in person and provides adequate proof of 
identification. Certificates should be suspended by the CA when there is suspicion of 
unauthorized use of the certificate, as well as upon notification of a temporary change 
in employment status of the Subscriber; this may result in the restriction of the 
Subscriber’s rights to access health information for that time. However, during 
suspension, a limited valid license period healthcare certificate may be issued to the 
Subscriber.  
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Weight is given on the importance of the existence of a disaster recovery plan, as well 
as the existence of physical, procedural, and personnel security controls. As specified, 
the site that will implement the PKI system must have the above well documented. 
These must also be publicly available to all members through the RA website. 
 
Finally, the CP gives the freedom to each CPS for the retention of the audit and 
archive logs.  However, it specifies that for audits, the time should not exceed 30 days, 
and for archiving, as in most of the health care organizations, all patient records 
should be retained for at least 7 years.   
6.4 Physical Security -- Access Controls 
 
Both the CA and RA shall implement security controls in order to ensure that access 
to the sites is limited only to authorized personnel, listed in the access list.  For this 
reason security personnel shall monitor and inspect the site on a 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week basis.  In the case of the RA, security access controls may be varied due 
to the fact that candidates for a certificate as specified in this policy are allowed to 
deliver Hand Written applications. To control access from the Internet the RA will 
operate under a secure network that includes intrusion detection and firewall systems. 
This is, however not described here because it is not a concern of this thesis. Other 
procedural controls will also be assigned. These are the different trusted roles 
assigned among the CA and RA personnel. For example, the CA Security Manager’s 
role includes assigning security privileges and access controls of CA Operators and 
System Administrators. The CA operator’s tasks are limited to operating the system. 
In this CP, particular emphasis is given to the fact that more than one person is 
required for each task. This is to ensure the high quality of services and proficiency. 
At the same time it gives the CA the flexibility not to depend on the knowledge of one 
person only.  However, personnel must have the adequate qualifications required for 
the duties to be performed. Additionally, as suggested, comprehensive training should 
be provided to all personnel. None of the above was addressed in any of the other CPs 
studied while implementing the CP suggested in this thesis. The CA will operate in 
isolation i.e. it will not be connected to any networks. 
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6.5 Technical Security Controls 
This section contains provisions of the public/private key pair management policy for 
CAs, RAs and end entities, and the corresponding technical controls. More 
specifically, it refers to the key size which should be long enough to provide adequate 
protection [41, 42]. As stated by Health Care Financing Authority (HCFA) Internet 
Security Policy,  24th November 1998, a 1024 bits key will be used. Both the CA 
private signing key and the end entity private signing key must be well protected from 
any disclosure and unauthorized use, especially when not active. Guidelines on how 
to protect the keys should be issued to the subscriber upon the acceptance of the 
certificate.   It is recommended that the CA’s private key be stored in an isolated 
machine within a restricted area and under strict access control. Regular backups for 
both keys should be made so as to minimize the recovery time in case of system 
disaster.  A reference is also made to the period of validity of keys. In particular the 
Policy CA public and private signature verification keys have ten and seven years’ 
validity period respectively.   If this was not the case then the CA would have to go 
through the procedure of notifying all users of these changes as well as having to issue 
other certificates for all its members more frequently. Changing these keys, therefore, 
on a frequent basis would hamper the operation of the system. Because by changing 
the CA must provide appropriate notice to all its members, revoke all certificates 
issued using the old key, request revocation of cross-certificates issued to the CA, and 
finally re-issue certificates to all Entities and ensure all CRLs are signed using the 
new key.  In contrast to this, other public and private keys should be valid for one or 
two years, depending on the importance of the key. 
Another characteristic of this CP, is the reference to the specific computer technical 
requirements regarding security.  This covers the Network Security Controls of the 
system that must be protected from any attacks through any open or general-purpose 
network with which it is connected.  Also covered by these security manners are the 
Web Server Security, the Operating System Security, and the Database Security.  The 
Web Server Security must be such that the web server limits user’s access to specific 
resources and folders.  The Operating System Security should provide filesystem 
security; that is, every user account should have limited, predefined access to the 
system’s folders and files. Finally, Database Security with Discretionary Access 
Control in which the selected DBMS must allow the ability to create, modify and 
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delete user accounts in the database level. The DBMS must support discretionary 
access control; i.e. it should provide the DBA with the ability to define the tables to 
which a user has access to, as well as the kind of access (INSERT, UPDATE, 
DELETE, SELECT). 
6.6 Certificate and CRL Profiles 
 
Section 6.7 gives a summary of the technical make up of a certificate, and the 
revocation list, as present in more details in Appendix A. In general terms, 
information is provided on the following: 
• Certificate and CRL profile 
• Version Number 
• Certificate  Extensions 
• CRL and CRL entry extensions  
Appendix A includes tables for the above and the user can see the structure of the 
certificate from these tables. 
6.7 Specification Administration 
 
Administering a specification requires certain actions to be taken by the PMAC in 
case of changes made to the CP. The PMAC is responsible for providing advanced 
notice to all entities and all authorities before any changes are made to the CP.  The 
notification mechanism will be determined by the PMAC.  Comments to the PMAC, 
by affected users, on any changes of this policy are accepted.  However, decisions 
with respect to these comments are at the exclusive discretion of the PMAC. 
6.8 Policy Administration 
 
This section refers to any relying parties that may need to register an object identifier 
number for this policy.  This may happen in the case of cross certificate authorities. 
6.9 Personnel Expertise 
 
The use of familiar and easy to learn technology is highly desirable, for this policy as 
it will lead to easier understanding, faster implementation, quicker response, less 
training cost when changes are required.  
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Chapter 7 
 Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) 
7.0 Overview 
 
To illustrate the proposed CP the following Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) for 
cancer patients is proposed.   This CPS is adopted by the Bank of Cyprus Oncology 
Center and PASYCAF to enable the provision of continuity Cancer Care, extending 
from the treatment center to home care. Shown in the ensuing sections of Chapter 
Seven (7) is this CPS, which is based on the proposed CP (Appendix A). The naming 
of sections and subsections is the same as in the CP.   
7.1 Introduction 
 
Introduction  
 
This is the Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) for BOCOC CA.  It states the 
practices the CA employs in issuing and managing certificates.  The CPS outlines the 
technical, procedural and personnel policies and practices of BOCOC CA. Only the 
sections where practices are added are present in the CPS.  
 
Identification 
 
This is the CPS of the BOCOC CA, a member of the Cyprus Public Key 
Infrastructure.  (This CPS has not yet approved by any PMAC, however prior to being 
applied it should be approved and the date of approval should be stated here.  
 
The CPS is published at URL: www.hippocrates.org.cy/policies.htm6  
As a member of HIPPOCRATES-PKI, the BOCOC CA is operating in compliance 
with the CP of HIPPOCRATES-PKI: 
• Certificate Policy Name: HIPPOCRATES-PKI-DigCertV1.0 
• Object Identifier: 16582 : More on Object Identifier can be found at 
http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers 
• Document version: 1.0  
                                                 
6The domain name hippocrates.org.cy is registered. However, all relevant sites are available, but will only become 
operational after receiving approval from the closed community that will use Hippocrates. 
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• Document date: May 2003.  
Due to the specific application of this PKI system, this CPS is only applicable to 
Oncology and more specifically a tight group consisting of the Bank of Cyprus 
Oncology Centre (BOCOC), PASYKAF and DITIS. 
 
Policy Management Authority Committee (PMAC) 
 
A committee employed by the Bank of Cyprus Oncology Center will act as the  
PMAC.  PMAC will be responsible for the compliance of the HIPPOCRATES-PKI 
members with the CP and the CPS. It will also define the rights of the subscribers. 
 
Repositories 
 
Each CA is responsible for maintaining an on-line repository or another certificate 
validation service that is available to the Relying Parties in a 24-hour, seven-day-a-
week period.   
 
CRL information: http:// www. hippocrates.org.cy /repository/information.htm  
 
Sponsors 
 
The committee employed by the Bank of Cyprus Oncology Center will initially be the 
only sponsor.  This committee will act in accordance with the rights given by the 
PMAC.  Future progressive sponsors will be added in later CPS versions.  The PMAC 
is the sponsor of the Policy CA. 
 
Subscribers (subjects) 
 
As per the groups that are specified in the CP. However, due to the closed system that 
will at first be applicable, only health care officials concerned with Oncology will be 
eligible to become subscribers. 
 
Policy Applicability 
 
This CPS along with the CP is applicable to all PKI authorized members.   
Certificates may be used because of the reasons stated in the CP. For:  
• e-mail signing and encryption (S/MIME)  [36, 47] 
• server certification and encryption of communications (SSL/TSL)  
• Object-signing.  
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CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES 
 
Certificate Profile 
 
As per the CP and Reference ISO DTS (Draft Technical Standard) 17090, Part 2 – 
Certificate Profile [57]. 
 
CRL Profile 
 
The BOCOC CA will issue X.509 version two (2) CRLs in accordance with IETF 
RFC 2459. 
 
Contact Details 
 
Questions concerning this policy should be addressed to the Hippocrates Home site, 
on which a feedback mechanism is included for users to offer their comments, 
corrections, and criticisms, and raise questions about any information provided. 
 
The Hippocrates home page is: http:// www.hippocrates.org.cy  
 
7.2 Requirements 
 
General Requirements 
 
All requirements stated in the CP for the obligations of the, CAs, RAs, PMAC, 
Sponsors, Subscribers, and Relying Parties, are applied in this section.  Further to that, 
this section is concentrated on any specific requirement that may apply exclusively to 
the CP. 
 
Other CA obligations 
 
In order to verify all information given by the subscriber, the CA follows certain 
measures and procedures.  Such measures depend on which category the subscriber 
belongs to.  Such measures are: 
• Groups: Directly contact the head of the group or the manager of the 
organization to verify the information given and the purpose of the need of a 
certificate. Further investigations may depend on the type of members 
included in the groups. For example, if in one group all the members are 
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doctors then the CA will follow the procedures specified for the health care 
professionals.  
• Healthcare Professionals (physicians): Contact the ministry of health and the 
Medical Association. 
• Nurses: Contact the general manager, Heads of the departments, Matrons or 
sisters of the organization that the nurse is employed by. 
• Healthcare workers: Contact the general manager and the Heads of the 
department of the organization that the employee works for. 
• License Healthcare organizations:  Contact the ministry of health to verify the 
license and any other information that is given.  
• Patients:  Directly contact the professional health care member, for the 
approval of their application and to verify any given information. 
• Medical Societies i.e. Anticancer Societies: contact the ministry of health to 
verify the license and any other given information. 
• Home-Care Specialist Palliative Care Nurses:  Direct contact with the 
appropriate Medical Society to which the nurse belongs to.   
• Administrators: Contact the PMAC to approve their actions. 
 
The PMAC must ensure that all the CA personnel associated with any PKI actions, 
have signed an employment agreement that clearly specifies their penalty clause for 
any actions that can be considered as violating this CP and CPS. 
 
Both the CP and the CPSs are publicly available on the Hippocrates Web Site.  
 
Certificate Status 
 
The CA must inform all the Subscribers and all Relying parties of the Status of their 
certificates.  This will be done in terms of Validation, Renewal, Expiration, and 
Revocation in the Hippocrates Web Site. At the Hippocrates web site, the user may 
access the Certificate Repository section and search for the status of a certificate, 
depending on any information the user has for a certificate or the certificate code.  
The output result will specify the current status of the certificate. 
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PMAC Obligations 
 
The PMAC will employ a committee that will be responsible for checking the 
compliance of the users with this policy.  The PMAC will periodically inspect the 
work done by the committee and will ask for specific user reports or any other reports 
regarding the operation of the PKI system. Another of the PMAC’s duties will be the 
performance of periodical inspections of the PKI system to check its compliance with 
the CP. 
 
Subscriber Obligations 
 
The Subscriber Agreement is included in Appendix C.  Generally, in order to ensure 
that the certification process is trustworthy and to secure the exchange of data / 
communication, the subscribers and relying parties are expected to comply with all 
the policies and duties mentioned in the CP.  
 
Repository Obligations 
 
BOCOC CA is responsible for maintaining an on-line repository or other certificate 
validation service that is available to the Relying Parties on a 24-hour, seven-day-a-
week period.  The BOCOC CA will maintain a second repository to minimize the risk 
of data loss and to guarantee data availability. 
 
Liability 
 
CA only guarantees the control of the identity of the subjects requesting a certificate, 
according to the practices described in this document. No other liability, implicit or 
explicit, is accepted.  
 
CA will not give any guarantees about the security or suitability of the service. The 
certification service is run with a reasonable level of security, but it is provided on a 
best effort only basis. It doesn’t warrant its procedures and it will take no 
responsibility for problems arising from its operation, or for the use made of the 
certificates it provides.  
 
CA denies any financial or any other kind of responsibilities for damages or 
impairments resulting from its operation.  
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However, the CA is responsible for any damages due to the failure of the CA to 
comply with the terms of this Policy.   CA is also responsible to Qualified Relying 
Parties for any damages that are caused to any suitable applications or any loss of 
information due to this failure of compliance with this policy.   
 
This CA, as mentioned earlier will be exclusively used for the good of the Cancer 
Patients. All parties involved, namely the BOCOC, PASYKAF, and DITIS want to 
have this CA working properly and are offering important help towards this. They do 
not expect to have warranties for its operation.  However, once the system is proven 
for its reliability and applicability in other areas of the health care system, other 
prospective users, i.e. other hospitals, clinics, or even the Ministry of Health itself, 
may come to trust the system enough as to apply it for other groups of patients.  If this 
system is developed to the point where it can be released as a commercial product, 
then it does not only have to instill trust in the users, but it has to have internal ways 
for verification of its reliability (self test). This CA will exercise its ability to ensure 
that the system is available ‘most’ of the time.   
 
Financial Responsibility 
 
The HIPPOCRATES-PKI assumes no financial responsibilities with respect to its 
members.  However, the services provided will be free of charge to the closed 
community mentioned above. 
 
Governing Law 
 
Interpretation of this CP and CPS is according to the Republic of Cyprus Laws. 
 
Severity, Survival, Merger, Notice 
 
In case that it is determined that one section of this CP is incorrect or invalid, the 
other sections of this CP shall remain in effect until the CP is updated  
 
Frequency of Publication 
 
• Certificates will be published as soon as issued.  
• CRLs will be published as soon as issued and at least every month.  
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• Changes to this CP and CPS will be published as soon as they are approved. 
Previous versions will remain available on-line.  
• Any information available to the CA must be published in the repository 
within 72 hours.  
• Certificates issued by the CA, which reference this Policy, will be published 
within 48, upon the receiving of the certificate from the Subscriber.  
• Any information related with this policy that affects the operation of the CA, 
i.e. information regarding revocation of a certificate, obligations, etc. must be 
available to the Subscriber immediately after the modification or alteration of 
this policy. 
Publications will be available on the Hippocrates Web site at the following pages: 
 
CA information: http://www.hippocrates.org.cy /ca/information.htm 
CRL information: http://www.hippocrates.org.cy /repository/information.htm  
CP/CPS: http://www.hippocrates.org.cy 
 
Confidentiality Policy 
 
In order to ensure trust and confidentiality among its members, the BOCOC CA 
divides confidentiality in the following categories 
 
• Users Key Privacy: 
Although some of the CA employees may have access to the users’ private 
keys issued by the CA, the BOCOC CA guarantees the subscribers that under 
no circumstances will it use the private keys of any subscriber to whom it 
issues a certificate. 
• Personal Information: 
BOCOC CA doesn’t collect any kind of confidential information. However, 
any information included in issued certificates and CRLs is not considered 
confidential.  
 
Certificate Revocation: 
 
All revoked certificates will remain in the CRL list in order to inform other 
members of the system about the certificates’ status.  However, when a certificate 
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is revoked, a reason code will be included in the CRL entry for the action. This 
reason code is not considered confidential. A reason code will be included to 
briefly explain the reasons for revoking a certificate and also as an example of 
avoidance to the others.  More specific details concerning the revocation will not 
be disclosed unless required by a legal authority of competent jurisdiction.  
7.3 Authentication 
 
Identification and Authentication 
 
As per the methods, which were described in the CP. 
 
Types of Names 
 
As per the Hippocrates CP and according to “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 
Certificate and CRL Profile” [1, 2], each entity of the BOCOC CA must have a 
clearly distinguishable and unique X.501 Distinguished Name (DN) in the certificate 
subject name field.  BOCOC CA will include  no alternative names in the 
subjectAltName extension field of the certificate. 
 
Name Meanings 
 
For the BOCOC CA the following will apply: 
 
• The Subject Name must represent the subscriber in a way that is easily 
understood for humans. 
• The organization name component is included in the DN. 
 
Name Uniqueness 
 
• The Distinguished Name must be unique [30] for each subject certified by 
BOCOC CA. In case the uniqueness of the name cannot be achieved then 
additional numbers or letters are appended to the common name to ensure 
uniqueness.  
• Certificates must apply to unique individuals or resources. Users may not 
share certificates unless they are group certificates.   For CAs the English 
name is recommended. 
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Re-key after Revocation 
 
Re-keying after revocation will follow the same rules as an initial registration.  
 
Revocation Request 
 
Certificate revocation requests must be sent by 
• E-mail, signed by a valid BOCOC CA certificate, to 
revocation.request@hippocrates.com.cy 
• Request directly on the web site. 
If requests cannot be signed by a valid BOCOC CA certificate, BOCOC CA will 
verify the same procedure used for the authentication of identity of a person.  
 
Types of assurance    
 
Interoperability of PKI technology and supporting policies, procedures, and practices 
is of fundamental importance, if information is to be exchanged between 
organizations and between jurisdictions in support of health care applications (for 
example between BOCOC and PASYKAF).  
 
Achieving interoperability between different PKI schemes, requires the establishment 
of a framework of trust, under which, parties responsible for protecting an 
individual’s rights may rely on the policies and practices and, by extension, the 
validity of digital certificates issued by other established authorities 
 
The proposed solutions for this issue are: 
• To develop a standard Healthcare X.509 V3 certificate profile. This will 
enhance interoperability and reduce implementation efforts.  
• Follow in a way that is possible the internet standards as mentioned in the 
IETF PKIX (Public Key Infrastructure using X.509) [1, 2] Working groups 
and the ASTM E-31 (Healthcare Informatics). These are very generic profile 
policies for healthcare, with widespread recognition. 
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7.4 Operational Requirements 
 
Application for a Certificate 
 
Procedures vary according to the category  that the applicant belongs to.  However, 
applications for Certificate requests may be submitted via: 
 
• An online procedure, using a www browser and contacting the Hippocrates 
RA web server. 
• By downloading the application form and delivering it by hand, with all the 
appropriate information. 
 
Certificate Issuance 
 
The BOCOC CA issues the certificate if, and only if, the authentication and the 
validation, of any given information of the subject, are successful.  
 
If the authentication is unsuccessful, the certificate is not issued and an e-mail, with 
the reasons behind the denial of issuance, is sent to the subject.  
Procedure for Revocation Request 
 
This can be done through the authorized RA electronically.   The entity requesting the 
revocation must authenticate itself in one of the following ways. By:  
• An e-mail to revocation.request@hippocrates.com.cy, signed by a valid BOCOC CA 
certificate belonging to a natural person. 
• Contacting the CA or RA authorized personnel and providing adequate proof 
of identification.  
 
Certificate Status or CRL Update 
 
CRLs shall be updated at least every 24 hours to ensure that the most recent CRL is 
available to the Relying Parties. A relying party must verify a certificate against the 
most recent CRL issued, in order to validate the use of the certificate.  Hippocrates 
RA was designed to have an on-line service that provides timely information 
regarding the revocation status of a certificate: certificate status can be viewed from 
the RA repository page. It is possible that some time passes until CA forwards 
updated CRLs and certificate statuses (see next paragraph). 
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Revocation Request Grace Period 
 
Unless there is a suspicion of a key compromise, any request for a revocation should 
be processed according to the order in which the requests are received (First In First 
Out).   
 
Types of Event Recorded 
 
The BOCOC CA should record in audit log files all events relating to the security of 
the CA system.  Logs should be electronic and should contain the date and time of the 
event, and the identity of the entity which caused the event. 
 
The BOCOC CA should also collect and consolidate, security information (not 
CAsystem generated) either electronically or manually. Such security information 
may be: 
• physical access logs 
• system configuration changes and maintenance 
• personnel changes 
• discrepancy and compromise reports 
• records of the destruction of media containing key 
• material, activation data, or personal Subscriber information 
 
Frequency of Processing Audit Log 
 
Audit logs will be reviewed at least weekly. Reviewing will give significant 
information on events such as security threats, CA compliance with the CP , and User 
compliance with the CP and the CPS.  
 
Retention Period for Audit Log 
 
This is for statistical analysis in case any security threats or disputes arises The 
BOCOC CA will keep the Audit logs for a minimum retention period of three years.  
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Audit Log Backup Procedures 
 
Logs are copied monthly to removable media and encrypted with a pass phrase of 
suitable length.   All backup procedures that are described in the Backup procedure 
chapter should be followed. 
 
Audit Collection System 
 
All actions taken by the Subscriber, along with the date and time of the actions, and 
the identity of the Subscriber, who caused the action will be audited. 
 
Retention Period for Archive 
 
The minimum retention period is three years; the maximum retention period is seven 
years.  
Integrity of the Backups 
 
As per the instructions that are given in the Backup policies of the BOCOC. 
 
Disaster Recovery Plan 
 
As per the instructions that are given in the Disaster Recovery of the BOCOC. 
7.5 Physical Security 
 
Physical Security -- Access Controls 
 
The CA operates in a controlled environment, where access is allowed to authorized 
people only.   The CA and RA are housed in the Bank of Cyprus Oncology Center in 
the Physics Department in the IT Room. 
 
Other Physical Security Aspects 
 
No unauthorized access to the hardware is permitted and all removable media are 
stored in secure containers.   Aspects such as: Air Conditioning, Water Exposures, 
Fire Prevention, Protection Media Storage Waste, and Disposal Off-site Backup 
should be covered in the disaster recovery plan of the Bank of Cyprus Oncology 
Center. 
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Multiple Roles (Number of Persons Required Per Task) 
 
The PKI should not be depended on a single person’s knowledge.  At least two people 
per role are expected to be available.  The administrators of the system will be 
assigned personnel duties as per their qualifications and will also decide on how the 
secrets of the CA system will be shared between them. 
 
Personal Security Controls 
 
Only trained persons, who are well aware of the necessary security requirements, may 
be CA managers.  
Background and Qualifications 
 
People with computer background and specialized in security aspects are definitely 
preferable. 
Documentation Supplied to Personnel 
 
The Personnel Agreement is included as an Appendix C. 
7.6 Technical Security Controls 
 
Technical Security Controls- Key Pair Generation 
 
For security reasons and to avoid any key compromise, users of the BOCOC CA will 
not be allowed to generate any key pairs. The BOCOC CA generates both public keys 
and private keys for end-entities.  
 
CA Public Key Delivery to Users 
 
CA certificate is available from its public repositories.  
 
Key Usage Purposes (As per X.509 v3 field) 
 
Keys may be used for authentication, non-repudiation, message integrity, and session 
key establishment.  Other key usages are: 
• BOCOC CA private key is the only key that can be used for signing 
Certificates and CRLs.  
The Certificate key Usage field must be used in accordance with RFC2459 [2] 
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Policy CA Private Signing Key 
 
The private signing key of the CA must be stored in an isolated machine, within a 
restricted area and under strict control, using at least a monitoring system. 
 
The key should be in an encrypted form and the activation data for the private key 
will be in the form of a password.  For the activation of the Policy CA Private Key, 
two persons must be presented. 
 
Private Key Backup 
 
A  BOCOC CA private key is kept, encrypted, in multiple copies and in different 
secure locations, on CD-ROMs.  
 
Public Key Archival 
 
The public key is archived as part of the certificate archival. Backup copies can be 
used as an archival service.  
Usage Periods for the Public and Private Keys   
 
The BOCOC CA has adopted the Constrains for Health Certificate Validity periods as 
mentioned in to RFC2459 for validity dates and to ISO/DTS 17090 - Part 3, Policy 
Validity Period [57] 
 
In general the following Validity period for keys will be applied: 
 
• Policy CA public signature verification key (2048 bits) and certificate – 
Twenty (20) years; 
• Policy CA private signing key (2048 bits) – Eight (8) years; 
• CA public signature verification key (2048 bits) and certificate – three years; 
• CA private signing key (2048 bits) – one year; 
• End Entity public signature verification key (1024 bits) and certificate – 
Twelve (12) years; 
• End Entity private signing key (1024 bits) – two years. 
• Key lengths must be at least 1024 bits and should be determined in 
organizational Threat-Risk Assessments. 
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Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements 
 
CA servers include the following functionalities:  
• Operating systems are maintained at a high level of security by applying all 
recommended and applicable security patches;  
• Monitoring is done to detect unauthorized software changes;  
• Services are reduced to the bare minimum;  
• Machines are protected by a suitably configured firewall, intrusion detection, 
and other spamming control machines. 
• The BOCOC CA used for signing certificates isn’t connected to any kind of 
networks, but instead is isolated and monitored. 
Security Management Controls 
 
The Local Area Network that hosts some of the PKI services i.e. RA services, is 
checked yearly, for tampering, using strong cryptographic techniques.    
Network Security Controls 
 
Intrusion detection and firewall were configured to allow requests only through port 
80 for http request, and SMTP connections for email requests. 
7.6 Certificate and CRL Profiles 
 
Certificate and CRL Profiles-Version Numbers 
 
X.509 v3.  
 
Name Forms 
 
Issuer: C=BOCOC CA, O=HIPPOCRATES-PKI, OU=Authority, CN=BOCOC 
Oncology CA (2)  
 
The Subject field contains a distinguished name of the entity with the following 
attributes:  
• countryName: ”CY”  
• organizationName: "HIPPOCRATES-PKI"  
• organizationalUnitName: “Personal Certificate” (for personal certificates);  
• ”Object Signer” (for object-signing certificates)  
 80
• localityName: the organization/Hospital where the subject resides;  
CA CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT –     
V 1.0 May 2003 
 
Other fields are: commonName: name and surname (natural person and object–
signing certificates) or DNS name (Digital Processing Entity certificates) and e-mail 
address of the subject (natural person and object-signing certificates) or of the 
manager (Digital Processing Entity certificates).  
 
CRL Profile 
 
X.509 v2  
7.7 Specification - Administration 
 
Specification Administration - Changes with Notification 
 
Prior to any changes to this certificate policy, the PMAC will notify all entities 
including subordinate CAs, and all CAs that are directly cross-certified with the 
Policy CA. 
 
Comment Period 
 
The comment period will be maximum 30 days.  
 
Publication and Notification Policies 
 
This policy definition, digitally signed by an authorized representative of the CA, is 
(currently) available in electronic form on the Internet at: http://www.hippocrates.org.cy  or 
via email from cp@hippocrates.com.cy. Other CAs issuing certificates that identify this 
certificate policy shall post copies of this CP on their CA web site. 
 
CPS Approval Procedures 
 
CPS contains information, relevant to the security of a CA, and more specific to this 
CP.  CPS must also be available on line for all Subscribers. The subscriber must 
accept both the CP and CPS prior to receiving the Certificate.  CPS can be found at 
http://www.hippocrates.org.cy/policies  or via an email from cps@hippocrates.com.cy 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
 
In today’s computing environment where the power of the Internet has opened the 
doors to a whole new realm of commerce, the need for a “solution” for secure, open 
and interoperable distributed networking is a must.  Many solutions have been 
considered in order to address these security concerns over the years, but none appear 
to provide a comprehensive solution, as the necessary trust by the users is still missing. 
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) was proposed to partly address the issue. This 
offers authentication, privacy, and non-repudiation, which are essential components to 
building the public’s trust [13, 29].  This thesis concentrated on a Health Care PKI 
System. A detailed analysis of the policies for the implementation of a Health care 
PKI System for Cyprus’s environment was given and contrasted with a number of 
other overseas PKI implementations.  Both the Certificate Policy (CP) and the 
Certificate Policy Statement (CPS) were based on the RFC 2527 and they were both 
modified to suit the Cyprus’s Environment.  The CP issues that were mentioned can 
be considered as general policies that some CAs can use as a reference to build up 
their own CPS.    
 
The advent of Health Care PKI System introduces new methods of providing security 
into unsecured networks and mistrusted areas such as the Internet.  As a result of the 
increasing demand for electronic transactions [58], the need for the adoption of the 
Health Care PKI System technology by health care organizations is rapidly increasing 
[58]. Nowadays a Health Care PKI System is the technology that can offer an 
integrated solution that alleviates the lack of insecure transactions and the fear of 
“spoofing” by third parties. It also provides the capability for authentication, integrity, 
and confidentiality, which are not given by any other security systems. A Health Care 
PKI System guarantees secure communication of individuals through a blend of 
technology, policy and administrative processes, which enable the exchange of 
sensitive data in an unsecured environment. This is done through:  (a) the use of 
“public key cryptography” in order to protect information in transit and (b) 
“certificates” to confirm the identity of a person or entity and establish a trusted 
relationship. 
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In addition to this a Health Care PKI System enables a whole realm of key 
management.  The management capabilities of  a Health Care PKI System include 
certificate validation and revocation, key backup and recovery, support for non-
repudiation of digital signatures, automatic update of key pairs and certificates, 
management of key histories, time stamping, and support for cross certification.  Each 
of these capabilities makes the maintenance of a Health Care PKI System easier and 
at the same time fewer resources are required. 
 
Further to that, the secure distribution of keys through the use of a certificate 
repository increases the trust within the Health Care PKI System community and 
makes the electronic communication easier.  As a result search requests are able to be 
serviced efficiently and distributed throughout the network to meet the requirements 
of even the highest volume of transactions. 
 
However, one of the overwhelming disadvantages of the Health Care PKI System 
solution is its high cost of implementation, especially the maintenance cost of the 
CRL [49].  Implementing a Health Care PKI System solution requires a good 
planning process and the necessary design.  Many planned Health Care PKI System 
implementations failed due to fact that the demanded attention was not shown to 
sensitive areas like the infrastructure security, training, etc.  Its high cost can also be 
increased if additional maintenance, redundancy and administrative overhead with 
multiple solutions are considered. 
 
Another disadvantage of the Health Care PKI System is the lack of standards 
supporting it.  While a number of standards have distinguished themselves as the 
standards to be followed, there are still too many other standards around that have not 
gained universal acceptance.  Only lately ISO, the International organization for 
standards, and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) have tried to find a 
solution to this problem by introducing the X.509 standard, which describes a basic 
electronic format for digital certificates and the Health Care PKI System standard 
using X.509  
 
The outcome of this thesis was the design and implementation of the Hippocrates PKI 
system, which is expected to become a general CA for the Health Care Sector in 
Cyprus.  All the hospitals and private health care organizations in Cyprus, whether 
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these are public or private, can belong to the Hippocrates PKI system. The 
Hippocrates CPS was derived from the CP mentioned in Chapter five (5) of the thesis. 
The sub-sections present in the Hippocrates CPS are there either due to small 
divergences from the general CP or to give specific information and details which a 
general CP does not cover.   
 
Hippocrates is expected, as far as architecture is concerned, to belong to the Cyprus 
root CA.  The users, i.e. health care professionals and patients need to support and 
trust Hippocrates for it to be widely adopted.  Hippocrates will initially be used as a 
pilot by the Bank of Cyprus Oncology Center in conjunction with the PASYKAF and 
the DITIS Project for the benefit of the Oncology Center, all oncologists, and the 
cancer patients.  However, a detailed auditing of all the policies is recommended, 
prior to its wider deployment. Accreditation from the Ministry of Health and the 
European Standards Organization is also required. Also a more formal mapping and 
evaluation of policies will enhance trust on Hippocrates and is recommended for 
future work. 
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Appendix A 
 
HIPPOCRATES-PKI Certificate Policy (CP) 
1.0 Introduction 
 
This part of the thesis specifies the procedures indicating the applicability of a certificate, 
for the operation of a particular community and/or class of application, with common 
security requirements.   It also defines the set of rules, called Certificate Policy (CP), for 
the operation and management practice of certification authorities (CAs) issuing qualified 
certificates.   Its purpose is to explain how the use of a CP creates the appropriate 
confidence in certificates, issued by a Certificate Authority (CA), complying with the 
particular policy.  Subscribers and other parties, certified by any particular CA, must have 
confidence in the applicability of the certificate.  
 
Considering that the health care sector is one of the most crucial sectors, where any 
patient information is important and any electronic communications between different 
parties is essential, the provision for secure and trusted systems must be provided.  
 
This CP is customized for health care; it focuses on requirements bound especially to the 
health care sector.  Each Certificate Authority (CA) that will be bound to the health care 
PKI system in the future is responsible of having its own specific Certification Practice 
Statement (CPS), which complements this CP.   This CP intends on complying with 
PKIX “Internet X.509 V3 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification 
Practices Framework” [1, 5]. 
1.0.1 Overview 
 
The aim of issuing this CP is to define policy requirements on the operation, management, 
and use of certificates containing public keys for digital signatures so that the assurance 
of the verification, authentication, data integrity and key agreement mechanisms will be 
well established.  The use of the certificates for any member of the PKI system is well 
identified by this CP.  The members are fully responsible and liable for any divergence of 
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the specific CP.  Certificate holders, who are using certificates, are obliged to consult 
their CA, in order to obtain further details for the implementation of this CP. This CP 
identifies specific roles, responsibilities and obligations for management, as well as 
supervising, and maintaining the PKI, which also assigns responsibilities for registering, 
and interpreting the specific CP.   All assigned duties and responsibilities of this policy 
shall be reflected in signed agreements between a CA and subscribers. A CA shall 
instruct Subscribers of their obligations, and of the intended use of certificates issued in 
compliance with this CP. 
 
Certificates may only be issued under this policy following validation of the Subscriber's 
identity and of the Subscriber’s responsibility and accountability for the certificate 
Subject. Identification and authentication shall be carried out in the manner set out in this 
policy.  All personal information collected by a CA, and not included in the certificate, 
may not be disclosed without consent of the Subscriber unless required by law. 
 
Any CA operating under this CP is required to have a Certificate Practice Statement 
(CPS), which states the practices the CA employs in issuing and managing certificates.  It 
is also required to assign tasks for the Registration Authorities (RAs). 
 
Any dispute concerning key or certificate management under this policy is to be resolved 
by the parties concerned as stated in this policy. 
1.0.2 Identification 
 
A unique object identifier for this CP has been assigned following the procedures 
specified in ISO/IEC and ITU standards.  This unique object identifier is part of a 
standard extension field of the X.509 certificate and specifies whether a particular 
certificate is suitable for the intended use. 
Certificate Policy Name: HIPPOCRATES-PKI-DigCertV1.0 
Object Identifier: 16582 (For General Internet Enterprise Number)   
More on Object Identifier can be found at http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers 
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1.0.3 Community and Applicability 
 
HIPPOCRATES-PKI is designed to provide trust within the health care sector. Members 
of this community can be any organization specialized in the health care sector, i.e. 
Private or governmental hospitals or clinics, doctors, health care professionals, and 
patients after the authorized approval from his/her health care professional.   Members of 
the HIPPOCRATES-PKI community shall provide services operating in compliance with 
this CP.   
1.0.3.1 Policy Management Authority Committee (PMAC) 
 
One member of HIPPOCRATES-PKI has the specific responsibility of being the Policy 
Management Authority of the PKI.  
 
The PMAC is responsible for: 
• Registering, interpreting and maintaining this CP, 
• Appointing a member of HIPPOCRATES-PKI to serve as the Policy CA for 
HIPPOCRATES-PKI, 
• Approving the CPSs of CAs in HIPPOCRATES-PKI, 
• Compliance inspections and general supervision of HIPPOCRATES-PKI, 
• Cross-certification with other PKIs and with CAs of other PKIs. 
 
The Bank of Cyprus Oncology Center7 will act as the PMAC for the HIPPOCRATES-
PKI. 
1.0.3.2 Certification Authorities (CAs) 
 
A Certificate Authority is a trusted authority in a network that issues and manages 
security credentials and public keys for message encryption.  As part of a PKI, a CA is 
                                                 
7  State of the art hospital built in Nicosia, Cyprus and specialized in cancer patient treatments. At this 
point, the system is intended to be used by BOC Oncology Center and DITIS-PASYKAF, always in 
accordance to Certificate Policy (CP) and Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) guidelines and procedures. 
In the future, the system is intended to be used by other healthcare organizations and individuals.   
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responsible for creating and signing certificates, distributing, and revoking digital 
certificates, binding subscribers, PKI personnel and (where permitted) other CAs to the 
public signature verification keys attributable to them. 
A Certificate Authority acts like a licensing authority.  Digital certificates are only issued 
to users who can prove their identity and credentials to the CA. By using a process called 
vetting, the CA examines traditional forms of identification before issuing a certificate. 
 
The Certificate Authority assigns responsibilities and duties to the RAs according to the 
CP compliance and is responsible for providing a Certificate Repository and a Certificate 
Status Service (CSS). 
 
Depending on the PKI implementation, the issued digital certificate of the CA includes 
the owner’s public key, the expiration date of the certificate, the owner’s name and other 
information about the public key owner along with the publishing of a CPS that includes 
reference to this CP. 
 
While an organization in the HIPPOCRATES-PKI community may use a contractor to 
provide (some of its) CA services, it remains responsible and accountable for the 
operation of its CA. 
1.0.3.3 Certificate Status Checking 
 
CAs revokes certificates when: 
• Information in the certificate becomes unexpectedly invalid 
• It is necessary to revoke the PKI privileges of a user 
 
The CA cannot delete the certificate or retrieve it from the user because the certificate is a 
public document that is used by thousands of PKI participants.  Instead, the digital 
certificate is marked as “revoked” in the CA’s database. 
 
PKI users can discover if a digital certificate has been revoked, by looking up the 
certificate’s validity in the CA’s database using a process called “real-time online 
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certificate status checking”.  By using this process, companies and organizations are 
always sure that certificate validity information is always fresh and accurate. 
 
Another method of certificate status checking requires PKI users to download a 
certificate revocation list (CRL), which is simply a list of certificates that have been 
revoked by the CA.  CRLs are generated periodically by a CA. 
Unfortunately, CRLs have many disadvantages. Firstly, they can be difficult to download 
and use.  Secondly, nobody is sure that their information is true, because if a CA issues a 
CRL daily and it revokes a certificate right after issuing a CRL, then the revocation will 
not be known to PKI users until the next day when the next CRL is issued.  Finally if a 
CA issues a CRL every day, then the users must download the CRL on a daily basis. 
 
Instead of doing all the above work, a real-time online certificate status checking, 
provides a better solution, by simply making the PKI users look up the certificate’s status 
in the CA’s database. This method is fast, easy to use, provides accurate and fresh status 
information and reduces risk. 
1.0.3.4 Registration Authorities 
 
Registration Authorities (RA) are primarily responsible for vetting certificate request.  
Approved certificate requests are sent to a CA and the CA creates the requested digital 
certificate.  Digital Certificates are distributed to users via the RA. RAs are also used to 
enroll new users into a PKI.  New users will apply for a certificate to the RA of their 
interest. The Registration Authority of the HIPPOCRATES-PKI is operating in 
compliance with this CP, and is responsible for all duties assigned by the CA and this CP. 
In some cases the RA may perform duties of more that one CA, provided that in doing so 
it satisfies all the requirements of this CP. 
 
The advantages of using RAs are: 
 
• With RAs, organizations can set up local or stand-alone enrollment centers at 
distributed geographic locations. Employees of an international company can be 
 A6
enrolled into a PKI via RA centers of the country they are living in. Digital 
certificates will be issued to these employees, by the company’s CA, which is 
located in the company’s country. 
• Organizations can separate the PKI operations performed by the CA and the RA. 
This is necessary if the organization wants to separate the certificate request 
process from the certificate issuing process. 
• Requests for digital certificates are sent to the RA instead of the CA, relieving CA 
administrators of the task of vetting certificate requests. 
1.0.3.5 Repositories 
 
All relying parties must be provided by the CA, with a Certificate repository or other 
certificate validation service. Both repositories and services must comply with the 
standards stated in the CPS, and must contain the following: 
 
• A copy of this policy and all other policies that affect the issue of the certificate 
along with all the policies referenced by issued certificates. 
• All issued certificates that reference this Policy.  
• Any past and current versions of the CA’s CP and CPS. 
• A Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or a certificate status database that may be 
accessed online (optional). 
• The CA’s certificate for its signing key. 
1.0.3.6 Sponsors 
 
A Sponsor is an organizational unit or officer with the authority to nominate a person to 
be a certificate Subscriber. 
 
The Sponsor may suggest appropriate distinguished names for Subjects and is responsible 
for either supplying or confirming authentication and certificate attribute details to the 
CA or RA. The Sponsor is also responsible for informing the CA or RA if the sponsor 
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relationship with the Subscriber has been terminated or changes such that certificates 
should be revoked. 
 
The PMAC is the sponsor of the Policy CA. 
1.0.3.7 Subscribers (subjects) 
 
A CA may only issue certificates after receiving approval from the RA. Any 
HIPPOCRATES-PKI Certificate holder that receives a certificate satisfying all the 
requirements of this CP, from a CA, is considered to be a subscriber.   Subscribers have a 
legitimate requirement to access, disclose, record, or otherwise manage personal, 
identifiable health information.  Eligibility for a certificate is at the sole discretion of the 
CA. 
 
According to this, CP Subscribers have been divided into different groups depending on 
their privilege for access to health information. 
 
Such groups are: 
 
• Healthcare Persons: All licensed healthcare professionals or affiliated with 
licensed healthcare organizations.  As a matter of statute, all licensed healthcare 
persons have health information privileges and responsibilities.  This group has 
the highest privileges among all other groups.  
• Nurses:  All licensed nurses working in a license health care organization, which 
is a member of this PKI system, are eligible for a digital certificate.   
• Healthcare workers:  This category includes all paramedic certified healthcare 
workers e.g. biomedical engineers, IT, secretaries, and also other persons, who 
have roles primarily within healthcare organizations. PMAC is responsible for the 
status of the privilege that shall be given to this group. 
• License Healthcare organizations: Includes other licensed healthcare 
organizations or clinics.   Healthcare organizations are eligible for healthcare 
certificates, which can be used for:  
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i. Certificate issuance, where the organization wishes to be a CA for its 
staff;   
ii. Authentication of health resources (servers); 
iii. Authentication of “role” proxies to provide support for the 
authentication of a functional group within the organization, where the 
individual identity of staff members is unimportant to business or 
practice partners.   
 
Examples of health care organizations include hospitals, Internet health care website 
providers, and health care research institutions.  However, the organizations should be 
recognized as being legally liable for their activities. 
 
• Patients: this group includes only those patients that have been appointed by the 
health care professional, as legitimate persons for the issuance of a digital 
certificate.  This group has limited rights and the use of certificates is limited to 
communications about the subject person’s health information. 
• Groups: These are collections of persons within an organization that share some 
common role.  Groups may be identified with a system account or NT domain.  
The Policy makes provisions to issue a certificate to a Group, provided some 
controls are maintained over the exercise of the related private key.   
• Medical Societies i.e. Anticancer Societies.  This group includes only licensed 
medical societies.  All legitimate societies are considered as healthcare 
organizations and their staff is subject to the groups that have been specified 
above.  
• Administrators: Have full rights to maintain, assist members, answer requests, and 
provide service of the system.  Specific rights to administrators of the PKI system 
are given by the PMAC.  Such rights may include different subcategories of 
administrators such as system maintenance, backup administrator, etc.  
• Relying Parties for healthcare certificates are, by definition, persons or 
organizations that have a legitimate need to access, disclose, manage or otherwise 
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manipulate personal identifiable health information.  Relying parties are 
themselves eligible for healthcare certificates. 
•  
Future Provisions may include also the following categories: 
 
Application /Devices: an identifiable computer running software process that is the 
holder of a private encipherment key 
 
Supporting organization:  Officially registered organizations that may provide services 
to a health care organization but which are not providing health care services.  Examples 
include health care financing bodies such as insurance institutions, suppliers of 
pharmaceuticals and other goods 
1.0.3.8 Subjects 
 
Provided that responsibility and accountability is attributable to the Subscribers as 
classified in 1.3.7, a CA may only issue certificates where the Subject is the Subscriber, 
or is an organizational role or an IT system. 
1.0.3.9 Policy Applicability 
 
This CP is applicable to all PKI authorized members.  However, the applicability of 
certificates issued in compliance with this policy does not rely solely on this compliance, 
but is critically dependent on involved IT-systems, as indicated in section 2.1.2.3. 
1.0.4. CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES 
1.0.4.1. Certificate Profile 
 
Certificates that reference this Policy shall contain public keys used for authenticating the 
sender of an electronic message and verifying the integrity of such messages, including 
public keys used for digital signature verification. All certificates that reference this 
Policy must be issued in the X509 format. CAs should identify in their CPS, the 
certificate extensions supported and they should state that such support should be 
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consistent with the Healthcare Certificate Profile detailed in an Attachment to this 
document.  
1.0.4.2 CRL Profile 
 
Any issued CRL by the CA must reference this policy and must be issued in the X.509 
version 3 formats.  In CRL’s it is recommended that the CRLNumber extension and the 
CRLReason extension be included and well indicated.  Finally, the CA’s public CPS 
shall identify the CRL extensions supported. 
 
1.0.5 Contact Details 
 
Any future modifications, alterations, interpretation, or maintenance which might be 
needed will be done once the system is up and running.    
 
Questions concerning this policy should be addressed to: hippocrates@hippocrates.org.cy 
General Requirements 
 
All requirements relating to the obligations of the, CAs, RAs, PMAC, Sponsors, 
Subscribers, and Relying Parties, and other issues pertaining to law and dispute resolution 
are clearly stated in this section. 
1.1.1 Obligations 
1.1.1.1 CA Obligations 
 
In the PKI model [48] the CA is the only responsible component for the issuance and 
general manageability of a certificate, i.e. verification of information contained in the 
certificate, revocation of a certificate, and renewal.  The CA may also take complete 
control over the application/enrollment process, the certificate manufacture, and the 
certificate publication.   The CA must ensure that all aspects related to services provided 
by its authority, and all of its operations performed, fully comply with the requirements, 
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representations, and warranties of this Policy and with the CA’s Certification Practices 
Statement (CPS).   
1.1.1.2 The Certificate Authority role over the Registration Authority  
 
The RA always operates in the interest of the CA.  The CA’s role, over the RA, is to 
ensure that all RAs operate and act in accordance to relevant provisions of this CP. A CA 
may not assign the duty of issuing a certificate to an RA.  
 
1.1.1.3 The Certificate Authority role over the Subscribers and Relying Parties 
 
The CA obligations over all subscribers, relying parties, and other certificate holders are 
firstly, to ensure that all are aware of their respective rights and obligations with respect 
to the operation of the CA and this CP.  Such an obligation should be in the form of a 
Subscriber Agreement, and with the issuing of a certification and its immediate 
publication to the repository, the CA should be able to certify that it has issued a 
certificate to a Subscriber that has entered into a Subscriber Agreement with the CA. 
1.1.1.4 Other CA obligations 
 
In accordance with this policy the CA that issues a healthcare certificate, certifies to the 
subscriber, and to all Qualified Relying Parties, that; 
 
• The CA is obliged to issue the CPS, and due to the fact that the CPS states in 
detail all the technical, procedural and personnel policies and practices of the CA, 
according to the requirements of the CP, it must be approved by the PMAC.  
• The CA is responsible of managing, and if necessary of revoking the certificate in 
accordance with this Policy. 
• The CA has taken all necessary steps to verify all information in the certificate. 
The CA guarantees that there are no misrepresentations of facts in the certificate. 
• The CA must include in its CPS, the specific measures undertaken to verify all 
information included in the certificate and articulate the major risks leading to 
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misinformation, which are not addressed by these measures.   If desired, the CA 
may assert in its CPS, dollar or other limits to its liability. 
• The CA guarantees that all issued certificates meet all requirements of this Policy 
and that they were processed according to the CA’s CPS. 
• The CA has a safe place to store all the Subscriber’s acceptance certificates8.  
• Maintain a CA Repository 
• Establish reliable mechanisms and procedures, to ensure that its RAs and 
Subscribers are aware of, and agree to conditions of this CP that apply to them. 
• Establish techniques to recognize any subordinate CA that complies with this CP.  
• Ensure the relying parties, by known mechanisms, that all the CA personnel 
associated with any PKI role must be individually accountable9 for any actions 
that will be performed. 
• The CA must structure its CPS so that proposed common practices for the PKI as 
a whole, are easily identified and referred to in the CPSs of subordinate CAs; 
• Must establish compliance inspection to be able to verify to the cross-certifying 
CAs that it complies with this CP. 
• Document any agreement with the cross certified CA regarding enhancements and 
assurances of the operational procedures, restrictions on the usage of the cross-
certificate, validity period for the cross-certificate, liability issues, etc. 
• Establish mechanisms to inform all relating parties, i.e. subscribers for all the 
disclaimers available to both CAs. 
• Ensure that the CP and the CPSs are publicly available on the CA Web Site 
• To prompt upon issuance published CA certificates and other certificates (after 
Subscriber consent) in the CA Repository 
• To ensure access controls for all authorized CA personnel.  Ca personnel may 
need to configure or modify the CA Web Site, CA Repository and CSS.  
                                                 
8  Acceptance Certificate, by the subscriber, states that the Subscriber accepts all obligations under this 
Policy.  
9 “Individually accountable” means that the CA and RA practices must ensure that there is evidence, which 
attributes an action to the person performing the action. 
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• The CA shall provide relevant information about issued certificates when 
necessary, to aid in resolving any dispute concerning digital signatures 
• Establish a certificate status service (CSS) mechanism to Subscribers and Relying 
Parties.  A CA must notify a Subscriber when a certificate, whose Subject is 
attributable to the Subscriber, is issued or revoked 
In general, the CA is responsible for performing all identification and authentication 
functions as well as all certificate manufacturing and issuing functions.  The CA warrants 
that all of its activities will be conducted in accordance with this Policy. 
 
1.1.1.5 CA- Subscriber Agreement  
 
The CA- Subscriber agreement should include key manageability, key protection, 
certificate validation, hardware and software relating aspects that are used in the PKI 
model [48], the certificate policy, and any other policies relating to the model.  
Procedures for communication between the Subscriber and the CA or RA, should also be 
included. These procedures include communication of changes in service delivery or 
changes to this policy, procedures for dealing with suspected key compromise, CA 
termination, description of the obligation of a Relying Party with respect to use, 
verification and validation of certificates and finally any limitations of liability as per the 
definition stated by the PKIX “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and 
CRL Profile” [1,2] in the user Notice field of the certificate.  All responsibilities for the 
above belong to the CA, which must be sue that all parties are fully aware and fully 
knowledgeable for their limitations and rights.   
 
The agreement should also specify to subscribers, the minimum requirements for the 
applications that are to be used with the certificates and services of the PKI.  As 
minimum requirements this policy states that the applications must correctly generate, 
protect, transfer and use the public and private keys, be capable of performing the 
appropriate certificate validity and verification checking, report appropriate information 
and warnings to the Relying Party, be operated in accordance with the IT Security Policy 
of the Organization.   Finally, the Subscriber should, in the agreement, give the CA 
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consent to collect, for the issuance of a certificate and otherwise for the agreement, 
necessary personal information about the Subscriber. Personal information collected by a 
CA, and not included in the certificate, may not be disclosed without consent of the 
Subscriber, unless required by law. 
1.1.1.6 Certificate Status 
 
The CA must inform all the Subscribers and all Relying parties of the Status of their 
certificates.  This will be done in terms of Validation, Renewal, Expiration, and 
Revocation. 
1.1.1.6.1 Validation Obligations 
 
The CA must establish mechanism that informs all Relying Parties of the certificate 
status (valid, suspended, or revoked).  Some of the acceptable mechanisms are, the 
distribution of certificate revocation lists (CRL) and an Online Certificate Status Protocol 
(OCSP) [24].  
1.1.1.6.2 Certificate Expiration, Revocation and Renewal 
 
A CA must ensure that any procedures for the expiration, revocation and renewal of a 
certificate will conform to the relevant provisions of this CP; and be expressly stated in 
the Subscriber Agreement, and any other applicable document outlining the terms and 
conditions of the certificate use. 
1.1.1.7 Protection of CA’s data 
 
The CA must ensure its personnel and its members, that all operational requirements and 
all physical and technical securities are applied for the safeness of their private keys and 
activation data. 
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1.1.1.8 Restrictions on CA’s Private Key Use 
 
A CA must be able to ensure that only its private key is used to sign certificates, CRLs 
and entries in an OCSS. In case a CA undertakes to act in accordance with other policies, 
using the same private key or issuing identity, these shall be identified in the CPS.  
1.1.2 PMAC Obligations 
 
The PMAC will be responsible for the supervision of HIPPOCRATES-PKI system. The 
PMAC is the sole responsible for the interpretation, maintenance, and registration of this 
policy.  The PMAC has to approve of all the policies and the CPS, before the CA starts 
its operation.  It shall also give further instructions to ensure that the policy CA operates 
in compliance with this CP and the intentions of the HIPPOCRATES-PKI . 
 
Periodic acceptance and compliance checks of the CA in accordance with this CP have to 
be done by the PMAC, in order to ensure that the performance of the CAs in 
HIPPOCRATES-PKI meet all the standards, established in their CPSs, and satisfy all the 
requirements of this CP. 
 
The PMAC, along with the committee it hires, will be responsible for accepting 
organizations, hospitals, health care professionals, etc as members of HIPPOCRATES-
PKI as far as the applicants meet all requirements specified in the subscribers section. 
 
Prior to the acceptance of other CAs, the PMAC has to validate and approve its CP and 
CPS.  In such cases the PMAC shall be able to include in the acceptance or rejection 
declaration form, any requirements that may need adding, for the compliance with this 
CP, for cross-certification or any other reasons for the denial of cross-certification. 
The PMAC decides whom to nominate as a Subscriber of certificates. This is to ensure 
that the subscriber can still work, in case of a debate between a subscriber and 
organization. The PMAC is also responsible for informing the CA or RA if the 
relationship between the Organization and the Subscriber terminates or changes such that 
certificates should be revoked. 
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1.1.3 RA Obligations 
 
Registration Authorities (RA), are used to enroll new users into a PKI.  The RA must be 
in full compliance with this CP and the CPS.  The RA is appointed by the CA to perform 
some of the duties of the CA and must operate on behalf of the CA.   If no RAs are 
appointed, all of the RA obligations turn to CA obligations. In the PKI model [48] the RA 
is responsible for informing all related parties i.e. subscribers, certificate holders, etc, of 
all relevant information regarding the rights and obligations of the CA, RA, and 
Subscriber contained in this CP, the Subscriber Agreement, and any other relevant 
document outlining the terms and conditions of certificate use. The RA is the only 
authority that submits subscribers’ information regarding an application for a certificate 
or renewal of a certificate to the CA.  However, prior to the submission of any 
information the RA is obliged to verify the identity and any other given information of 
that Subscriber and also to verify the authority of that Subscriber in receiving a certificate.  
RAs must not issue certificates; approved certificate requests are sent to a CA from an 
RA and the CA creates requested digital certificates.  There is no requirement for an RA 
to notify a Subscriber of the issuance or revocation of a certificate.   
 
In accordance with this policy the RA Obligations also include   
 
• Ensuring that private keys and activation data, used to access and operate RA 
applications for each person involved in RA duties, are protected in accordance 
with all security requirements stated in this policy. 
• Ensuring that private keys used by RA personnel to access and operate RA 
applications must not be used for any other purpose.  
• Identifying and recording any actions that are carried out by any individual in 
performance of RA duties 
1.1.4 Subscriber Obligations 
 
To become part of this PKI model [48] the subscriber must accept this CP and the CPS.  
The acceptance must be in the form of an agreement, which every Subscriber must enter.  
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This agreement clearly outlines the obligations of the subscriber and states the terms and 
conditions of use of the issued certificate, including permitted applications and purposes.  
The Subscriber must fulfill its obligations as stated in this Agreement. 
 
In the healthcare sector where many health care professionals operate as individuals and 
others as part of an organization or part of a referring group of people, the subscribers’ 
obligations vary and are depended on the individual situation. 
 
However, standardized obligations are often available, and cover all situations and users.  
Such obligations are: 
 
• Subscribers must take all reasonable measures for the protection of their private 
keys, and the prevention from loss disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use.   
• Upon any actual or suspected loss, disclosure, or other compromise, subscribers 
must immediately notify the CA that issued the certificate.    
• Subscribers are obliged to use their private keys of Subjects attributable to the 
Subscriber, only for the purposes identified in the CP  
The subscriber must be aware that at any given time the CA or RA may require additional 
information regarding its membership or its action within the PKI model.  The CA or RA 
may also require, from the subscriber, additional information regarding its application for 
a certificate.  The Subscriber is obliged to submit this information to the required 
authorities. Any submitted information must be complete and accurate. 
 
Further to the standardized or better to say “general” obligations that individuals, 
organizations, or groups must follow, there are obligations that are considered separately, 
depending on the category the subscriber belongs to.  These categories are defined 
depending on whether the Subscriber: 
 
• Is an individual,  
• Is an organization acquiring  the certificate and managing a private key on behalf 
of an identified individual, 
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• Is an organization obtaining certificates where the subject is a named Group. 
 
Obligations of Subscribers who act as individuals: 
 
In such a case the Subscriber Agreement will require that the Subscriber; 
 
• Use the certificate exclusively for authorized healthcare purposes, consistent with 
this Policy and this CPS. 
• Must attend any “individuals” subscribers’ meetings regarding training, problem 
discussions, and any other additional information. 
• Generate a key pair using a trustworthy system, or use a key pair generated in a 
secure hardware token by the CA or RA and take reasonable precautions to 
prevent any loss, disclosure, or unauthorized use of the private key. 
Obligations in the case where the Subscriber is an organization acquiring the certificate 
and managing a private key on behalf of an identified individual:   
 
In such a case the Subscriber Agreement will require that the Subscriber; 
 
• Uses the certificate exclusively for authorized healthcare purposes related to the 
organization.  
• States clearly on the certificate that the private key is maintained on behalf of the 
organization. 
• Uses the certificate in such a way so as not to go against the rights of any 
individual members of the organization. Further, the Subscriber must maintain a 
log of all use, of the organization’s private key, including the date and time of key 
use. 
• Makes sure that all users of the organizations attend any meetings held between 
other organizations that are members of this PKI model, to discuss variable 
problems, and for further training of the applications and the use of the certificate 
and the private key. 
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• Generates a key pair using a trustworthy system and take reasonable precautions 
to prevent any loss, disclosure, or unauthorized use of the private key. 
 
Obligations of an organization obtaining certificates where the subject is a named Group 
the CA shall require the Subscriber to: 
 
• Generate a key pair using a trustworthy system. 
• Clearly indicate on the certificate that the private key is maintained, by a party on 
behalf of a group of individuals.   
• Maintain processes that assure that the private key can be used only with the 
knowledge and explicit action of current member or members of the subject 
Group.  The Subscriber must detail conditions under which the Group private key 
may be used.   Further, the Subscriber must maintain a log of all use of the Group 
private key including the date and time of key use and identity of the person or 
persons invoking the key use.    
• It is intended that the Subscriber will place access control mechanisms to insure 
that only authorized persons are allowed to invoke use of the Group private key.  
• Assure that all members of the subject Group have received security training 
appropriate to the health information functions for which the certificate is issued. 
Also assure that all members will attend any discussion meetings held between 
individual groups of the PKI model. 
In General, each Subscriber must have explicitly acknowledged, to the CA, the 
Subscriber’s acceptance of the Subscriber's obligations under this Policy.  
1.1.5 Relying Party Obligations 
 
Prior to the use of the healthcare certificate a Relying Party must ensure that the 
certificate is appropriate and valid by checking the most recent CRL, other published 
revocation information, or any other list as specified by the  X.509 and PKIX  “Internet 
X.509  Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile” [1, 2]. The Relying Party 
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must check if the PKI can be trusted as well as checking that the purpose of issuing the 
certificate complies with this Policy and the CA’s CPS. 
1.1.6 Repository Obligations 
 
Each CA is responsible for maintaining an on-line repository or other certificate 
validation service that is available to Relying Parties in a 24-hour period, seven days a 
week.   
This repository shall contain  
• All CA-certificates and other published certificates. 
• An online certificate status database10 or an online Certificate Revocation List 
(CRL) [24].  
• The issued certificates that reference this Policy.  
• Past and current versions of the CA’s CPS or summary of key provisions.  
• Copy of this Policy and other policies referenced by issued certificates 
1.1.7 Liability 
 
This policy ensures that all PKI components [48], including the certification and 
repository services, issuance and revocation of certificates, and issuance of CRLs, is in 
accordance with this CP.  It also ensures its members that the CA will take all necessary 
measures to ensure that all RAs and Subscribers will follow the requirements of this 
policy when dealing with any certificates containing this policy’s OID or the associated 
keys.   It also assures that all certificates issued in compliance with this CP, and 
containing this policy’s OID are only relevant for authentication and for the protection of 
integrity of the transactions, within the approval limits of the organization.  Any 
falsification of the transaction would cause only administrative action for correction and 
may result in a financial loss.   In such a case, the CA has no obligations, and disclaims 
all liability for any use, other than the intended, as identified by this CP, for certificates 
issued under this CP.  In some cases the CA may make a legal claim for loss of its 
reputation.   The CA assumes no liability for the use of HIPPOCRATES-PKI certificates 
                                                 
10 Can be access online by use of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or LDAP query 
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or any associated public/private key pairs in relation to cross-certified CAs and their 
relying parties.  
 
However the CA is responsible for any damages due to the failure of the CA to comply 
with the terms of this Policy. The CA is also responsible towards Qualified Relying 
Parties, for any damages caused to any suitable applications or any loss of information 
due to this failure of compliance with this policy.   
 
The CA does not guarantee 100% availability of the CA services.  The CA informs its 
members that cases such as yearly services, warranty maintenance, system repair or 
factors outside the control of the CA, may affect such availability.   
 
Finally the Organization of the CA and its employees makes no representations, 
warranties or conditions, expressed or implied other than those expressly stated in this CP 
or its CPS.  Any disputes, concerning key or certificate management under this policy, 
are to be resolved by the concerned parties as stated in this policy with the help of the 
PMAC. 
1.1.8 Financial Responsibility 
 
Any financial responsibilities for the use of any of the CA services are weighted to the 
Organizations, individuals, or any other relying parties of the HIPPOCRATES-PKI.  
Each member can use a contractor to provide (some of) its CA services, with the only 
obligation for the contractor, the compliance with this Policy.  The cost of such use is 
also reflected on the individual member. 
1.1.9 Interpretation and Enforcement 
1.1.9.1 Governing Law 
 
The enforceability, construction, interpretation, and validity of this Policy and a CA’s 
CPS shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of Cyprus. Any agreements between 
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the CA and the members of the PKI MODEL [48] must also be constructed and governed 
under the Law of the Republic of Cyprus. 
1.1.9.2 Severity, Survival, Merger, Notice 
 
Any agreements by the CA must ensure that it will contain appropriate provisions 
governing severity, survival, merger or notice. 
1.1.9.3 Dispute Resolution Procedures 
 
Disputes are classified into two categories. The ones, within the organizations, that 
concerns key and certificate management, and the ones that are between Organizations of 
the HIPPOCRATES-PKI system.   For both situations disputes arising from this Policy or 
the CA’s CPS, unless precluded by governing laws or other agreements, shall be resolved 
pursuant to binding arbitration, in accordance with the procedure and mechanism the 
PMAC will establish.  If a Relying Party of a Subscriber submits a dispute to the PMAC, 
the PMAC is obliged to investigate all relevant situations prior to its decision. All 
disputes should be resolved by negotiation if possible. A dispute not settled by 
negotiation should be resolved in the Court in accordance with the Laws of the Republic 
of Cyprus.  Prior to resolving of the dispute in the court, the PMAC, being the only 
committee that can take decisions for the revocation, renewal, or approval of a certificate, 
can cooperate closely with the organization or individuals in resolving any disputes.    
 
A dispute relating to key and certificate management within an Organization shall be 
resolved by the appropriate organizational authority in conjunction with the Issuing CA.  
Each CA must ensure that any agreement it enters into, provides appropriate dispute 
resolution procedures. 
1.1.10 Fees 
 
This CP along with the CPS, that supports the CP, will be available on line at no charge. 
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1.1.11 Publication and Repository 
 
According to this policy, and the CA’s CPS, each CA must provide an on-line 
information utility that will be available to Relying Parties and will contain: 
 
• All the CA documents and all other policies related to this PKI model.   
• A CA Repository for publishing certificates and CRLs.  The CA Repository must 
comply with all Repository Obligations mentioned previously. 
• This CP as a full text version and its CPSs referencing this policy, digitally signed 
by an authorized representative of the CA.  This is needed, first to inform its 
members or any prospective members, but it will also be necessary for the 
purposes of any audit, inspection, and accreditation or cross-certification. 
• A yearly compliance inspection report that is prepared from the PMAC. 
• Irregularities found by the external inspectors. 
 
The on line information will be provided via the RA. 
1.1.11.1 Frequency of Publication 
 
Any information available to the CA must be published in the repository within 72 hours. 
Certificates issued by the CA referencing this Policy, will be published within 48, upon 
the receiving of the certificate from the Subscriber.  Any information related to this 
policy that affects the operation of the CA, i.e. information regarding revocation of a 
certificate, obligations, etc., must be available to the Subscriber immediately after the 
modification or alteration of this policy. 
1.1.12 Compliance Inspection 
 
External auditors must inspect the CA and RA performance prior to the initiation of their 
operation.  Thereafter external auditors must check and inspect, at least once a year, the 
compliance of the standards established in its CPS with this CP and all other relevant 
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policies, as well as the performance of the PKI components.  A compliance inspection 
report must be available on line to all subscribers and must be prepared by the PMAC.  
1.1.12.1 Inspector Obligations 
 
• To inspect whether the CPS outlines - in sufficient detail - the technical, 
procedural and personnel policies and practices of the CA.   
• To inspect whether the CPS meets the requirements of all the CPs supported by 
the CA. 
• To check the compliance of the PKI components [48] with this CP. 
• To inspect the performance of the CA and the CA compliance with the CP.  
• To supply the PMAC with any information that regards the compliance and 
performance of the PKI components with this policy.  
• To specify sufficient reasons to the PMAC why the CA has not complied with its 
CP at all times and state any periods of non-compliance. 
1.1.12.2 Inspectors Identity and Qualifications  
 
External inspectors must have sufficient knowledge of the PKI technology and 
cryptography techniques.  External inspectors must also have knowledge of the operation 
of the relevant PKI software and the operation of the PKI components [48] in accordance 
with this policy. 
1.1.12.3 Actions Taken as a Result of Inspection 
 
In cases where the CA or any other compartment of the PKI model [48] does not satisfy 
or comply with this policy or the CPS that is published in accordance with this policy, the 
PMAC must request immediately the relevant component (CA, RA, etc.) to make the 
appropriate modifications so that all irregularities may be corrected.  However, no PKI 
component [48] should stop its operation until the next programmed inspection.   
Operation shall discontinue according to the actions taken in the case of severe 
irregularities and in previous responses to problems. Any irregularities found must be 
published so that Subscribers must be aware.    
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1.1.13 Confidentiality Policy 
 
Any information regarding subscribers, which is submitted on applications or after the 
necessary investigation to identify the submitted applicant information, is confidential 
and belongs to the Subscriber.  This information will be kept confidential by the CA, 
shall be used only for the purpose collected, and such information shall not be released 
without the prior written consent of the Subscriber, unless otherwise required by law.   
With prior consent of subscribers, such information may be published in public 
directories.   Moreover, the private key of each Subject is to be held only by its 
Subscriber and must be kept confidential by them. Any disclosure by the Subscriber is at 
the Subscriber’s own risk. 
 
Alternatively, CA Certificates, CRLs, and personal or corporate information, appearing 
on them and in public directories, are not considered sensitive.  
1.2 Identification and Authentication 
1.2.1 Initial Registration 
 
Subject to all requirements stated under this security policy, below, the certificate 
applications will reach the RA  
 
• Via the electronic way, over a secure channel such as that provided by SSL / TLS 
or other suitably encrypted channels, using the public Internet.  
• Or an, in person, application directly to the RA. 
1.2.1.1 Types of Names 
 
According with PKIX “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL 
Profile” [1, 2] the following must be applied: 
The subject name (for certificate applicants) must have a distinguishable and unique 
Distinguish Name (DN) in the certificate subjectName field. The DN must not be blank. 
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In accordance with the RFC 2459, each Subject may have alternative names in the 
subjectAltName extension field, only if the CPS states whether an alternative name of a 
particular form shall be included in the certificate. 
 
Each subjectName field shall include a “CN=” component that specifies designation of 
the qualifying professional license or credential (e.g. MD The use of professional 
designations is limited to certificates issued to Independent Practitioners, in which case 
use of such designation is mandatory.  In the case of an organization, the name should 
reflect the legal name of the organization. 
 
Relying party implementations should be prepared to receive such standard credential 
designations in subject names. 
 
For certificates issued to members or patients, the subject DN must include an 
“OU=patient” or “OU=member” designation and include the name of the hospital, clinic, 
or center in the “O=” component of the DN.  
 
The DN for certificates issued to organizations in order to secure servers, must include 
the name of the server in the “CN=” component.  This name shall be of a form: <machine 
name>. <Domain name> and the name of the Organization in the “O=” component. 
  
The DN for certificates issued to a Group must include the name of the group in the CN 
component as follows: “CN= GROUP$ <group name>” and the name of the parent 
organization in the “O=” component. 
1.2.1.2 Name Meanings 
 
The contents of each certificate subjectName and issuerName must have a reasonable 
association with the authenticated name of the Subscriber.   It is also recommended that 
the organizationName component be included in the DN and that it should be the official 
name of the Organization. 
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The subject name must be listed in a certificate.  In the case of individuals this should be 
a combination of first name and/or initials and surname.   
 
Where subject private keys are not under the exclusive control of the subject and are 
managed by an organization, that organization’s designation must be included in the 
“O=” of the Subject DN. 
1.2.1.3 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms 
 
In the CPS, the CA stipulates how names are to be interpreted.  
 
1.2.1.4 Name Uniqueness 
 
The DN subject listed in a certificate must be unique among all Entities of a CA. For each 
Entity, the CA may issue additional numbers or letters to the commonName to ensure the 
uniqueness of the DN. The CA may issue multiple certificates, each with distinct key 
usage, to a single subscriber. 
1.2.1.5 Verification of Key Pair 
 
The identities of both the Subscriber and the issuing certificate must be confirmed before 
the certificate is issued.  The method that proves the possession of their respective private 
keys, should comply with current standards as stated in the CPS.  In the case where the 
Subscriber is not the certificate subject, the CA, either directly or through its agents (RA), 
should ensure that the individual or organization has established appropriate security 
mechanisms, to ensure that the person, group, server or process identified as the 
certificate subject, controls any private key use identified with the certificate. 
1.2.1.6 Authentication of Organization 
 
When an RA receives a certificate application from an organization, it has to be 
examined via methods that comply with this Certificate Policy. For the application to 
pass this examination, the RA has to ensure that: 
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• The organization exists and is qualified as per this Certificate Policy to be a 
Subscriber of a part of the Health Care CA. 
• That the certificate application was signed by an authorized representative of the 
organization.   
• That the information contained in the certificate application is correct. 
• Any additional business information such as legal name, type of entity, names of 
officers, addresses, phone numbers as well as any national payer or provider 
identifier, are provided. 
1.2.1.6.1 Authentication of non Healthcare Organizations acting as agents  
 
Organizations that do not belong in the Healthcare Sector, but are agents or business 
partners of healthcare organizations, are not allowed at the moment to receive a 
certificate.  However, any business partner they may have qualifies for a certificate, if it 
complies with this CP. 
1.2.1.7 Authentication of Individual -- Independent Practitioner 
 
Licensed healthcare persons may be authenticated by a variety of mechanisms depending 
upon the relationship between the CA and / or RA and the applicant.  However, in every 
case,  
• The measures will be taken by the RA, in order to confirm that the certificate 
request originated from the Subscriber.   These measures will be briefly described 
at the CPS and will be taken through non-electronic means, such as by contacting 
the Ministry of Health, the Subscriber, and the National Medical Committee.   
• The RA shall verify the currency and good standing of the qualifying license.  
• The RA shall also obtain and maintain a physical copy of a certificate application, 
containing the handwritten signature of the applicant.  This application shall 
include appropriate evidence concerning the accuracy of the provided information 
and an acknowledgement that a fake application may result in the prosecution of 
the applicant.  
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1.2.1.8 Authentication of Groups   
 
As with the case of the authentication of Organizations, the RA has to make the same 
verifications and measures to confirm that the applicant group complies with this CP 
However, in order for the RA to proceed with the acceptance of the application, in this 
case, the subscriber Group has to designate one or more Responsible Individuals, and 
authorize them to represent the Group.  The designated persons will act on behalf of the 
group and will be the leaders as far as checking, if the group complies with the CP and 
the CPS, is concerned. They should also be able to verify and confirm all identities of the 
people of the group, and to manage keys on behalf of the Group.  
1.2.2 Renewal Applications 
 
Subscribers are obliged to inform the RA, who originally registered them, of the 
expiration of their Healthcare Certificate two months prior to the scheduled expiration of 
the operational period of the certificate, provided the original certificate has not been 
suspended or revoked. A request by subscribers may be made electronically via a 
digitally signed message generated with the Subscriber's private key, corresponding to 
the public key contained in the original certificate or by a hand written message signed by 
the subscriber and containing a copy of the Subscriber ID.  Organizations are only 
obliged to apply for a renewal via the electronic method.   Renewal certificates must be 
issued without re-keying. Renewal with re-keying requires re-authentication of the 
subscriber by the RA just as with a first time application.  
 
Prior to re-issuance, the RA must once again confirm the accuracy of information 
contained in the certificate just as with a first time application.   
 
Depending on the Subscriber, the CA and RA may assign different validity periods for 
their Certifications, which Subscribers must follow. The maximum validity period shall 
not exceed the remaining validity period of the subscriber’s qualifying license.  Finally, 
the certificate validity period must not extend past the validity period of the CA's signed 
certificate.   
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1.2.3 Re-key after Revocation 
 
Revoked or expired certificates shall not be renewed.  Applicants whose certificates have 
been revoked due to a compromise of private key or expiration should apply for a 
certificate just as with a first-time application.  In this case, all measures for the 
validation, examination, and other procedures for the identification and the compliance of 
the Subscriber with this CP and the CPS will be taken.  After revocation a re-keying and 
a new certificate will be issued.  
1.2.4 Revocation Request 
 
A revocation request may be submitted electronically in such a way so as to prevent 
unauthorized revocation requests, but at the same time not compromising how quickly 
the process can be carried out, in case the need to quickly11 revoke certificates arises. For 
Groups, certificates may be revoked upon request by the Responsible Individuals 
representing the Group. 
1.2.5 Types of assurance  
 
Types of assurance should be well specified in the CPS. 
1.3 Operational Requirements 
 
This section specifies the requirements imposed, upon issuing CA, subject CAs, RAs, or 
end entities with respect to various operational activities. 
1.3.1 Application for a Certificate 
 
An applicant for a certificate must complete an application form either online from the 
RA website or by downloading a printed version of the form and completing it in hand 
writing.  Hand Written applications shall be delivered to the RA with all needed 
information. In the case where the applicant is not the Subscriber, proof of authorization 
to act on behalf of the prospective Subscriber is required.   
                                                 
11 In cases that Subscribers have lost their keys  
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Upon the acceptance of an application from the Subscriber, the CA must proceed with 
measures and mechanisms to ensure that the application is accompanied by the correct 
information as stated in the CP and the CPS.   
 
The objectives of the measures should be: 
 
• To  prove  the identity of the Subscriber in the case of an  Independent 
Practitioner,   
• To check if the organization or hospital is qualified for a certificate according to 
this CP, that a representative of the organization has given written proof of 
authorization when the applicant is not the Subject, and for proof of authorization 
that the signature of the Subject is attributable  
• To confirm that the applicant group complies with this CP and that designated 
persons will act on behalf of the group 
• To check if the Subscriber has understood the policies as stated in the CP and 
accepts the obligations as articulated in the Subscriber Agreement. For this reason 
the CA shall check whether the Subscriber has signed the Subscriber Agreement.    
 
All applications are subject to review, approval and acceptance, by the CA, and the 
decision of whether to issue a certificate is at the sole discretion of the CA. 
1.3.2 Application for a Cross-Certificate 
 
Some entities may trust and own certificates from different CAs.  In that case Cross 
certification is used to create the certificate between two CAs, and to minimize the 
certificate path between two subjects, when both CAs trust each other. 
 
The future need of a Cross Certification must be taken in to account.  For this reason, and 
in addition to all mechanisms and procedures stated above, when a CA encounters a 
request for cross-certification within the health care CA, this must be accompanied by its 
CP, the CPS, and a report mentioning the representatives, the managers, and all 
authorized personnel of the CA.  The CA is allowed to hire an external inspector to 
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validate that the CA satisfies the requirements of its CP.  All applications are subject to 
review, approval and acceptance by the CA and the decision of whether to issue a cross-
certificate is at the sole discretion of the CA. 
1.3.3 Certificate Issuance 
 
Upon successful completion of the Subscriber identification and authentication process, 
in accordance with this Policy, and the complete and final approval of the certificate 
application, the CA shall issue the requested certificate. 
 
All Subscribers will be notified of the final approval and the issuing of the certificate and 
arrangements will be made by the CA so that the certificate will be picked up by the 
Subscriber or the designated persons of the groups or the organization. The certificate 
will not be published by the CA until it has been accepted by the applicant.  Subscribers 
should notify the CA when they receive the certificate.  
 
 If the Subscriber has not notified the CA for the acceptance of the certificate within 30 
days of issuance, the certificate shall be revoked.  The CA, in its CPS, may set a lesser 
time limit. 
 
In the case of an organization or a group the designated responsible person is obliged to 
deliver the certificates and inform the CA of the delivery.  In every circumstance, the 
Responsible Individual must take steps to assure that the users have accepted 
responsibility for its use. 
1.3.4 Certificate Acceptance 
 
The subscriber is required to indicate acceptance or rejection of the certificate to the CA, 
in accordance with procedures and within a time frame established by the CA and 
specified in its CPS.  If the Subscriber does not indicate acceptance within the maximum 
time period, then the certificate shall be revoked.  Certificate acceptance can be 
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accomplished through electronic means with a digitally signed document using the issued 
certificate's related private key. 
1.3.5 Certificate Suspension and Revocation 
 
A certificate will be revoked by the CA immediately, at any given time, if the CA 
suspects or realizes that the Subscriber, organization, group, or any member of the group 
has failed to comply with obligations set out in this CP, the CPS, the Subscriber 
Agreement, or any applicable policy and law. RAs have a duty to inform the CA if they 
become aware of inaccuracy of the subject information in the certificate. 
 
Revocation of a certificate will also take place if any of the information in the certificate 
changes and is no longer true, upon request by the Subscriber12, If the CA determines that 
the certificate was not properly issued in accordance with this Policy and/or any 
applicable CPS, when the subscriber delays the indication of the acceptance of the 
certificate, and when the PMAC in its discretion instructs an issuing CA to do so, a 
certificate will be revoked.  Finally, in the event that the CA ceases operations, any 
certificate issued to and all certificates issued by the CA shall be revoked prior to the date 
the CA ceases operations. 
1.3.5.1 Who Can Request Revocation 
 
The revocation of a certificate may only be requested by: 
• The Subscriber in whose name the certificate was issued  
• The designated responsible individuals of the group or the organization  that are 
authorized to represent the group and the organization 
• The issuing CA or its delegate RA.  
• The PMAC  
 
The revocation of a CA-certificate may only be carried out by the CA, on whose behalf 
the CA-certificate was issued 
                                                 
12 A Subscriber may request revocation of the Subscriber’s certificate at any time for any reason. 
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1.3.5.2 Required Revocation 
 
A Subscriber or the designated responsible individual of the group or the organization 
must promptly request revocation of a certificate: 
 
• Whenever any of the information on the certificate changes or becomes obsolete. 
• Whenever the Subscriber suspects that someone else is using the certificate or the 
private key assigned with it. 
• Whenever the Subscriber loose his private key. 
1.3.5.3 Procedure for Revocation Request 
 
A certificate revocation request should be sent to the issuing CA as soon as possible after 
recognition of compromise or false subject information. This can be done through the 
authorized RA electronically and only if it is digitally signed with the private key of the 
Subscriber, or the Responsible Individual.  Alternatively the Subscriber, or Responsible 
Individuals, may request revocation by contacting the CA or RA authorized personnel 
and providing adequate proof of identification.  The CA must also ensure that these 
procedures and any additional procedures and requirements with respect to revocation are 
set out in the CPS.  All authenticated revocation requests, and any resulting actions taken 
by the CA, must be recorded and retained. When a certificate is revoked, full justification 
for the revocation must also be documented. 
1.3.5.4 Certificate Status or CRL Update 
 
After revocation, the CA should update its applicable certificate status databases and 
should publish the certificate in the next CRL it issues. However, an On-Line 
Revocation/Status Checking Availability may also be available for the certificate status.  
In this case such a database shall ordinarily be updated, promptly after revocation or 
suspension.   
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1.3.5.5 Revocation Request Grace Period 
 
Requests for revocation should be processed according to the order in which the requests 
are received.  In the case that the Subscriber suspects that someone else is using the 
certificate or the private key assigned with it or whenever the Subscriber looses his 
private key requests must be processed immediately.  The CA should state in its CPS the 
maximum time within which it will process certificate revocation requests. 
1.3.5.6 Certificate Suspension 
 
Certificates should be suspended by the CA, if the CA suspects unauthorized use of the 
certificate, and should proceed with further investigations.  Also upon notification of a 
temporary change in employment status of the Subscriber, this may result in the 
restriction of the Subscriber’s rights to access health information for that time.   
 
During suspension, a temporary13 healthcare certificate may be issued to the Subscriber, 
if the subscriber is otherwise eligible for new issues of such a certificate.  Upon removal 
of the first certificate from suspension, the interim certificate must be revoked.  
 
Certificate suspension may be supported by including the certificate in the CA's CRL 
with the CRLReason code specified as certficateHold with hold instruction id-
holdinstructon-reject.   A certificate is subsequently removed from suspension with a 
CRLReason entry removeFromCRL. 
1.3.5.7 CSS Publishing Frequency 
 
All updates of the CRL should be in accordance with the time specified in the CPS.  
However, CRLs shall be updated at least every 24 hours to ensure that the most recent 
CRL is available to Relying Parties.  
 
                                                 
13 Temporary means with Limited Valid License Period  
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1.3.6 Computer Security Audit Procedures 
 
All system components activities, i.e. logins, file access, requests, that are accessed by 
the Subscribers and may influence the outcome of issuing processes for certificates issued 
in compliance with this CP, the CRL, and any outcome of the Cross certificates, along 
with all events related to the security of the system, should be automatically recorded in 
audit trail files.   The CA should establish procedures for the regular review of these files, 
with respect to potential security incidents.  
1.3.6.1 Types of Event Recorded 
 
All logs should contain all the action taken by the Subscriber, the date and time of the 
actions, and the identity of the Subscriber, who caused the action. 
1.3.6.2 Frequency of Processing Audit Log 
 
A CA must ensure that CA personnel, as specified in the CPS, review its audit logs and 
that all significant events are explained and documented in an audit log summary.  All 
actions taken following these reviews must be documented and signed.   
1.3.6.3 Retention Period for Audit Log 
 
Recent audit logs must be retained for a time limit specified in the CPS, but no longer 
than thirty days for external inspection, in case that is needed.  
1.3.6.4 Protection of Audit Log 
 
All audit log files must be protected from unauthorized viewing, modifications, and 
deletions.  Manual audit information must be protected from unauthorized viewing, 
modification and destruction. 
1.3.6.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures 
 
Backups at regular times shall be made for all audit logs and audit summaries. 
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1.3.6.6 Audit Collection System 
 
A CA must ensure that the CPS specifies what information is logged. 
1.3.6.7 Vulnerability Assessments 
 
All audits are made to check the future vulnerabilities of the systems.  As a result the CA 
must ensure that vulnerability assessment is performed, reviewed and revised following 
an examination of these monitored events. 
1.3.7 Records archival 
 
Retention of records and storage media are often a legal requirement.  Therefore, the CA 
is obliged to maintain a suitable archiving and record retention procedure.  
1.3.7.1 Types of Records Archived 
 
The CA must ensure that the archiving of the following records / information is 
performed at regular time intervals. 
• The CP, the CPS, and all other related policies. 
• All applications for certificate and all accompanying information with the 
application regardless if the application was accepted or not. 
• All generated certificates and all information stored at the CRLs during regular 
times, including the status of the certificates. 
• All correspondence and contracts between the CA and RAs and the Subscribers. 
• Signed certificates and Key histories. 
• All computer security audit data.  
All this information should be given to all Subscribers and Relying Parties at any given 
time upon their request.  Such requests must be specified with a relevant purpose prior to 
the delivery of the information.  All requests shall be made electronically via the website.  
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1.3.8 Issues of Access Archiving Data 
 
The CA must be aware of some pitfalls posed by obsolete or redundant storage 
technologies, limiting the ability to access data.  For example, the CA must take measures 
to avoid a situation in which it is not possible to read information stored on “old” media, 
i.e. old tapes, because of the adoption of more modern techniques and technologies for 
storage. 
 
However, the CA must ensure that all of its records are safeguarded properly and are not 
inadequately stored, something which would result in the data being more susceptible to 
modification, deletion or corruption, thereby destroying the integrity of the contents.   
1.3.8.1 Retention Period for Archive 
 
In the health care sector, in general most of the health care organizations retain all patient 
records for at least 7 years.  Accordingly, the Health Care CA must establish mechanisms 
to ensure the retaining of the audit information, Subscriber Agreements and any 
inspection, audit, application, identification, authentication, acceptance and revocation 
information for at least seven years.  However, all issued Certificates, and CRL data 
generated by the CA, must be retained for at least one year after the expiration of the key 
material. 
1.3.8.2 Protection of Archive 
 
The integrity and availability of archive media must be ensured and protected.  An extra 
copy of the retained back up must be stored in a location other than the CA site and must 
be protected by either physical security alone, or a combination of physical and 
cryptographic protection.   However, if encryption has been used to ensure the protection 
of sensitive records any future access to the material may be jeopardized, if the CA does 
not take measures to avoid the reduction of control over the cryptographic Keys. 
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1.3.8.3 Integrity of the Backups 
 
A CA should establish those mechanisms that periodically verify the integrity of the 
backups.   In the case that any data is found to be corrupted or damaged in any way, it 
should be replaced with the other copy held in the separate location as soon as possible.  
The CA should also ensure availability of the archive and that archived information is 
stored in a readable format during its retention period, even if the CA’s operations are 
interrupted, suspended or terminated.  In that case the CA should end notification to all 
subscribers to ensure the continued availability of the archive.  
1.3.8.4 Archiving and CPS  
 
Any further details that subscribers need to know should be referred to them through the 
CPS. 
1.3.9 Disaster Recovery Plan 
 
The best way to prepare for a disaster is to avoid the disaster.  Today’s IT Systems are 
even more vulnerable to a variety of disruptions, i.e. disk failures, power outage, fire, 
terrorist actions, etc.  For these reasons, the CA must have in place an appropriate disaster 
recovery and business resumption plan in order to ensure its availability and maintain its 
uptime as high as possible.  This plan must explain step by step the procedures that need 
to be followed to re-establish the usual operation of the PKI system.  However its 
maximum allowable downtime must be stated in its CPS.  Also the selected technological 
framework should allow provisions that ensure the system’s availability.  Finally, the 
disaster recovery plan must be documented by the repository so that all parties will be 
aware of its procedures. 
1.3.10 Key Changeover 
 
A Subscriber, the CA, or the RA may initiate the key changeover process. Automated key 
changeover is permitted. A CA must ensure that the details of this process are indicated 
in its CPS. 
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Subscribers without valid keys must be re-authenticated by the CA or RA in the same 
manner as the initial registration.  
 
When a Subscriber’s certificate has been revoked as a result of non-compliance, the CA 
must verify that any reasons for non-compliance have been addressed to its satisfaction 
before certificate re-issuance. Keys may not be renewed using an expired digital 
signature key. 
 
New Policy CA keys shall be generated and a new self-signed CA certificate shall be 
issued at least three months before the expiration of the old private CA key. 
1.3.11 Entity Public Certificate Is Revoked 
 
In the case that a revocation of a CA’s certificate is needed, the CA, according to this 
policy, and as briefly described in the CPS, must notify the followings parties; 
 
• The PMAC 
• All of its subordinate CAs, if any; 
• All CAs with whom it is cross-certified, if any; 
• The RAs; 
• All Subscribers. 
The CA must also publish the certificate serial number to the CRL, revoke all CA-
certificates signed with the revoked certificate. 
 
After addressing the factors that led to revocation, the CA may generate a new CA 
signing key pair, re-issue certificates to all Subjects and ensure all CSS entries are signed 
using the new key. 
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1.3.11.1 Entity Key Is Compromised 
 
The CA must request immediate revocation of its certificate, in the event of compromise 
of its private key.  In such a situation, the CA has to revoke all certificates issued, using 
that key, and provide all Relying Parties with an appropriate notice.  
  
The CA will be eligible to start to re-issuing certificates to all Relying parties only after it 
has generated a new CA signing key pair and receives the new, requested CA certificate. 
In the event of the compromise, or suspected compromise, of any other Entity’s private 
key, the Entity must notify the CA immediately. 
1.3.12 CA Termination 
 
A CA ceases its operations only at the point where all services associated with a logical 
CA are terminated permanently.  In the event that a CA ceases operation, all Subscribers 
must be notified immediately upon the termination of operations. The issuer of any 
signed certificates, all its subordinate CAs, all CAs with whom it is cross- certified, and 
all other known Relying Parties, should also be notified. All certificates issued by the CA 
that reference this Policy, will be revoked no later than the time of termination and the 
CA must take all necessary measures to arrange for the continued retention of the CA’s 
keys and information. 
1.3.12.1 CA Change of Management 
 
In the event of a change in management of a CA’s operations, the CA must notify all 
Entities for which it has issued certificates, all CAs with whom it has cross-certified, all 
Subscribers, and the PMAC members. 
1.3.12.2 CA transfer of Operation 
 
In the event of a transfer of a CA’s operations to another CA, operating at a lower level 
of assurance, the certificates issued by the CA whose operations are being transferred 
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must be revoked through a CRL, signed by that CA, prior to the transfer.  All archives 
should be retained for all the time specified in the CPS.  
1.3.12.3 Physical, Procedural, and Personnel Security Controls 
 
Due to the importance of information and data, as well as the expenditure of the hardware 
components that a PKI system is consisted of, both the RA and the CA site must ensure 
that all security controls concerning aspects such as physical security, Trusted Roles, 
identification, and personnel training, are in place.  
1.3.13 Web Server Database Connectivity 
 
The CA will have to connect to the RA’s database. Therefore, the technology must 
support authentication and encrypted data flow from and to the DBMS. 
1.4 Physical Security -- Access Controls 
 
Both the CA and RA shall implement security controls in order to ensure that access to 
the sites is limited only to authorized personnel, listed in the access list.  For this reason 
security personnel shall monitor and inspect the site on a 24 hours a day, seven days a 
week basis.  Monitoring shall be done via electronic media and through periodical 
inspections of the Computer Hardware and Software components of the system, in order 
to ensure the integrity of the data and the equipment.  Electronic monitoring shall be done 
through a close control monitor system, whereas for periodical inspections a log file shall 
be used to record the time of the last inspection.  The security personnel will be obliged 
to record the time of login and logoff of all authorized personnel.  The security personnel 
must also escort all visitors and keep a log file with their identifications.   The log file 
shall be inspected periodically and the inspection procedure shall be well defined in the 
CPS. 
 
In the case of the RA, security access controls may be varied due to the fact that 
candidates for a certificate as specified in this policy are allowed to deliver Hand Written 
applications.  In this case, and in order for the RA to ensure its integrity and avoid any 
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contact of the candidate with the machines, different personnel shall be responsible for 
the acceptance of the application forms. 
1.4.1. Other Physical Security Aspects 
 
The CA must ensure that  
 
• All removable media and paper containing sensitive plain text information such as 
keys for signing certificates and CRLs, are stored in a secure container or safe. 
• The operation of the RA site provides appropriate security protection of the 
cryptographic module and the RA Administrator’s private key. The CA must 
conduct a threat and risk assessment. For example, the cryptographic module and 
the RA Administrator’s private key could be stored in a secure container or safe. 
• Any software or hardware that supports the functions of Responsible Individuals 
shall be appropriately protected 
1.4.2 Procedural Controls 
 
Trusted Roles are assigned to all personnel, who according to this policy and the CPS, 
have access to or control cryptographic operations, which may affect the global operation 
of the CA in the matters of CA’s issuance, use, revocation of certificates, and any other 
CA operations  i.e. CRL.  According to this policy this personnel list may include 
employees (such as system administration personnel, operators, and engineering 
personnel), contractors, consultants and executives who are designated to oversee the 
CA's operations of the CA.  Finally, individual Trusted Roles may be assigned by both 
CA and RA. 
1.4.2.1 RA Trusted Roles 
 
All RA personnel must understand their responsibility and their role for the identification 
and authentication of prospective Subscribers and perform the following functions: 
• Acceptance of requests for certificates, certificate change, and revocation; 
• Authentication of an applicant’s identity; 
 A44
• Transmission of applicant information to the CA; 
• Provision of authorization codes for on-line key exchange and certificate creation. 
1.4.2.2 CA Trusted Roles 
 
All CA personnel must understand their responsibility in ensuring the integrity and the 
high availability of the system. For this purpose a separation of duties for critical CA 
functions, in order to prevent one person from maliciously using the CA system without 
detection, is needed.  This separation will cover at the minimum the duties of day-to-day 
operators, system administrators, managements, and auditors of the system.  Of course 
any different arrangements of separation of duties may be acceptable, provided the brief 
description of the roles in the CPS. 
 
CA Security Managers role includes: 
• Assigning security privileges and access controls of CA Operators and System 
Administrators 
• Review of the audit log to detect CA Operators’ compliance with system security 
policy 
 
CA Operator role includes: 
• Configuring CA security policies; 
• Creation, renewal or revocation of certificates; 
• Generating, distributing, and otherwise managing CRLs 
 
CA System Administrator role includes: 
• Configuration and maintenance of the CA system hardware and software; 
• Creating emergency system restart media to recover from catastrophic system 
loss; 
• Performing system backups, software upgrades and recovery, including the secure 
storage and distribution of the backups and upgrades to an off-site location. 
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Only these personnel should have access to the hardware and software that controls the 
CA operation. 
 
CA Auditors role includes 
• Verification of audit logs;  
• Verification of CP and CPS compliance;  
1.4.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role 
 
Prior to the inclusion of any CA personnel to the Access List, the CA must establish 
proof of their identity and validity of their information.  For the personnel that is included 
in the Access List the CA must  
• Give a Certificate for the performance of their CA role.   
• Give them an account on the CA system. 
• Notify all Security Personnel for physical access to the CA system. 
 
Certificates and Accounts must: 
• Be directly attributable to an individual 
• Not be shared 
• Be restricted to actions authorized for that role, through the use of CA software, 
operating systems and procedural controls. 
 
CA operations must be secured.  For these reasons mechanisms such as token-based 
strong authentication and encryption, when accessed across a shared network, may be 
used. 
1.4.2.4 Multiple Roles (Number of Persons Required Per Task) 
 
The need of multiple roles among the different PKI systems is a must, not only to ensure 
that no single individual may gain access to Subscriber private keys stored by the CA, but 
also to ensure the high quality of services and proficiency.   The CA must ensure that for 
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operations such as Key Recovery or Key generation a multi user technique, preferably 
using a split-knowledge technique, such as twin passwords, must be performed. 
 
Multiple Roles are also useful, because of the fact that not only one user is appointed and 
eligible for one task, but more.  This gives flexibility to the user and to the CA not to 
depend on the knowledge of one person only. 
1.4.3 Personal Security Controls 
 
A CA must ensure that all personnel that are related with any duties with respect to the 
operation of a CA or RA must: 
 
• Be appointed in writing; 
• Be bound by contract to the terms and conditions of the position they are to fill; 
• According to their contract, not disclose any sensitive CA security-relevant 
information or Subscriber information; 
• Have received comprehensive training with respect to the duties they are to 
perform; 
• Not be assigned duties that may cause a conflict of interest with their CA or RA 
duties. 
1.4.3.1 Background and Qualifications 
 
All personnel must be unquestionably loyal, trustworthy and characterized by integrity, 
and should have demonstrated security consciousness and awareness in his or her daily 
activities.   All personnel should be able to perform its duties with caution and according 
to this CP and the CPS.  The CPS must describe any other different requirements to the 
above special requirements needed by the CA. 
1.4.3.2 Training Requirements 
 
All personnel that are related to any duties, with respect to the operation of a CA or RA, 
must receive comprehensive training.  The training will include: 
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• The CA/RA security principles and mechanisms; 
• This CP and the CPS 
• All PKI software versions in use on the CA and RA system; 
• All PKI duties they are expected to perform;  
• Disaster recovery and business continuity procedures. 
 
Refresher training and seminars will be held in order to ensure the high quality of 
knowledge and also to ensure the updateability of the personnel as regards to any changes 
of the system or this CP. 
1.4.3.3 Documentation Supplied to Personnel 
 
This CP and the CPS, along with all relevant documentations regarding the policies of the 
system, must be made available to the CA and RA personnel.   The CA should ensure 
that all personnel receive all relevant information along with the acceptance of their 
contract.  All personnel should sign a statement, stating that the person identified has 
been informed and acknowledged their understanding that certificates issued under this 
Policy should be used to facilitate appropriate access to personal health information and 
that such data is protected and any inappropriate acquisition and misuse may lead to a 
criminal penalty. 
1.4.4 Security and Confidentiality 
 
Due to the nature of the system, security and confidentiality are critical factors affecting 
the selection of the technological framework. The selected framework must provide the 
ability to authenticate and encrypt communication and to control access to the system’s 
components and resources. 
1.5 Technical Security Controls 
 
This section contains provisions of the public/private key pair management policy for 
CAs, RAs and end entities, and the corresponding technical controls. 
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1.5.1 Key Pair Generation 
 
Subscribers will not be allowed to generate their own key pairs.  Keys will be given to 
them by the CA, using an approved software or hardware component.  Hardware and 
software components must be evaluated and all their capabilities must be checked to see 
if they meet the technical specifications.   However, key pairs for CA and  RA must be 
generated in such a way that use of the private key, at all times, remains under the control 
of the authorized authority. 
1.5.1.1 Subscriber Public Key Delivery to CA 
 
The Subscriber’s public key must be transferred to the RA, which will store it to the CRL 
database. The CA in a way must ensure that:  
 
• The key has not been changed during transit. 
• The sender possesses the private key that corresponds to the transferred public 
key. 
• The sender of the public key is the legitimate user claimed in the certificate 
application.  
1.5.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Entity 
 
The private key should be delivered in hand to a physical person after proof of their 
identity. Guidelines should be given for the protection of the private key.  Private keys 
prior to the delivery should be encrypted with a minimum of an 8-bit password. 
1.5.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer 
 
The public signature verification key must be implemented and delivered to the CA, 
either via an on-line transaction, i.e. through the web interface, in accordance with the 
PKIX ”Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols” [1,2], 
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or via an equally secure manner stated in the CPS.  This should be done after a request is 
made. 
1.5.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Users 
 
The CA’s public signature verification key should be available via the CA’s Repository.  
A legitimate user should be allowed to directly access the repository database. 
1.5.1.5 Key Sizes  
 
Key sizes should be long enough to provide adequate protection.  As a result each CA 
must ensure that each certified public key is of the type and length stated in this policy.   
Key sizes are currently specified [61] as 1024 bits for Public Key Cryptosystems (e.g., 
RSA [9]) and 160 bits for Elliptical Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) [42]. 
1.5.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation 
 
Parameters, if any, shall be specified in the CPS. 
1.5.1.7 Parameter Quality Checking 
 
Parameters, if any, shall be specified in the CPS 
1.5.2 Hardware/Software Key Generation 
 
All software and hardware of interest to the CA should be evaluated prior to using.  All 
components chosen will be the ones that comply with the specifications given by this CP.  
1.5.2.1 Key Usage Purposes (As per X.509 v3 field) 
 
As per PKIX ”Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile” [1, 
2] the CA signing keys may be used for signing certificates and CRLs, whereas the End 
Entity signing keys may be used for authentication, non-repudiation and message 
integrity.  Both keys may also be used for session key establishment.  The name of the 
field as per the X. 509 is specified as KeyUsage field.  
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1.5.3 Private Key Protections 
 
The CA should make it clear that it does not have any legal or ethical responsibility and 
is not liable in the case of a private key being misused. 
1.5.3.1 Policy CA Private Signing Key 
 
The private signing key of the CA must be well protected from any disclosure and 
unauthorized use, especially when not active.  In such a case, the key must be stored in an 
encrypted form. The activation data for the private key may be in the form of a password.  
Two persons must participate or be present to activate the Policy CA’s private signing 
key. It is recommended that the CA’s private key be stored in an isolated machine within 
a restricted area and under strict control as to who may have access to this machine. 
Regular backups should be made so as to minimize the recovering time in case of system 
disaster.   For backups the system should provide at least the same level of protection in 
all situations as stipulated for the regular active private signing key.  The procedures used 
shall be described in the CPS. 
1.5.3.2 End Entity Private Signing Key 
 
Guidelines should be given to the Subscriber for the protection of his private keys from 
disclosure. When not active, the private key must be stored in encrypted form, to protect 
it from unauthorized use. The activation data for the private key may be in the form of a 
password.   Occasionally backups are also recommended for avoiding the possibility of 
loses.  Subscribers are advised to copy and store their keys in an encrypted form. 
1.5.3.3 Private Key Backup 
 
As mentioned earlier the Subscribers are recommended to back up the Subscribers’ 
private key.  For this reason, the CA / RA should inform Subscribers of the consequences 
of the non-availability of the private key, and they should give them guidance for the 
appropriate method(s) for key backup.  
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1.5.4 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management 
1.5.4.1 Public Key Archival 
 
All public keys are archived by the Issuing CA. 
1.5.4.2 Usage Periods for the Public and Private Keys 
 
Suggested validity periods for keys are: 
• Policy CA public signature verification key (2048 bits) and certificate – ten years; 
• Policy CA private signing key (2048 bits) – seven years; 
• CA public signature verification key (2048 bits) and certificate – three years; 
• CA private signing key (2048 bits) – one year; 
• End Entity public signature verification key (1024 bits) and certificate – two 
years; 
• End Entity private signing key (1024 bits) – two years. 
• Key lengths must be at least 1024 bits and should be determined in organizational 
Threat-Risk Assessments. 
 
Key lengths and validity periods shall be stated in the CPS. 
 
However to minimize the risk of key misuse, the keys should be renewed every year. 
1.5.4.3 Destroying Private Keys 
 
Upon expiration, revocation of a certificate, or other termination of the use of a private 
key, used for creating signatures, all copies of the private key should be securely 
destroyed. 
 
1.5.5 Activation Data 
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Any activation data must be unique, unpredictable, and must have an appropriate level of 
strength for the keys or data to be protected. Where passwords are used, an Entity must 
have the capability to change its password at any time. 
1.5.6 Restrictions on Private Key Use 
 
The CA's signing key shall be used only for signing certificates and revocation lists. 
Separate Keys are often used for signing certificates and for signing CRL or other 
revocation information. 
 
The RA’s private key should be used only to support the RA function unless specifically 
authorized by the CA. 
1.5.7 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements 
 
All workstations and servers used in the CA system should be configured to provide the 
minimal functionality required to provide the assigned CA or RA services. Operating 
systems along with the PKI software must provide access control and trace-ability down 
to an individual level on all transactions and functions affecting the use of CA’s private 
signing keys as described in the CPS.  
 
Local Security Policies should be well designed in order to provide the best security 
required for the local personnel, using the PKI CA software.  Any initializations of the 
system, operating a CA’s private signing keys can be performed by at least two operators, 
both of which are securely identified by the system. A detailed log file must be kept to 
record with all important steps of the initializing process. The CPS shall include a 
description of significant security measures for the CA system. 
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1.5.8 Life Cycle Technical Controls 
1.5.8.1 System Development Controls 
 
All cryptographic modules developed must be tested prior to usage.  All modules must 
have been developed using well-established techniques and methodology. 
1.5.8.2 Security Management Controls 
 
Any alterations of the computer hardware or any modifications, upgrades of the system, 
or any changes of the configurations must be documented and controlled. The PMAC 
shall be notified of any significant changes. 
1.5.8.3 Network Security Controls 
 
The CA server and repository must be protected through application level (proxy) 
firewalls configured to allow only the protocols and commands required for the CA’s 
services. 
 
The PKI system must be protected from any attacks through any open or general-purpose 
network with which it is connected, i.e. the Internet.   For this purpose the system must be 
protected through an integrated solution that involves the implementation and 
configuration of firewalls, intrusion detection, and other spamming equipment.  Such 
protection must be provided, to allow only the protocols and ports that are required for 
the operation of the CA to pass thru. All required protocols must be defined in the CPS.  
Finally, Communications over an external network always require the establishment of an 
encrypted channel of sufficient strength. 
1.5.9 Web Server Security 
 
The technology must be such that the web server limits user’s access to specific resources 
and folders. An important issue that is often overlooked nowadays during the 
configuration of a web server, is the ability to retrieve a list with the contents of a 
directory. The web server must be configured in such a way that users are not allowed to 
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see a listing with the contents of directories (files and subfolders).  More on Web Server 
Security can be found in Appendix D. 
1.5.10 Operating System Security 
 
The operating system and its configuration must provide filesystem security; that is, 
every user account should have limited, predefined access to the system’s folders and 
files. Moreover, the selected operating system should allow the deployment and use of 
other security techniques such as software firewalls and software intrusion detection 
systems. 
1.5.11 Database Security with Discretionary Access Control 
 
The selected DBMS must allow the ability to create, modify and delete user accounts in 
the database level. The DBMS must support discretionary access control; i.e. it should 
provide the DBA with the ability to define the tables to which a user has access to, as 
well as the kind of access (INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, SELECT). 
 
This kind of control allows the minimization of the chances of a particular user damaging 
the database. For example, unregistered users who access the system through their web 
browser, to apply for registration, will logon to the database with a specific, limited 
capabilities account; this account will be configured in such a way by the DBA so that it 
restricts the user’s ability to manipulate the database. For instance it may allow the user 
only to INSERT an entry into the application requests table, but not UPDATE it. So even 
if the user gains the ability to send raw SQL commands to the database, he will not be 
able to change his request status, delete other users’ requests, view other users’ requests, 
steel passwords, access other tables etc. 
1.5.12 Reliability 
 
The technological framework must provide system reliability; i.e. the system must always 
produce correct results. In order to achieve this requirement, the use of popular, well-
tested and mature software is suggested. 
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1.5.13 Resilience 
 
The technological framework must provide the means to build a resilient system; i.e. the 
system must prevent data from being damaged in cases of failure. Since the core of the 
system will be based on databases, the use of a DBMS, which ensures the ACID14 
properties, is critical. No compromise should be made in favor of low cost. 
1.6 Certificate and CRL Profiles 
 
This section specifies the certificate format and the CRL format.  Any further coding 
conversations or any other specific information regarding the content required, 
recommended fields, extensions, and CRLs, should be specified in the CPS. 
1.6.1 Certificate Profile 
 
Public keys shall be contain in the Certificates that reference this Policy and shall be used 
for authenticating the sender of an electronic message and verifying the integrity of such 
messages, including public keys used for digital signature verification. 
 
All certificates that reference this Policy must be issued in accordance to the X.509 
format.  CAs should identify in their CPS, the certificate extensions supported. Such 
support should be consistent with the Healthcare Certificate Profile detailed in an 
attachment to this document. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 ACID stands for Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation and Durability. These are the attributes any serious 
DBMS must possess. 
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1.6.1.1 Version Numbers 
 
The CA must issue X.509 Version 3 certificates, in accordance with the PKIX “Internet 
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile” RFC2459[2]. 
 
The values of the base (non-extension) X.509 fields shall be: 
 
Field Comment Content 
Version Version of X.509 certificate, version is 3 
serialNumber Unique serial number for certificate 
Signature The OID for the algorithm used by the CA to sign the certificate. 
Issuer X.501 type distinguished name of CA. 
Validity The first and last date in the validity period for the certificate 
Subject Distinguished name of the entity to which the certificate is issued. 
 
Table 1:The values of the base (non-extension) X.509 fields 
1.6.1.2 Certificate Extensions 
 
The following table states extensions that: are required, recommended, not recommended, 
and not allowed, in certificates complying with this CP. It also states whether each 
extension should be marked as critical or not: 
 
 
Extension Required Recommended 
Not 
recommended 
 
Not allowed 
 
authorityKeyIdentifier NC    
subjectKeyIdentifier NC    
keyUsage C    
certificatePolicies  NC   
policyMapping    EE, CA 
subjectAltName  NC   
issuerAltName  NC   
subjectDirectoryAttributes    EE, CA 
basicConstraints CA/C   EE 
extKeyUsage  If applicable: 
EE, CA / C 
  
cRLDistributionPoint  NC   
authorityInformationAccess    EE, CA 
nameConstrains    EE, CA 
OCSPNocheck    EE, CA 
policyConstraints    EE, CA 
privateKeyUsagePeriod    EE, CA 
 
C = critical, NC = noncritical, EE = End Entity certificate, CA = CA certificate 
Table 2:Table Extensions Criticallity 
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The following table specifies the values of certificate extensions and recommends values 
for some recommended extensions. 
 
Extension Comment Content 
authorityKeyIdentifier Can be used to identify a particular public key when a CA has 
several. Fingerprint of CAs public key, and serial number of CA 
certificate. 
subjectKeyIdentifier Fingerprint of the subjectPublicKey. 
keyUsage End Entity certificate – RSA key: digitalSignature, 
nonRepudiation, keyEncipherment. CA certificate – RSA key: 
keyCertSign, cRLSign. 
certificatePolicies End Entity and cross-certification certificate: OID, URI of CPS and 
UserNotice CA certificate – OID. 
subjectAltName E-mail address is recommended. 
issuerAltName E-mail address, and http URI to CA web site are recommended. 
basicConstraints CA certificate: true 
Shall not appear in end End Entity certificates 
cRLDistributionPoint URI of CRL. 
 
Table 3: The values of required certificate extensions 
1.6.1.3 Cryptographic Algorithm Object Identifiers 
 
The following algorithms, for signing and verification, must be supported by the CA and 
the End Entities: 
 
RSA – {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }; 
SHA-1 – sha1WithRSAEncryption, {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 
pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 5 }. 
 
In addition, the CA and End Entities must support the algorithms approved by PKIX 
“Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile” [2] for 
verification. 
1.6.1.4 Name Forms 
 
Each DN must be in the form of an X.501 UTF8 String. 
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1.6.1.5 Processing Semantics for Critical Certificate Policy Extension 
 
Critical extensions should be interpreted as defined in PKIX “Internet X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile” [2].  
1.6.2 CRL Profile 
 
All PKI End Entity software must support and correctly process the CRL fields and 
extensions identified in PKIX “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and 
CRL Profile” [2].  Any CRL issued by a CA referencing this Policy must include the 
CRLNumber extension; use of the CRLReason extension is recommended.  The CA’s 
public CPS shall identify the CRL extensions supported. 
 
 
CRL Field Comment -Content 
version X.509 CRL, version is 3 
signature and signatureAlgorithm sha-1WithRSAEncryption shall be used by the CA to sign the CRL. 
OID: {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs- 
1(1) 5 } 
issuer  
thisUpdate Required 
nextUpdate Required 
CRL Entry Field  
userCertificate Serial number of revoked certificate 
revocationDate Required 
 
Table 4: Supported Extensions 
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1.6.2.1 1 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions 
 
All PKI user software must correctly process all CRL extensions and CRL entry 
extensions identified in PKIX “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and 
CRL Profile” [2]. The following table lists CRL extensions and CRL entry extensions 
that are required, recommended, and allowed in CRLs complying with this CP. It also 
states whether each extension shall be marked critical or not: 
 
 
CRL Extension Required Recommended Allowed 
 
authorityKeyIdentifier NC   
issuerAltName  NC  
CRL Entry Extension    
reasonCode NC   
invalidityDate  NC  
 
Table 5: CRL Extension Criticallity 
The following table gives the stipulations for the extensions and entry extensions: 
 
CRL Extension Comment – Content 
 
authorityKeyIdentifier Can be used to identify a particular public key 
when a CA has several. Fingerprint of CAs public 
key, and serial number of CA certificate. 
issuerAltName E-mail address, and http URI to CA web site are 
recommended. 
CRL Entry Extension 
 
 
reasonCode Specified reason codes are strongly 
recommended. 
 
invalidityDate Date of known or suspected compromise or 
invalidation. 
Table 6: Extensions Stipulations 
1.7 Specification Administration 
1.7.1 Changes with Notification 
 
Prior to any changes to this certificate policy, the PMAC will notify all entities including 
subordinate CAs, and all CAs that are directly cross-certified with the Policy CA. 
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1.7.1.1 List of Items 
 
All items, except the contact information in this certificate policy, are subject to the 
notification requirement. 
1.7.1.2 Notification Mechanism 
 
The notification will be stated by PMAC and must contain a statement of the proposed 
changes, the final date of receipt of comments from entities, and the proposed effective 
date of change.  Notification of the changes along with the proposed changes will be 
available on line at the RA web site.  All subordinate CAs will be notified by the PMAC, 
in writing. 
1.7.1.3 Comment Period 
 
The comment period will be maximum 30 days unless otherwise specified in the CPS.  
The comment period will be defined in the notification. If a proposed change is modified 
as a result of such comments, a new notice of the modified proposed change shall be 
published. 
1.7.1.4 Mechanism to Handle Comments 
 
Proposed Comments by impacted users must be handed directly to the PMAC within the 
time limit and no later than the time specified in the CPS.  Decisions with respect to the 
proposed changes are at the sole discretion of the PMA. 
1.7.1.5 Period for Final Change Notice 
 
The PMAC will determine the period for final change notice. 
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1.7.1.6 Items Whose Change Requires a New Policy 
 
If a policy change is determined by the PMAC to warrant the issuance of a new policy, 
the PMAC may assign a new Object Identifier (OID) for the modified policy.  The new 
assign number will be a under the original root OID. 
1.7.2 Publication and Notification Policies 
 
This policy definition, digitally signed by an authorized representative of the CA, is 
(currently) available in electronic form on the Internet at: 
http://www.hippocrates.org.cy/policies.htm  or via email from cp@hippocrates.com.cy. Other CAs issuing 
certificates that identify this certificate policy shall post copies of this CP on their CA 
web site. 
1.7.3 CPS Approval Procedures 
 
CPS contains information, relevant to the security of a CA, and more specific to this CP.  
CPS must also be available on line for all Subscribers. The subscriber must accept both 
CP and CPS prior to receiving the Certificate.  CPS can be found at 
http://www.hippocratres.org.cy  or via an email from cps@hippocrates.com.cy. 
1.8 Policy Administration 
 
Any party that registers an OID for this Policy (the Registering Party), will provide notice 
of any proposed changes to this policy, which may materially impact users of this Policy.  
The Registering Party will make reasonable attempts to directly notify CAs known to 
have implemented this Policy, who then are required to notify their Subscribers.  Notice 
can be accomplished either electronically or by mail. The Registering Party will post the 
proposed changes in electronic form, on the Internet.   
If the changes to the Policy will have a material affect upon acceptance by Relying 
Parties, the new Policy created by the application of the proposed changes should be 
assigned an OID, distinct from that assigned to this Policy. 
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1.9 Personnel Expertise 
 
The selection of a particular framework should take into account the current personnel’s 
expertise. The use of familiar and easy to learn technology is highly desirable, as it will 
lead to faster implementation, quicker response when changes are required and less 
training cost 
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Basic Structure of an X509 v3 Certificate 
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Appendix C 
 
Hippocrates CA/RA Personnel Agreement 
 
Hippocrates Certificate Authority (CA) system has the obligation and responsibility to ensure the 
trustworthiness of the provided services and protect confidential information processed, at all times. 
Hippocrates CA system is supported by the job function of appropriate Certificate Authority (CA) and 
Registration Authority (RA) personnel who must obey to the following rules and procedures:  
 
(1) Demonstrate integrity and confidentiality. 
 
All personnel have an obligation to act in a conscious, loyal and secure way in all daily activities regarding 
the operation of Hippocrates CA system. If for any reason any employee is found revealing any sensitive 
CA security-relevant information or Subscriber information will be held liable for his/her action and legal 
measures may be forced against him/her. 
 
2) Read and Adhere to Hippocrates Agreed Procedures. 
 
All personnel must understand the guidelines provided in Hippocrates Certificate Policy (CP) and 
Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) and perform their duties according to them. The CP and CPS must be 
made available to CA and RA personnel by an appointive officer.  
 
(3) Willing to receive appropriate training. 
 
All personnel, according to their duties and in respect to the operation of CA or RA, must be willing to 
receive comprehensive training on the following areas: 
• The CA/RA security principles and mechanisms 
• The CP and CPS guidelines and their practical implementation 
• All PKI software versions in use on the CA and RA system 
• All PKI duties they are expected to perform 
• Disaster recovery and business continuity procedures 
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(4) Acknowledge the proper and legitimate Usage of Hippocrates CA’s Public Key Certificates. 
 
Upon agreeing to subscribe to a certificate, all personnel acknowledge that it should be used to facilitate 
appropriate access to personal health information and that such data is protected from disclosure or other 
malicious activity. Any inappropriate acquisition and misuse may lead to a criminal penalty. 
 
 
 
I acknowledge that I have read, understood and accept the terms of this document and I will comply with 
the recommended procedures.  
 
Signature ____________________                                     Date_________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 C3
Hippocrates End User Agreement 
 
 
A certification authority has the obligation and responsibility to ensure the trustworthiness and security of the 
certification process. However, the certification authority alone cannot ensure trustworthiness and security; the 
subscribers and relying parties also have duties, as far as making sure that the certification process is secure and 
trustworthy is regarded. 
 
The terms “End User” and “Subscriber” hereinafter refer to: (a) an identified individual on behalf of whom the 
certificate is being issued, and who is managing the private key (b) an identified organization acquiring the 
certificate and managing the private key on behalf of an identified individual (c) an organization acquiring the 
certificate and managing the private key on behalf of a group of identified individuals.  
 
Upon requesting a certificate from the Hippocrates Registration Authority, End Users shall: 
 
(1) Present Accurate Information: A subscriber has an obligation to present accurate information to the 
certification authority and the registration authority when the subscriber applies for a certificate. 
 
(2) Check of Certificate Issuance: When a certification authority issues a certificate, the subscriber has an 
obligation to check the descriptive information on the certificate for accuracy and notify the certification authority 
in case of mistakes or oversights. 
 
(3) Protect the Private Key: A subscriber has an obligation to take reasonable precautions to prevent any loss, 
disclosure or unauthorized use of the private key associated with the certificate, including the selection of a 
passphrase having a minimum of 8 characters.  
  
(4) Prompt Revocation/Renewal Procedure: A subscriber has an obligation to take prompt action towards (a) 
certificate revocation in cases where there is a compromise or leakage of the private key (b) certificate renewal in 
cases where the information recorded on a certificate has changed. 
 
(5) Read and Adhere to Hippocrates Agreed Procedures: Furthermore, in the case where the subscriber is an 
organization, it should maintain control and ensure that the use of certificates will not be against the rights of any of 
individual members of the organization.  
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(6) Accept that in the Usage of Public Key Certificates Hippocrates CA’s Liability is Limited According to 
What is Specified in the Certificate Policy. 
 
Upon agreeing to subscribe to a certificate, the End User consents to the formation and conclusion of contracts, 
delivery of notifications and communications in general, by electronic means, with Hippocrates CA for the purposes  
of the digital certification services provided in accordance with appropriate policies and that she/he  is prepared and 
has the capability and equipment to do so. 
 
 
I acknowledge that I have read, understood and accept the terms of this document and I will comply with the 
recommended procedures.  
 
Signature ____________________                                     Date_________ 
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Appendix D 
Web Server Security Requirements 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Since RA users will have the ability to connect and download digital certificates from the 
RA web server or perform other sorts of sensitive data transactions, it is extremely 
important to be able to provide a secure communication link between the user’s web 
browser and RA’s web server. A secure communication link is imperative, in order to 
ensure the identity of the participating entities and the confidentiality of the transmitted 
data. A secure communication link can be established using the SSL protocol. 
 
2.0 The Secure Socket Layers (SSL) Protocol  
 
SSL is a protocol layer which is placed between a reliable connection-oriented network 
layer protocol (TCP) and the application protocol layer (HTTP). SSL provides secure 
communication between the client and server, in three ways: 
 
1. Allows mutual authentication, using certificates. 
2. Allows data integrity check, using digital signatures (message digests). 
3. Allows confidentiality, using data encryption. 
 
The protocol begins with a handshake phase that negotiates an encryption algorithm and 
keys, and authenticates the server to the client. Once the handshake is complete, all data 
traffic between the two end-hosts is encrypted using the keys negotiated during the 
handshake phase. 
 
During server authentication, the client (web browser) obtains a certificate from the 
server (web server) containing the server’s public key. The certificate must be issued by a 
CA listed in the browser’s list of trusted CAs. This allows the client to authenticate the 
server before sending any data to it. 
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During client authentication, the server obtains a certificate from the client containing 
the client’s public key. This certificate must have also been issued by a CA which is 
included in the server’s list of trusted CAs. 
 
2.1 Certificates in SSL Transactions 
 
As stated earlier, the certificate which the client obtains from the server must be issued by 
a CA listed in the browser’s list of trusted CAs. If not, then the client’s browser will 
display a warning dialog box (like the one beside) notifying the user that the certificate is 
not issued by a trusted CA (or other reasons for which the client may choose to refuse the 
certificate). Still, if the system policies allow it, the certificate may be accepted thereby 
allowing the communication to continue.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 5: Security Message Alert received from Windows 2000 Advance Server 
 
3.0 Do We Need Certificates from A Third Party? 
 
It is not necessary to obtain a certificate from a third party, as long as HCA creates its 
own, self-signed certificates to be used for SSL transactions. A drawback of this practice 
is the fact that the client will have to manually accept the certificate (in response to a 
dialog box like the one shown before). Another drawback is that if the client works for an 
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organization, the Information Systems Administrator may configure the system so that it 
does not accept any certificates from non-trusted parties. 
 
3.1 Certificates from Verisign 
 
Verisign provides certificates with 128-bit encryption key and one-year lifetime for $895. 
With two-year lifetime, it costs $1595. 
There is also a cheaper, 40-bit encryption certificate which costs $349 and $598 for one-
year and two-year lifetime respectively but it is not recommended. 
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